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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self–contained papers, which contribute to different strands
of the literature on industrial organization and microeconomic theory. In Chapter 2, I analyze
an incentive problem within a principal–agent employment relationship when the principal
has better information about the job offered to the agent. Chapter 3 examines market out-
comes when consumers are loss averse. It contributes to the literature on behavioral industrial
organization. Chapter 4 studies the allocation of ownership and control rights within indus-
tries and its implication on competition. It links the literature on industrial organization with
the corporate finance literature. The appendix contains the appendices of the papers in which
proofs and tables are presented. References of the papers can be found in the last chapter of
the thesis.
1.1 Informed Principal with Moral Hazard
In Chapter 2, I study the design of employment contracts when an employer (=principal) is
better informed about a job offered to an employee (=agent). I consider how the principal
optimally incentivizes the agent given this information asymmetry by offering information–
specific wage schemes to the agent.
While the optimal design of employment contracts, in which the agent makes an unobservable
effort choice (=moral hazard), is well understood under standard assumptions, much less is
known about optimal contracting if the commonly made assumption of symmetric informa-
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tion about job environment or job difficulty is not met. This is particularly true if the principal
(rather than the agent) holds an informational advantage. However, situations like this can be
frequently observed in reality. For instance, consider new employment contracts after early
resignation or dismissal of professional conductors in an orchestra, coaches at sports teams,
CEOs, or politicians. In such settings principals can access information about the circum-
stances which initiated predecessor’s replacement more easily than external successors and,
therefore, are better informed about the quality of the work environment or the difficulty of the
job. There is also a clear moral hazard problem with respect to successor’s future effort deci-
sion. Furthermore, since replacement decisions are very urgent, principals often do not face
other means than wage offers to convince successors of the high quality of the work environ-
ment although other means as offering time for consideration or talks with other employees to
potential successors could be less costly to the principal if there was no urgency. Finally, a po-
tential external successor receives some information open to the public about the replacement,
namely whether the orchestra or sports team was successful lately before the replacement took
place or not. In my model this kind of public information turns out to be crucial for the optimal
incentive scheme given to the agent.
In the main part of Chapter 2, I first consider contracting under moral hazard but full sym-
metric information as a benchmark case. Here, the agent observes directly whether the work
environment is favorable or not, but agent’s effort choice remains unobservable to the princi-
pal. In the example from above, it can be thought of an internal successor who already knows
whether the current orchestra or sports team is of high or low quality. There arises a trade–off
for the agent between spending high effort for favorable work environments if this increases
the expected wage payment a lot and spending low effort for favorable work environments if
the expected wage payment is already very high relative to unfavorable work environments.
Then, I turn to the setting in which only the principal is informed about the quality of the
work environment. I analyze how a principal with favorable information optimally signals
his information via wage offers to the agent and how this affects the agent’s effort choice.
Surprisingly, I find that in this case contracting can become more efficient with respect to
agent’s effort choice than under full symmetric information. This states a novel efficiency
result and is the main finding of Chapter 2.
At the end of the main part of Chapter 2, I show that the principal with favorable information
prefers to pool with the one with unfavorable information if the probability of facing favorable
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information becomes very high.
1.2 Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss–
Averse Consumers
In Chapter 3, the impact of the behavioral bias “loss aversion” on market outcomes as pric-
ing and advertising levels is analyzed. Here, consumers are considered to be loss averse with
respect to two dimensions—expected purchase prices and expected taste from product char-
acteristics. Loss–averse consumers put a higher weight on losses (in the price or taste dimen-
sion) than on gains of equal size relative to their reference point (=expectation about future
outcomes).
There is a growing literature in behavioral industrial organization that analyzes market out-
comes when consumers show specific behavioral biases as unwareness about product add–
ons, naivety, overconfidence, or loss aversion. As is shown by various field studies and ex-
periments, those behavioral biases play an important role in daily consumer behavior. It is
therefore interesting to ask, under which circumstances firms might want to exploit boundedly
rational consumers and when there might be a need for consumer protection policies.
The existing literature on consumer loss aversion predicts higher prices in markets with hor-
izontally differentiated products when firms do not have knowledge of their rivals’ costs (cf.
the paper by Heidhues and Koszegi (2008)). The model presented in Chapter 3 of this the-
sis considers a similar market environment but allows firms’ costs to be common knowledge
since market participants know each other already. This applies to markets in which costs
are determined by firm size due to scale effects. Moreover, we focus on products for which
price information is more easily accessible than information about product characteristics as
for instance clothing or electronic devices. As a novelty, we highlight that information prior
to the moment of purchase matters if consumers are loss–averse, since product information
plays an important role already at the stage at which loss–averse consumers form expectations
about future transactions (=form their reference point).
We postulate that, to make their consumption choices, loss–averse consumers form their prob-
abilistic reference point based on expected future transactions which are confirmed in equi-
librium. Here, a consumer’s reference point is her probabilistic belief about the relevant con-
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sumption outcome held between the time she first focused on the decision determining the
consumption plan and the moment she actually makes the purchase.
We distinguish between “informed” and “uninformed” customers at the moment consumers
form their reference point. Informed consumers know their ideal taste ex ante and will per-
fectly foresee which product they will buy. Therefore they will not face a loss or gain in
product satisfaction beyond their intrinsic valuation.
Uninformed consumers, by contrast, are uncertain about their ideal product characteristic:
they form expectations about the difference between ideal and actual product characteristic
which will serve as a reference point when evaluating a product along its taste dimension.
They will also face a gain or a loss relative to their expected distributions of purchase price
after learning the taste realization. Since we assume that all consumers become fully informed
before they have to make their purchasing decision, we can isolate the effect of consumer loss
aversion on consumption choices and abstract from the effects of different information at the
moment of purchase.
Our main finding is that loss aversion—or, more precisely, the presence of more ex ante unin-
formed, loss averse consumers—may lead to lower prices which is in stark contrast to the ex-
isting literature on consumer loss aversion. Moreover, the standard result that more informed
consumers (or more consumers without a behavioral bias) lead to lower prices is challenged
in our model when firms are strongly asymmetric (=cost differences between firms are large).
The driving force behind this result is that loss aversion in the price dimension has a pro–
competitive effect while the effect of loss aversion in the taste dimension is anti–competitive.
The pro–competitive effect dominates the anti–competitive effect if the size of loss aversion
in the price dimension becomes sufficiently large. This occurs if the price difference becomes
large, which is caused by strong cost asymmetries. In this situation uninformed consumers are
very reluctant to buy the expensive product and rather accept a large reduction in taste when
buying the low–price product.
We also link this result to firms’ private incentives to disclose information about product char-
acteristics at an early stage, i.e. to firms’ private incentives to advertise. We find that firms
want to advertise in strongly asymmetric markets, while the reverse holds true in rather sym-
metric markets. Moreover, in symmetric markets we predict the need for consumer protection
policy to be highest.
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1.3 Ownership and Control in Differentiated Product Mar-
kets
In Chapter 4, we study the equilibrium allocation of ownership and control rights within hori-
zontal industries and its implication on competition.
Cross ownership arrangements between firms are widespread, particularly in Europe and Japan
(cf. Allen and Gale, 2000). In Chapter 4, we therefore ask how incentives, to undertake (par-
tial) financial investments, depend on market parameters and what the influence of ownership
structures on allocative decisions is. We are also interested in the question whether it can ever
be optimal to acquire cash flow rights without control rights in a competitor although horizon-
tal integration increases profits. Moreover, we study whether a direct financial investment by
an investor can ever be preferable to a financial investment via a firm controlled, but not fully
owned by the investor.
We analyze the equilibrium allocation of ownership and control rights in a static duopoly. Af-
ter acquisitions took place, firms sell a horizontally differentiated product and simultaneously
set prices. Initially, an investor I1 holds a controlling stake in one firm and decides whether to
acquire a stake in the other firm (=target firm) and/or an additional stake in the initially con-
trolled firm. Moreover, the investor can initiate a cross investment of the initially controlled
firm in the target firm to indirectly participate in the target firm’s profits.
The acquisition of shares has two effects. First, the acquisition is associated with cash flow
rights on the target firm’s profits. I1 will internalize their effect by appropriately setting the
initially controlled firm’s price. Second, if I1 acquires enough shares, she gains control in
the target firm as well. She then sets both prices so as to maximize her portfolio return. The
threshold of shares to gain control is assumed to be exogenous. We think of it as being the
lower, the more dispersed the remaining ownership in the firm or, alternatively speaking, the
less shareholders are able to coordinate their votes against decisions favorable to our investor
I1.
Against the standard idea that under no restraint the raider would want to overtake the tar-
get firm, we find that both partial and full acquisitions may arise, and control of the target
firm is not always desirable. In some cases, cross ownership arrangements between firms are
undertaken, whereas in others they are dominated by a direct investment of investor I1.
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Our qualitative results are robust to extensions of the model to more than two firms and settings
in which the investor controls a second instrument as e.g. cost reducing investments, while the
price instrument of a firm is under managerial control.
Chapter 2
Informed Principal with Moral Hazard
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Motivation
New employment contracts, particularly those after early resignation or dismissal of prede-
cessors, show a specific kind of information asymmetry, namely private information on the
principal’s side, which is distinct from the one in standard problems. In such settings princi-
pals can access information about the circumstances which initiated predecessor’s replacement
more easily than external successors and, therefore, are better informed about the quality of
the work environment or the difficulty of the job. Moreover, if concerns about successors’
ability do not arise due to track records, private information on the principal’s side constitutes
the main source of information asymmetry. However, moral hazard with respect to the succes-
sor’s future effort decision is likely to demonstrate a second restriction on efficient contracting
in this context. Finally, since replacement decisions are very urgent, principals often do not
face other means than wage offers to convince successors of the high quality of the work envi-
ronment although other means as offering time for consideration or talks with other employees
to potential successors could be less costly to the principal if there was no urgency.
Models with informed principals and adverse selection have been studied intensively by Maskin
and Tirole (1990, 1992) and others. However, much less is said on informed principal mod-
els in which moral hazard is the main limitation on contracting. In the following I consider
an informed principal model with moral hazard on the agent’s side. Here, only the principal
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knows the project type he offers to an agent who is supposed to exert unobservable effort on
the project. I want to show how the agent’s equilibrium effort decision is altered, if the princi-
pal holds private information about the expected outcome of projects and the principal’s wage
offer is the only means to signal the project type to the agent. Different pairs of project types
are considered and welfare implications are drawn about how contracting is affected by the
degree of complementarity between effort and project type.
I define the degree of complementarity to be high if the good project, whose success probabil-
ity function I assume to have a steeper slope in effort than bad projects in general, additionally
shows a sufficiently low intercept of the success probability function. The degree of comple-
mentarity is low, or equivalently effort and project type are substitutes here, if the intercept of
the good project is much higher than the one of the bad project. A high degree of complemen-
tarity following this definition corresponds to a higher effort elasticity of the good project’s
success probability function. Moreover, the degree of complementarity describes whether it is
easier to motivate the agent to spend high effort levels for good projects than for bad projects.
If the degree of complementarity between effort and project type is particularly high, then
shirking at a good project is relatively unattractive for the agent, while the reverse holds true
for effort and project type being substitutes.
My main finding is that contracting under moral hazard and private information on the prin-
cipal’s side leads to a more efficient effort choice than contracting under moral hazard and
symmetric full information if effort and project type are complements, i.e. if the success
probability function of good projects shows a steeper slope and a not too high intercept. The
reverse holds true for effort and project type being substitutes, i.e. if the success probability
function of good projects shows a steeper slope and a sufficiently higher intercept than bad
projects. In the latter case the additional information asymmetry distorts contracting under
moral hazard even further with respect to effort choice.1 I also identify cutoff levels of slopes
and intercepts for good and bad projects such that effort choice is not altered by the principal
being endowed with private information.
With high complementarities, the principal with the good project separates from the one with
the bad project in equilibrium by increasing the premium above its level with project observ-
ability. This also increases the agent’s effort choice above its level when projects are fully
1This finding is in line with Inderst (2001) who also predicts incremental distortions if moral hazard and
private information on the principal’s side are combined.
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observable ex ante. The intuition behind this main efficiency result is that mimicking a good
project might become less profitable for a principal endowed with a bad project if the wage
contracts for good projects are relatively high–powered, i.e. induce the agent to choose a
relatively high effort level. This requires, however, that high–powered wage contracts are
sufficiently profitable for good projects. This is the case if shirking at a good project is less
attractive for the agent since success probabilities are sufficiently low at zero effort, which
corresponds to effort and project type being complements. Note that the principal with the
good project is not better off here although total efficiency increases. The reason for this is
that preventing the principal with the bad project from mimicking makes the principal with
the good project weakly worse off. Thus, the agent solely obtains the efficiency gain.
This setup applies to new employment contracts for professional conductors, coaches, CEOs,
or politicians after early resignation or dismissal of the predecessor. External successors for
these kinds of jobs clearly face an informational disadvantage since they cannot fully access
what caused these incidents. Were problems purely predecessor–specific or were they also
related to the quality of the orchestra, the sports team, the firm or the difficulty of the mission?
On the other hand, the problem of private information about successor’s ability is mitigated
by the importance of reputation for those kinds of professions. I assume a potential successor
provides sufficient track record. Moreover, moral hazard with respect to the successor’s future
effort decision is a big issue for those jobs. The distinction between effort and project type
being complements or substitutes can be linked to information open to the public about the
replacement. I will focus on the conductor–orchestra example from now on.
For complements consider a situation in which the orchestra attracted less audience lately and
the predecessor was dismissed due to bad performance or quit by herself. In this situation a
successor has to initiate drastic modifications to make the potentially good orchestra successful
again. It can be thought of a higher practice frequency and the rehearsal of different musical
scores. However, spending effort will be less attractive for a new conductor if the orchestra
turns out to be limited in quality of musicians, i.e. being of bad type at least in the short run.
Substitutability between effort and project type occurs if the predecessor resigned early from
her contract due to private reasons or due to an offer from another potentially better orchestra
although the current orchestra performed well lately. Another situation of this kind is dismissal
due to other non–performance related reasons as e.g. political incorrectness of the previous
conductor although the orchestra was successful in the past. In these situations the successor
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can potentially benefit from the preparatory work of the previous conductor if the orchestra
turns out to be of high quality. In a situation in which the predecessor was dismissed due to
rumors between conductor and musicians, the successor might free–ride on musicians return-
ing to their average—possibly high—performance after the replacement occurred. In a bad
orchestra, however, shirking will be relatively less beneficial for the new conductor in all of
these situations.
My main results translate to new employment contracts after early resignation or dismissal in
the following way. If the previous conductor was dismissed due to bad performance (=effort
and project type are complements), I predict more high–powered contracts for external suc-
cessors (=private information on principal’s side) than for internal successors (=symmetric
full information) of similar track record if the orchestra is of high quality. But there is no con-
tractual wage difference between compatible external and internal successors if the orchestra
is of low type. The wage offers from good orchestras are always higher here than the ones
from bad orchestras. Moreover, there is a one–to–one mapping between wage differentials
and differences in effort levels for a specific type of orchestra. In a case in which a conductor
resigned for private reasons (=effort and project type are substitutes), I find the external suc-
cessor’s wage contract to be less high–powered than the internal successor’s wage contract if
the orchestra is of high type. Again, both wage contracts are identical for low quality orches-
tras. But the wage offer for an external successor from a good orchestra can be lower here than
the one from bad orchestra. The same applies even to an internal successor if the free–riding
potential in good orchestras is huge, i.e. if effort and project type are extreme substitutes. The
different results for both cases can be explained by the varying incentives of bad orchestras to
pretend to be of good type. I provide a broader discussion of this in the main part of the paper.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on contracting under moral hazard and asym-
metric information by providing a novel efficiency result: Contracting under less public infor-
mation can increase efficiency with respect to effort choice. I also identify critical conditions
under which this efficiency result vanishes or even is reversed.2 Moreover, I provide a new
application for informed principal models with moral hazard for which signaling of principal’s
type is purely wage–based, namely new employment contracts after early dismissal or resig-
nation of predecessors. This application also allows to distinguish between conditions that are
efficiency–increasing or –decreasing.
2The reversed result was shown by Inderst (2001) in a more specific setting.
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The plan of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, I first introduce the general setting and
then analyze contracting under full symmetric information and under private information on
the principal’s side. In the latter case least–cost separating equilibria and optimal pooling equi-
libria for the high–type principal are derived and compared with the equilibria that arise under
full symmetric information. This delivers the main efficiency result of this paper. Section 2.3
discusses robustness of the main efficiency result and Section 2.4 concludes.
2.1.2 Related Literature
Myerson (1983) analyzes a general informed–principal problem but focuses on the interrela-
tion between different solution concepts. The characterization of equilibrium mechanisms is
limited in his paper. Maskin and Tirole (1992) offer a detailed characterization of equilibrium
contracts in an informed–principal problem with common values but consider problems of
adverse selection rather than moral hazard problems. Beaudry (1994) focuses exclusively on
risk–neutral agents who do not face limited liability constraints. He emphasizes that informed
principals transfer rents to agents in equilibrium to reveal their type. The author relates this
finding to the appearance of efficiency wages. A solution to the moral hazard problem with an
informed principal and discrete effort can be found in Chade and Silvers (2002) who also show
that there may arise a downward distortion of effort in equilibrium. Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas
(2000) introduce an information collection stage by the uninformed party, i.e the agent, before
she decides whether to accept or reject the principal’s wage offer. The principal’s private in-
formation is of private value in this paper. This means that it only contains knowledge about
the agent’s costs of effort. The separation of the good type of principal becomes only possible
by offering an option contract which allows the agent to reject the initial offer after detection
of the bad type of principal.
The paper closest to mine is Inderst (2001) who analyzes an informed principal problem with
moral hazard on the agent’s side in which players are risk–neutral. The principal’s private
information is about project type which positively affects the success probability of the high
outcome. In Inderst (2001) a principal with a good project can separate from one with a bad
project by increasing the share of project revenue he retains after wage payments are made.
Separation is possible because expected revenue is more valuable for projects with the high
success probability than for those with the lower one. However, not participating in the full
revenue of the project destroys the agent’s first–best incentives to exert effort which distorts
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effort for high projects downward in separating equilibrium. To show that equilibrium effort
decision can be altered in either way I need two assumption which differ from those of Inderst
(2001): In my model the agent is protected by limited liability of wages at zero such that
even under symmetric full information about project type a distortion in effort arises due to
moral hazard. Moreover, the specification of expected outcome differs since in my paper the
marginal success probability of effort is not independent of the project type.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 General Setting
Consider a principal–agent moral hazard problem with discrete outcomes and continuous ef-
fort choice by the agent.3 Let the principal privately observe whether the job or project the
agent works on is of good or bad type. I call a “good” project one in which the probability
function of high outcome (=success probability function) is always “steeper” in effort than for
a bad project, while the intercept of the success probability might be weakly lower or higher
than for a bad project.
There are two players, a risk–neutral principal, and a risk–neutral agent who is protected by
limited liability of transfers at zero. This means that wage payments are non–negative. The
agent’s outside option is normalized to zero. The outcome of a project is stochastically de-
pendent on the agent’s effort choice e ∈ [0, e¯], which is non–contractible, and on the project’s
type i ∈ I = {L, H}, which is the principal’s private information. I will henceforth use “project
type” and “principal’s type” as synonyms. Each type of project refers to a technology pa-
rameter θi ∈ {θL, θH} with θH > θL = 0.4 The agent’s prior beliefs about the project type are
described by β = Prob{i = H} with β ∈ (0, 1). The outcome of both project types may take
two realizations y ∈ {0, y¯} with y¯ > 0.5 But projects differ in their probability of high outcome
3For simplicity I focus on a setting with binary outcomes. I will show in Section 2.3 that results carry over to
the continuous–outcome case. Continuous effort choice allows for a proper analysis of efficiency implications of
this model.
4This setup resembles mixed models of moral hazard and adverse selection examined in Laffont and Mar-
timort (2002), Chapter 7. However, in this model the informed rather than the uninformed party proposes the
contract.
5It is shown below that restricting y to zero implies that the limited liability constraint at zero becomes
binding.
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(=success probability) which is a function of agent’s effort level e,
pi(e) ≡ p(θi, e) = Prob{y = y¯|θi, e} with e ∈ [0, e¯] and 0 < pi(e¯) < 1∀i ∈ I. (2.1)
Furthermore, I specify pi(e) to be an affine function of θi represented by the following func-
tional form,
pi(e) =
 pL(e) = rL + sLp(e), if i = L,pH(e) = (rL + ∆rθH) + (sL + ∆sθH)p(e), if i = H, (2.2)
with p(e) ∈ C3, p′(e) > 0, p′′(e) ≤ 0,∀e ∈ [0, e¯], and p(0) = 0. Typical examples for p(e) are
linear and root functions, i.e. p(e) = ex, 0 < x ≤ 1.6 rL and sL depict the intercept and the slope
of the success probability function of the bad project, while rH = rL+∆rθH and sH = sL+∆sθH
represent the counterparts of the good project. θ ∈ [0, θH] describes the transition of intercept
and slope from bad to good projects. Moreover, I assume that rL, sL,∆s > 0 and ∆r ≥ −rL/θH,
i.e. both projects show a strictly positive intercept and a strictly positive slope with the slope
of the good project being always higher than the one of the bad project and its intercept being
either weakly lower or higher than the one of the bad project. This representation allows me
to compare projects whose success probability functions belong to the same functional family
but differ in slope and axis intercept in general terms.7 It follows that pi(e) is element of C3,
strictly increasing and concave in effort, i.e. p′i(e) > 0 and p′′i (e) ≤ 0 ∀e ∈ [0, e¯], and that
pi(0) ≥ 0 ∀i.8 Additionally, the good project shows a higher marginal success probability
of effort and a weakly stronger concavity for any given effort level, so that p′H(e) > p′L(e)
and p′′H(e) ≤ p′′L (e) ∀e ∈ [0, e¯].9 The latter two properties are necessary to obtain a convex
optimization problem in the signaling game. Let c(e) be the agent’s cost of effort function,
which is element of C3, strictly increasing, and strictly convex in effort, i.e. c′(e) > 0 and
c′′(e) > 0 ∀e ∈ [0, e¯] and c(0) = 0 and c′(0) = 0. I will focus on interior solutions in the
6In contrast to Inderst (2001), I do not assume specific functional forms for the success probability function.
7In principle, comparisons of projects of different functional families are compatible with this model but the
general proof of optimality of least–cost separating becomes intractable without specifying explicit functional
forms (cf. Lemma 2.4). In addition, the given specification of pi(e) is a sufficient condition for preserving the
ordering of the effort elasticity of the success probability functions for project L and H at any effort level (cf.
Corollary 2.2.1). This property turns out to be of importance for the main efficiency result of this paper.
8These are the standard properties which together with the assumptions on the agent’s cost of effort function
yield concavity of the principal’s utility function. Continuity of the third derivative of pi(e) I need to solve the
principal’s problem in the separating equilibrium.
9The former property does not rule that total revenue of effort for the good project is lower than for the bad
project for some (low) effort levels.
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following.
By conditioning wage payments on outcome (which is contractible), the principal fully de-
scribes a contract in this setting.10 I denote the principal’s transfer by w(0) = a (=fixed wage)
in case of failure and by w(y¯) = a + b (= fixed wage plus premium) in case of success. Let
w = (a, b) with w ∈ W = R2 state a contract the principal offers to the agent. The agent can
either accept the principal’s offer and exert a non–negative effort level, e, or reject it without
exerting effort. For given output realization y, wage payment w(y), and effort level e the prin-
cipal receives the utility v(w(y), y) = y−w(y) and the agent the utility u(w(y), e) = w(y)− c(e).
For any accepted wage offer w = (a, b) the agent maximizes her expected wage payment minus
her costs of effort over e. This effort decision is dependent on the agent’s conditional belief
µ(i|w) about project type i, where µ maps W into the simplex ∆2. Given my assumption on the
concavity of pi(e) and the strict convexity of c(e) there exists a unique solution to the agents
problem. The first–order necessary condition of the agent’s problem for a given premium b
and beliefs µ(i|w) are as follows,
∑
i∈{L,H}
µ(i|w)p′i(e) · b − c′(e) = 0. (FOCA)
Denote the solution to the agent’s problem by eˆ = e(b, µ(.|w)). The agent’s effort choice is only
indirectly affected by fixed wage a via her beliefs about the project type i. I next incorporate
the underlying moral hazard problem by defining the following indirect utility functions:
• Principal:
Vi(w, µ(i|w)) = pi(eˆ) · (y¯ − b) − a,
• Agent:
Ui(w, µ(i|w)) = pi(eˆ) · b + a − c(eˆ),
where i ∈ {L, H} and µ(i|w) ∈ [0, 1].
I henceforth abbreviate Vi(w, 1) by Vii(w) and Vi(w, 0) by Vi j(w) for all i, j ∈ {L, H}, i , j. I
10Note that in a model with binary outcomes the optimal contract is also binary.
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proceed analogously for the agent’s utility, i.e. Uii(w) ≡ Ui(w, 1) and Ui j(w) ≡ Ui(w, 0).11
Given the structure on pi(e) and c(e), I obtain strict concavity of V and U in b (resp. e).
The timing and the information structure of the game are as follows. At date zero the principal
learns the project type and makes a take–it–or–leave–it wage offer to the agent. The agent
updates her beliefs about the project type conditional on the offered wage contract and then
decides whether to accept the contract or not. If the agent accepts the offer, she chooses the
optimal effort level given her beliefs. Then the outcome is realized and the principal makes
the scheduled wage payment to the agent. If the agent rejects the offer, then zero effort is
chosen and outcome is realized. The agent gets her outside option which is equal to zero
and the principal receives the outcome which can be positive since the success probability
function is strictly positive at zero effort. The solution concept is a Perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium (=PBE). Denote the principal’s strategy by σP, where for each i, σP(.|i) is a
probability distribution over W and the agent’s strategy by σA, where for each w, σA(.|w) is a
probability distribution over the set {0, 1}. Here, 1 represents acceptance by the agent, while 0
represents rejection. Thus, an equilibrium is determined by a vector of strategies and beliefs
σ = (σP, σA, µ).
2.2.2 Observable Project Type
If project type i is observable (=symmetric full information), then the setting reduces to a pure
moral hazard problem. The first–best effort level of project i, eFBi , is determined by
p′i(e)y¯ = c′(e) ∀i ∈ {L, H}. (2.3)
Since the agent is protected by limited liability at zero transfer, the moral hazard problem
generates a distortion even if project type i is observable.12 Applying the implicit function
theorem (=IFT) to (FOCA), the first–order necessary condition of the agent’s problem for
11In this model private information is in common values. This means that the success probabilities enter the
utility functions of both players, the principal and the agent since wage payments are conditioned on outcomes.
12Suppose not, then given risk neutrality of both players agent’s effort choice must be first–best efficient. From
(2.3) it follows that in this case the premium b must be equal to y¯. This corresponds to selling the entire project
to the agent. At this the principal optimally chooses a fixed wage payment a = −(pi(eFBi )y¯ − c(eFBi )) to leave the
agent without rent (= the agent’s individual rationality condition is binding). But since a is strictly negative for
positive NPV projects the limited liability constraint will be binding and a distortion arises.
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µ(i|wi) = 1, I find a positive relationship between effort level e and premium bi
de
dbi
> 0 ∀i. (2.4)
I therefore conclude that an increase in the premium leads to a higher effort level for given
beliefs.
For realized project type i the principal’s problem is expressed by
max
{wi}
pi(eˆ) · (y¯ − bi) − ai (2.5)
s.t.
ai ≥ 0 (LLi)
Uii(wi) ≥ 0 (IRi)
eˆ = arg max
e
pi(e) · bi + ai − c(e). (ICi)
The following lemma shows the optimal effort level of (2.5) for interior solutions.
Lemma 2.1: Suppose project type i is observable. Then the optimal effort level for the princi-
pal’s problem (2.5), e∗i , is specified by
p′i(e)(y¯ − bi(e)) − pi(e)b′i(e) = 0, (2.6)
with bi(e) = c′(e)/p′i(e) and b′i(e) = 1/(de/dbi) from (2.4). Moreover, the principal offers the
contract w∗i = (a∗i , b∗i ) with a∗i = 0 and b∗i = bi(e∗i ).
I henceforth will refer to the moral hazard problem with symmetric full information as the
benchmark case. In my conductor–orchestra example this translates to employment contracts
offered to an internal successor who knows ex ante whether the orchestra is of high or low
quality.
Note that (IRi) is satisfied with strict inequality at e∗i , i.e. the agent receives a positive rent. Fur-
thermore, from (2.6) it can be seen that e∗H > e∗L does not follow directly from the assumption
that p′H(e) > p′L(e) for all e. E.g. for pH(0)−pL(0) = ∆rθH large and p′H(e)−p′L(e) = ∆sθH p′(e)
relatively low for all e (=effort and project type are substitutes) it could be the case that the
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second–best effort level is higher for the bad project. Here, the expected wage payment for
the good project is much larger at higher effort levels than its expected outcome because the
probability of paying the premium is very high and a compensating fixed wage is ruled out by
limited liability at zero. In my conductor–orchestra example this means that if the previous
conductor left a good orchestra e.g. for private reasons, then an internal successor is able to
free–ride a lot on the good performance of the orchestra. She actually free–rides so much that
less incentives will be given to her than to an internal successor in a bad orchestra.
From the derivation of bi(e) it follows that e∗H > e∗L implies b∗H > b∗L. However, the reverse
is not true in general. From p′H(e) > p′L(e) for all e it follows that bH(e) < bL(e) for any e,
this means that inducing a specific effort level requires a lower premium payment for the good
project. This creates incentives to mimic the good project for low–type principals. The next
section deals with unobservable project types and with the incentives to mimic which arise is
this setting.
2.2.3 Unobservable Project Type
Separating Equilibria
If the project type is private information to the principal and a principal with the good project
offers the second–best contract from the previous section, then he might be mimicked by a
principal with the bad project. The reason for this is that being perceived as the principal with
the good project by the agent reduces the required premium per effort level, i.e. bH(e) < bL(e)
∀e feasible. By the same argument mimicking in the opposed direction is never profitable.
However, in some settings it might be too costly for a principal with the good project to
separate from principals with the bad project. This rises the issue of optimality (or existence)
of separating equilibria.
In the following I consider PBE in pure strategies and focus on the least–cost separating con-
tract. The refinement I choose is the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987). If the
principal with the good project (=H–type principal) wants to separate from the principal with
the bad project (=L–type principal), then he can increase the differences between the premia
of the two contracts by adjusting bH or introduce a positive fixed wage for the good project,
aH > 0. The interplay of these two means of mimicking prevention is crucial for the main
efficiency result in Lemma 2.3 and Proposition 2.2.
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To solve for the least–cost separating equilibrium with (wsL,wsH) = ((asL, bsL), (asH, bsH)), I use
the following strategy. I first show that in any separating equilibrium the L–type principal
will offer the second–best contract, i.e. wsL = w∗L = (0, b∗L) (see Lemma 2.2). This is feasible
although the Spence–Mirrlees condition is not generally satisfied in this model. In Lemma
2.3 I then independently derive the unique least–cost separating contract wsH for the H–type
principal subject to the incentive constraint of the L–type principal given wsL = w∗L. Next, it is
shown that the least–cost separating contract is more profitable for H–type principals than the
best non–separation contract (0, b∗HL) for a huge set of parameters (see Lemma 2.4). This step
is non–redundant due to the potential violation of the Spence–Mirrlees condition in this setup.
In Proposition 2.1 I state existence of the least–cost separating equilibrium (wsL,wsH) and
uniqueness under the intuitive criterion. The properties of the the least–cost separating equi-
librium and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium under symmetric full information from
Lemma 2.1 are compared in Proposition 2.2 which delivers the main efficiency result of this
paper. In the subsequent example with linear success probability functions and quadratic costs
I show that the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of a least–cost separating equi-
librium are always met under the assumptions of this model.
I first determine wsL if wsH is such that mimicking the H–type is not profitable for the L–type
principal, i.e. if the L–type incentive constraint is satisfied and potentially binding (=LCS
allocation). The next lemma shows that in this case the L–type principal will always offer the
second–best contract from above, wsL = w∗L = (0, b∗L).
Lemma 2.2: Suppose project type i is unobservable and the separating contract for the H–
type principal wsH is such that the L–type’s incentive constraint is satisfied. Then, wsL = w∗L =
(0, b∗L).
The least–cost separating contract for the H–type wsH can now be derived from the H–type
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principal’s problem given that the incentive constraint for the L–type, (ICPL) is satisfied,
max
{wsH∈W}
pH(eˆ) · (y¯ − bsH) − asH (2.7)
s.t.
asH ≥ 0 (LLH)
UHH(wsH) ≥ 0 (IRH)
eˆ = arg max
e
pH(e) · bsH + asH − c(e). (ICH)
VLH(wsH) ≤ VLL(w∗L). (ICPL)
In Lemma 2.3 the unique least–cost separating contract for the H–type principal’s problem is
derived.
Lemma 2.3 (Least–Cost Separation): Suppose project type i is unobservable. There exists a
unique least–cost separating contract wsH for the H–type principal. The induced effort level
esH, the fixed–wage payment asH, and the premium bsH are characterized as follows
1. if (ICH) and (ICPL) are binding (=interior solution),
esH ∈ {e ∈ [0, e¯] |
(
p′H(e) − p′L(e)
)
(y¯ − bH(e)) −
(
pH(e) − pL(e)
)
b′H(e) = 0},
asH = a˜(esH),
bsH = bH(esH),
2. if (LLH), (ICH), and (ICPL) are binding (=corner solution),
esH ∈ {e ∈ [0, e¯] | maxe VH((0, bH(e))) s.t. pL(e)(y¯ − bH(e)) = VLL(w∗L)},
asH = 0,
bsH = bH(esH),
3. if (ICPL) is trivially satisfied (=trivial solution),
esH = e
∗
H,
asH = 0,
bsH = b∗H,
with bH(e) = c′(e)/p′H(e) and a˜(e) = pL(e)(y¯ − bH(e)) − VLL(w∗L). Moreover, the agent receives
a positive rent.
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Given the generalized specification of pi(e) and c(e), solutions are interior if pH(e) and pL(e)
are sufficiently similar such that |b∗H − b∗LH | is small. This translates to |∆s/∆r − sL/rL| being
sufficiently small.13 Corner solutions in the sense of Lemma 2.3 occur for intermediate values
of |∆s/∆r − sL/rL| for which the distance between b∗H and b∗LH becomes large enough for
pure–premium separation to be optimal. If |∆s/∆r − sL/rL| increases further I receive trivial
solutions in which separation is costless since mimicking is not profitable. With complements
this resembles a parameter setting with ∆r → −rL/θH and rL being positive and large. Here,
the premium of the H–type project is too high for L–type principals although they receive
higher effort levels per premium by misleading agents. With substitutes this is reversed. Here,
L–type principals find the premium for H–type projects too low. Parameters are such that ∆r
is positive and large and rL → 0. In the following I will focus on interior and corner solutions.
From the previous Lemma and Lemma 2.1 it becomes apparent that the relation of the opti-
mal effort levels for good projects under least–cost separation, esH, and under full symmetric
information, e∗H, crucially depends on the properties of the success probability function pi(e)
∀i. This relation will be analyzed more closely in Proposition 2.2.
I next identify conditions for the least–cost separating contract wsH to be optimal for H–type
principals relative to the best non–separating contract (0, b∗HL). This is important since the
Spence–Mirrlees condition is not globally satisfied in this setup. Therefore the H–type prin-
cipal can have an incentive to deviate from the the least–cost separating contract wsH. His best
deviation under pessimistic beliefs by the agent, µ(H|w , wsH) = 0, is given by (0, b∗HL) with
b∗HL = arg maxb VHL((0, b)).14 Deviating becomes more attractive if the zero–effort success
probability for H–type project is much higher than for the L–type project, i.e. ∆r being rel-
atively large. The H–type’s optimal premium is rather low in this case compared to the one
of the L–type although the marginal success probability is higher for the H–type project (cf.
Lemma 2.1 with pH(0) = (rL +∆rθH) being large and pL(0) = rL being small.) Then, reducing
the premium to b∗HL and being perceived as a L–type principal might be less utility decreasing
than paying a positive fixed wage asH > 0 to separate at a higher premium bsH. The following
lemma shows that conditions to rule out such deviations are rather mild.
13Cf. Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.2.1.
14b∗HL = bsH is unproblematic for interior solutions in the sense of Lemma 2.3 since a∗HL = 0 and asH > 0.
For corner solutions separation is always preferred if b∗HL = bsH since the agent chooses a higher effort level for
H–type projects.
2.2. THE MODEL 21
Lemma 2.4 (Optimality of Least–Cost Separation): Suppose project type i is unobservable and
the agent holds pessimistic beliefs with respect to the least–cost separating contract, µ(H|w ,
wsH) = 0. Then the H–type principal weakly prefers the least–cost separating contract wsH to
the optimal non–separating contract (0, b∗HL), i.e. VHH(wsH) ≥ VHL((0, b∗HL)), if the difference in
the zero–effort success probability for the H–type project, ∆r, is weakly lower than the critical
level ∆rc with ∆rc > rL · ∆s/sL.
Moreover, ∆rc ≡ min{∆rc1,∆rc2} with ∆rc1 s.t. b∗HL(∆r) ≥ 0 for ∆r ≤ ∆rc1 and ∆rc2 s.t. (V∗HH −
V∗HL − V∗LH + V∗LL)|∆r ≥ 0 for ∆r ≤ ∆rc2 and V∗i j ≡ Vi j((0, b∗i j)).
For ∆rc1 > ∆r
c
2 there might be true non–optimality of least–cost separation for extremely high
levels of ∆r, while for ∆rc1 ≤ ∆rc2 this is never the case since parameters would have to be such
that second–best solutions (=observable project type) are not interior which is not considered
in this paper. Optimality of least–cost separation, VHH(wsH) ≥ VHL((0, b∗HL)), is necessary and
sufficient for existence of a least–cost separating equilibrium. This condition, however, is hard
to verify without specific functional forms of pi(e) and c(e) because the relevant effort levels
and wage payments are only implicitly determined by Lemma 2.3 and no general single–
crossing property is available in this setup. Before providing a proof of this lemma I transform
the necessary and sufficient condition and derive a sufficient condition for existence.
VHH(wsH) ≥ VHL((0, b∗HL))
VHH((0, bsH)) − asH ≥ VHL((0, b∗HL)) by separability
VHH((0, bsH)) − (VLH((0, bsH)) − VLL((0, b∗L))) ≥ VHL((0, b∗HL)) by Lemma 2.3
VHH((0, bsH)) − VHL((0, b∗HL)) ≥ VLH((0, bsH)) − VLL((0, b∗L)). (2.8)
If the H–type principal sets bsH equal to b∗H, which is obviously suboptimal in general, separa-
tion will be purely fixed–wage based, i.e. asH = VLH((0, b∗H))−VLL((0, b∗L)). Thus, VHH((0, b∗H))−
VHL((0, b∗HL)) ≥ VLH((0, b∗H)) − VLL((0, b∗L)) suffices for existence. I obtain the following
second sufficient condition for existence, since VLH((0, b∗H)) ≤ VLH((0, b∗LH)) with b∗LH =
arg maxbLH>0 VL((0, bLH), µ(H|.) = 1), being the L–type’s hypothetically optimal premium if
L–type principal is perceived as the H–type principal w.p.o.,
VHH((0, b∗H)) − VHL((0, b∗HL)) ≥ VLH((0, b∗LH)) − VLL((0, b∗L)). (2.9)
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It can be seen that this condition compares the optimal contracts for each type i of principal
being perceived as type j w.p.o. by the agent.15 The proof of Lemma 2.4 is presented in the
appendix.
I finally conjecture that even without pi(e) being an affine function of θi there will be optimality
of least–cost separation for pH(0) not too high relative to pL(0). However, this is much harder
to show without using specific functional forms. In a subsequent example I provide evidence
that the necessary and sufficient condition for existence (2.8) is always satisfied under the stan-
dard assumptions of this model if explicit functional forms for pi(e) and c(e) are considered.
This translates into ∆rc1 < ∆rc2 which means that the condition for second–best solutions being
interior is reached at a lower level of ∆r than the condition for least–cost separation being
optimal.
The implementation of the least–cost separating contract is presented next.
Proposition 2.1: Suppose project type i is unobservable and ∆r is weakly lower than ∆rc >
rL · ∆s/sL. Then, there exists an equilibrium σ = (σP, σA, µ) which implements the least–cost
separating contract, i.e. σP(w∗L|L) = 1, σP(wsH |H) = 1, σA(1|w∗L) = 1, σA(1|wsH) = 1, and
µ(H|wsH) = 1. Moreover, any equilibrium that satisfies the intuitive criterion implements the
least–cost separating contract.
I now turn to the comparison of equilibrium properties between the game with private infor-
mation and symmetric full information. The following proposition states the main efficiency
result of this paper, namely that in the game with less public information efficiency can in-
crease for the high–type principal.
Proposition 2.2: Suppose pi(e) and c(e) are such that the incentive constraint of the L–type
principal is not trivially satisfied by w∗H. Then in the game with less prior information, effi-
ciency with respect to the agent’s effort choice increases in the contract of the H–type prin-
cipal, (i.e. the equilibrium effort level esH in the least–cost separating contract wsH is higher
15This condition can be related to supermodularity of Vi j in true type i and perceived type j with i, j ∈ {L, H}.
But supermodularity of Vi j is not sufficient to show that the condition holds true since each Vi j is additionally
maximized over e.
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than the second–best effort level e∗H under symmetric full information), if and only if
ηH(e∗H) > ηL(e∗H). (2.10)
Here, ηi(e) ≡ e · p′i(e)/pi(e) is defined as the effort elasticity of project i’s success probability
function at effort e. The corresponding fixed–wage and premium payments asH and bsH are
given in Lemma 2.3.
The effort elasticity of the success probability function reflects the principal’s trade–off be-
tween a higher marginal success probability, which rises principal’s revenue, and a higher
marginal premium payment if the principal increases the induced effort level at a certain
point.16 If the net effect of this is larger for the H–type principal than for the mimicking L–
type principal at the second–best effort level for good projects e∗H, then the H–type principal
will increase the induced effort level in the least–cost separating contract. This demonstrates
a situation with a high degree of complementarity between effort and project type. For the
conductor–orchestra example this implies that after dismissal of the previous conductor due to
bad performance an external conductor will receive a higher premium from a good orchestra
than an internal or informed successor of similar track record. Thus, the third–best effort level
is higher than the second–best effort level. For a situation with effort and project type being
substitutes I predict the reverse result.
The previous proposition uses a local property of the success probability functions pH(e) and
pL(e). However, it can be shown that the sign of ηH(e)− ηL(e) is constant globally under given
assumptions.
Corollary 2.2.1: For pi(e) = (rL + ∆rθi) + (sL + ∆sθi) · p(e) with p(0) = 0, θL = 0 and
θH > 0 the sign of (ηH(e) − ηL(e)) is constant for all e and θH. It is positive if and only if
∆s/∆r > sL/rL.
This means that for ∆r < rL∆s/sL effort and project type are complements for all effort levels,
while they are substitutes for ∆r ≥ rL∆s/sL. A proof is provided in the appendix.
I next show a closed–form solution of wsH in a parametric example. Consider a success proba-
16Cf. the first–order condition of the H–type principal’s problem in case 1 of Lemma 2.3.
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bility function with p(e) being linear, i.e. pi(e) = (rL+∆rθi)+(sL+∆sθi)·e, and a quadratic cost
of effort function so that c(e) = γ/2 · e2 with γ > 0. Then the least–cost separating contracts
(wsL,wsH) = ((0, b∗L), (asH, bsH)) for both types of principal are described by
b∗L =
1
2
y¯ − γrL
2s2L
,
asH =

sL∆sθH y¯2
4γ −
γ(∆r2s3L−2rL∆r∆ss2L+r2L∆s2(sL+∆sθH ))
4s2L∆s2(sL+∆sθH )
, if only (ICH) and (ICPL) bind
0, otherwise
bsH =

1
2 y¯ −
γ∆r
2∆s(sL+∆sθH) , if (ICH) and (ICPL) bind
˜b, if (LLH), (ICH), and (ICPL ) bind
b∗H = 12 y¯ −
γ(rL+∆rθH)
2(sL+∆sθH )2 , if is (ICPL) trivially satisfied
with
˜b1/2 =
(sL + ∆sθH)y¯s3L − γrLs2L ±
√
s3L∆sθH
(
s3L(sL + ∆sθH)y¯2 − γ2r2L
)
2s3L(sL + ∆sθH)
and ˜b = ˜b1 if ∆s/∆r > sL/rL and ˜b = ˜b2 otherwise. These results are directly derived from
Lemma 2.3. The corresponding effort levels can be determined by esi = bsi · (sL + ∆sθi)/γ,
which directly follows from the first–order condition of the agent’s problem (FOCA).
It can be shown here that (ICPL) is trivially satisfied for rL being very large or ∆r being very
large. Moreover, if (ICPL) is not trivially satisfied, then bsH > b∗H if and only if ∆s/∆r > sL/rL,
which follows directly from Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.2.1. It can also be shown here by
rearranging bsH =
1
2 y¯ −
γ∆r
2∆s(sL+∆sθH) > b
∗
H =
1
2 y¯ −
γ(rL+∆rθH)
2(sL+∆sθH )2 . Furthermore, ˜b1 > b
∗
H and ˜b2 < b∗H
for θH > 0, and ˜b1 = ˜b2 = b∗H for θH → 0.
For the interior solution case of Lemma 2.3, the necessary and sufficient condition for opti-
mality of least–cost separation, VHH(wsH) ≥ VHL((0, b∗HL)), becomes equivalent to
sL∆sθ
2
H
(
sL∆s
2y¯2(sL + ∆sθH) + γ2 (rL∆s − ∆rsL)
2
sL∆sθH
− γ2∆r2
)
≥ 0. (2.11)
It collapses to (sL∆s(sL + θH∆s)(sL + 2θH∆s)y¯2)/θH for ∆r = 0 and to θH sL∆s3y¯2 for ∆r =
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rL · ∆s/sL, both of which are strictly positive. For ∆r > rL · ∆s/sL it can be shown that (2.11)
remains strictly positive if b∗HL(∆r) = 1/2
(
y¯−γ(rL+∆rθH)/((sL+∆sθH)sL)
)
becomes negative,
i.e. least–cost separation is always optimal here (cf. Lemma 2.4).
A similar argument can be made for the corner solution case of Lemma 2.3.
Pooling Equilibria
A disadvantage of the intuitive criterion applied in Proposition 2.1 is that its selection is not
sensitive to the prior distribution of types. This is particularly worrisome if the probability of
H–type projects β is close to one and therefore costly separation is very likely from an ex ante
point of view. In this situation offering a pooling contract can be beneficial for the H–type
principal since for β → 1, his optimal pooling contract approaches the second–best contract
under observable project type that is strictly more profitable than any nontrivial least–cost
separating contract. This is true since nontrivial separation adds another binding constraint to
the H–type principal’s problem.
To allow for optimal pooling equilibria of this kind I depart from the intuitive criterion in
the next proposition. A different selection procedure—namely, lexicographical maximum
selection—is introduced. This concept is borrowed from Inderst (2001) and initiates a weakly
stronger selection than the undefeated equilibrium concept by Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and
Postlewaite (1993).17 The set of lexicographical maximum equilibria is defined by M∗ ≡
ML(MH(Σ)) with Σ being a compact subset of the set of PBE and Mi(Σ) the set of equilibria
maximizing the payoff of type i.
The following proposition shows that for given priors β all equilibria in M∗ implement a unique
allocation. There exists a cutoff level βc ∈ (0, 1) such that all equilibria in M∗ implement the
least–cost separating allocation for β < βc, while for β ≥ βc all equilibria in M∗ implement the
unique optimal pooling allocation for the H–type principal.
Let bP(e| β) depict the premium payment such that the agent exerts effort e for given priors
17In contrast to Mailath’s undefeated equilibrium concept the lexicographical maximum equilibrium concept
selects a unique equilibrium in this game.
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β ∈ [0, 1]. bP(e| β) is derived from the agent’s problem and can be expressed by
bP(e| β) = c
′(e)
Ei[p′i(e)]
=
c′(e)(
βp′H(e) + (1 − β)p′L(e)
) . (2.12)
Let ePO(β) describe the effort level induced in the H–type’s optimal pooling equilibrium which
is determined by the first–order condition of the H–type’s problem given prior beliefs β,
p′H(e)
(
y¯ − bP(e| β)
)
− pH(e)b′P(e| β) = 0, (2.13)
for all β ∈ [0, 1]. ePO(β) ∈ [e∗HL, e∗H] since by construction ePO(0) = e∗HL and ePO(1) = e∗H.
Analogously, the optimal pooling premium for the H–type principal, bPO(β) ≡ bP(ePO(β)| β),
satisfies bPO(β) ∈ [b∗HL, b∗H] with bPO(0) = b∗HL and bPO(1) = b∗H. The following proposition
shows that there always exists a cutoff level for the prior probability of facing a good project β
such that the optimal pooling equilibrium for the H–type principal generates a higher expected
surplus for the H–type principal than the least–cost separating equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3: Suppose project type i is unobservable, ∆r is lower than ∆rc > rL · ∆s/sL,
and the incentive constraint of the L–type principal is not trivially satisfied by w∗H. Then there
exists a unique value βc ∈ (0, 1) such that for β < βc all equilibria σ ∈ M∗ specify the least–
costs separating contract (wsH,w∗L), while for β ≥ βc they specify the optimal pooling contract
of the high–type principal wPO(β) = (0, bPO(β)) with bPO(β) ≡ bP(ePO(β)| β).
The next proposition describes the motion of the effort level induced by the H–type principal
as a function of the prior probability of facing a H–type principal β for the lexicographical
maximum equilibrium.
Proposition 2.4: Consider the lexicographical maximum equilibrium from above. For β < βc
the effort level induced by the H–type principal is constant at a level of esH, while at β = βc
there is a discontinuity in eH:
a.) If ∆r < rL∆s/sL (=effort and project type are complements), then eH jumps downward to
ePO(βc) and for β > βc is strictly increasing up to ePO(1) = e∗H < esH.
b.) If ∆r ≥ rL∆s/sL (=effort and project type are substitutes), then eH jumps downward to
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ePO(βc) for ∆r close to rL∆s/sL and upward to ePO(βc) for∆r much larger than rL∆s/sL.
For β > βc, eH is strictly increasing up to ePO(1) = e∗H > esH.
Analogously, the effort level induced by the L–type principal is constant at e∗L for β < βc and
for β ≥ βc is identical to the effort level induced by the H–type principal. If β ≥ βc, then the
induced effort level is always weakly lower than the second–best effort level for the H–type
principal, which states a negative efficiency result for high levels of β. The induced effort level
can be higher or lower than the second–best effort level for the L–type principal dependent on
the the sign of e∗HL − e∗L. E.g. for extreme substitutes with ∆r being much larger than rL∆s/sL,
it holds that e∗HL < e∗H < e∗L. Here, ePO(β) is lower than e∗L for all β ≥ βc because it always holds
that ePO(β) ≤ e∗H. For the conductor–orchestra example the previous proposition implies that
there shouldn’t arise wage differences for external successors between good or bad orchestras
if the probability of facing a good orchestra is very high after early dismissal or resignation
of a conductor. However, the offered wage premium will be lower than the one for internal
successors in good orchestras.
In the parametric example with linear success probability, bPO(β) is determined by
bPO(β) = 1
2
y¯ − γ(rL + ∆rθH)
2(sL + ∆sθH)(sL + β · ∆sθH) .
The corresponding effort level follows from ePO(β) = bPO(β) · (sL + β · ∆sθH)/γ.
2.3 Discussion
Proposition 2.2 states that if effort and project type are complements, then the principal’s
private information about the project type increases the induced effort level for good projects
above its level under full observability of project type. This rather surprising efficiency result
is very general with respect to the functional form of the success probability function. In fact,
the proof of Proposition 2.2 does not even require the used affine representation of pi(e) in θi.
This representation is only necessary to be able to show optimality of least–cost separation
without using specific functional forms.
The positive efficiency result relies on the assumption that contracting under full symmetric
information is already second–best with respect to effort choice, i.e. the sole moral hazard
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problem between the principal and the agent already generates a distortion of the effort choice
by itself. Such distortions of the effort choice can be caused by limited liability or risk aversion
on the agent’s side. In my setup the positive efficiency result disappears, if the limited liability
constraint is relaxed. To see this more clearly, consider the modified limited liability condition
a ≥ −l with l ≥ 0. (LL′)
For l → ∞, the effort induced by the H–type’s least–cost separating contract esH(l) remains
constant, while his second–best effort level e∗H(l) converges to first–best, i.e. to eFBH with
eFBH > e
s
H(l) ∀l.
Furthermore, the positive efficiency result is robust to an extension to continuous outcome.
This can be shown, for instance, in a setup with CARA utility and normally distributed out-
come following Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994). Here, the agent’s effort choice determines
the mean of the outcome distribution. Let the bad project’s mean of outcome be equal to the
agent’s effort choice, while the good project’s mean of outcome is an affine function of effort
with a positive slope larger than one. Then the positive efficiency result for good projects
can be reproduced under a negative relationship between the intercept and the slope of the
agent’s affine production function, if the degree of the agent’s risk aversion and the variance
of the outcome distribution are sufficiently high. Again, there is a trade–off between marginal
expected revenue of effort and expected revenue at zero effort. Moreover, the distortion that
arises in the pure moral hazard problem must be sufficiently large.
2.4 Conclusion
In this paper I consider a one–shot moral hazard problem between a risk–neutral principal and
a risk–neutral agent protected by limited liability in which the principal holds private informa-
tion that is output–relevant and thus of common value. Surprisingly, this simple combination
of moral hazard and asymmetric information on the principal’s side has not been studied in-
tensively in the literature. I analyze the game by deriving separating equilibria in which the
principal signals his type purely via wage offers to the agent if other means of information dis-
closure are not at hand. The lack of a single crossing property constitutes a special difficulty
of this model. Therefore it is much harder to show optimality of separation under favorable
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information and thus existence of a separating equilibrium. In contrast to the standard prob-
lem with moral hazard and private information on the agent’s side as well as in contrast to
the related informed principal model of Inderst (2001), I find that in certain setups contracting
will become more efficient with respect to agent’s effort choice if output–relevant information
becomes private to the principal. This states a novel efficiency result in which the third–best
effort level dominates the second–best one.18
The intuition behind this result is that in certain setups the principal with favorable information
wants to recoup efficiency relative to the pure moral hazard problem under full symmetric
information to prevent the principal with unfavorable information from mimicking. However,
the effect can be directed in either way depending on the ratio of principal’s marginal expected
revenue to principal’s total expected revenue of effort for both kinds of information. This ratio
can be expressed by the effort elasticity of expected revenue. My prediction is that efficiency
is affected positively through private information on the principal’s side if the effort elasticity
of expected revenue is higher under favorable information. I also provide evidence that this
result is robust to an extension to continuous outcome.
This model applies to new employment contracts after early dismissal or resignation of profes-
sional conductors, coaches, CEOs, or politicians. Here, urgency of replacement often prevents
other means of information disclosure as e.g. offering time for consideration or talks with other
employees to potential successors. Thus, signaling takes place via wage offers. There is also a
clear moral hazard problem with respect to successor’s future effort decision and successor’s
ability is observable due to his track record. Moreover, external successors for these kinds
of jobs clearly face an informational disadvantage, since they cannot fully access whether the
early replacement of the predecessor was also related to the quality of the work environment.
On the other hand, a potential external successor receives some information open to the pub-
lic about the replacement. If e.g. an orchestra performed badly before the dismissal of the
predecessor, then there is no space for free–riding in the new position even if the orchestra is
of high quality. This is reversed, if the orchestra performed well lately before the predecessor
resigned. Thus in the former case, I predict higher premium payments for external successors
(=private information on the principal’s side) than for internal ones of similar track record
(=full symmetric information) and lower premium payments for external successors than for
internal ones in the latter case.
18The first–best effort level is never reached due to limited liability on the agent’s side.
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Chapter 3
Pricing and Information Disclosure in
Markets with Loss–Averse Consumers
3.1 Introduction
Consumer information about price and match value of products is a key ingredient in determin-
ing market outcomes. Previous work has emphasized the role of consumer information at the
moment of purchase.1 If consumers are loss–averse information prior to the moment of pur-
chase matters: Product information plays an important role at the stage at which loss–averse
consumers form expectations about future transactions. Our analysis applies to inspection
goods with the feature that consumers readily observe prices in the market but have to in-
spect products before knowing the match value between product characteristics and consumer
tastes.
Loss–aversion in consumer choice has been widely documented in a variety of laboratory and
field settings starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Loss–averse consumers have to
form expectations about product performance. We postulate that, to make their consumption
choices, loss–averse consumers form their probabilistic reference point based on expected fu-
ture transactions which are confirmed in equilibrium. Here, a consumer’s reference point
is her probabilistic belief about the relevant consumption outcome held between the time
she first focused on the decision determining the consumption plan—i.e., when she heard
about the products, was informed about the prices for the products on offer, and formed her
1See e.g. Varian (1980), Janssen and Moraga-Gonzlez (2004), and Armstrong and Chen (2008).
31
32 CHAPTER 3. PRICING AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
expectations—and the moment she actually makes the purchase.2
We distinguish between “informed” and “uninformed” customers at the moment consumers
form their reference point. Informed consumers know their taste ex ante and will perfectly
foresee their equilibrium utility from product characteristics. Therefore they will not face a
loss or gain in product satisfaction beyond their intrinsic valuation.
Uninformed consumers, by contrast, are uncertain about their ideal product characteristic:
they form expectations about the difference between ideal and actual product characteristic
which will serve as a reference point when evaluating a product along its taste or match value
dimension. They will also face a gain or a loss relative to their expected distributions of price
after learning the taste realization. Since all consumers become fully informed before they
have to make their purchasing decision, we isolate the effect of consumer loss aversion on
consumption choices and abstract from the effects of differential information at the moment
of purchase.3
In this paper, we study the competitive effects of firm asymmetry and consumer loss aversion
in duopoly markets. Consumers are loss–averse with respect to prices and match value and
have rational expectations about equilibrium outcomes to form their reference point, as in
Heidhues and Koszegi (2008). Firms are asymmetric due to deterministic cost differences and
this is common knowledge among the firms when the game starts.4 Firms compete in prices for
differentiated products. Prices are deterministic and possibly asymmetric. Consumers observe
equilibrium prices before forming their reference point. Note that if prices are asymmetric,
uninformed consumers will face either a loss or a gain in the price dimension depending
on which product they buy. Hence, an (ex ante) uninformed consumer’s realized net utility
depends not only on the price of the product she buys but also on the price of the product she
does not buy.
Our theory applies to a number of inspection good industries in which some consumers form
expectations before knowing the match value a particular product offers. Let us provide some
examples. First, prices of clothing and electronic devices are easily accessible (and are often
2For evidence that expectation–based counterfactuals can affect the individual’s reaction to outcomes, see
Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, and Shizgal (2001), Medvec, Madey, and Gilovich (1995), and Mellers,
Schwartz, and Ritov (1999). The general theory of expectation–based reference points and the notion of personal
equilibrium have been developed by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) and Koszegi and Rabin (2007).
3Our model can alternatively be interpreted as one in which consumers know their ideal taste ex ante but are
exposed to uncertainty about product characteristics when they form their reference point.
4In the extension section we show that our analysis also applies to products of different qualities.
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advertised) in advance while, for inexperienced consumers, the match quality between prod-
uct and personal tastes is impossible or difficult to evaluate before actually seeing or touching
the product. A related example is high–end hifi–equipment and, in particular, loudspeak-
ers. Price tags are immediately observed but it may take several visits to the retailers (on
appointment) or even trials at home to figure out the match value of the different products
under consideration—for example, because people differ with respect to the sound they like.
In these markets potential cost differences may arise from size differences of producers and
product–specific costs (or, as we allow in our extension, from different ex ante observable
quality differences). Second, the housing market has the feature that the price is listed (and,
in some countries, not negotiable) whereas the match value is only found out after visiting
the flat. Third, price information on products sold over the internet—for example, CDs of a
particular classical concert—is immediately available, while the match value is often deter-
mined only after listening to some of the material that is provided online. Fourth, competing
services such as long–distance bus rides and flights are differentiated by departure times. Here
consumers are perfectly aware of the product characteristics ex ante—i.e.,price and departure
time—but learn their preference concerning their ideal point of departure only at some later
stage (after forming their probabilistic reference point but before purchase).
Our first main result is that, in asymmetric markets, price variation is increased, relative to the
scenario without loss–averse consumers. This is in stark contrast to the focal price result by
Heidhues and Koszegi (2008).5
Our second main result is that loss aversion—or, more precisely, the presence of more ex ante
uninformed, loss averse consumers—may lead to lower prices. Hence, the standard result
that more informed consumers (or more consumers without a behavioral bias) lead to lower
prices is challenged in our model when firms are strongly asymmetric. The driving force
behind this result is that loss aversion in the price dimension has a pro–competitive effect while
the effect of loss aversion in the taste dimension is anti–competitive.6 The pro–competitive
effect dominates the anti–competitive effect if the size of loss aversion in the price dimension
becomes sufficiently large. This occurs if the price difference is large, which is caused by
5In a related setting to ours, Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) show that consumer loss aversion can explain the
empirical observation that firms often charge the same price in differentiated product markets even if they have
different costs. One of the distinguishing features of our model is that realized costs are public information and
consumers observe prices before forming their reference point.
6Note that this is different from Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) where loss aversion has an anti–competitive
effect in both dimensions.
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strong cost asymmetries. In this situation uninformed consumers are very reluctant to buy
the expensive product and rather accept a large reduction in match value when buying the
low–price product.
This paper contributes to the understanding of the effect of consumer loss aversion in market
environments and is complementary to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008). More broadly, it con-
tributes to the analysis of behavioral biases in market settings, as in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006),
Gabaix and Laibson (2006), and Grubb (forthcoming). An important issue in our paper, as
also in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), is the comparative statics effects in the composition of the
population. However, whereas in their models this composition effect is behavioral in the
sense that the share of consumers with a behavioral bias changes, we do not need to resort to
this interpretation although our analysis is compatible with it: We stress the composition effect
to be informational in the sense that the arrival of information in the consumer population is
changed (while the whole population is subject to the same behavioral bias).
The informational interpretation lends itself naturally to address questions about the effect
of early information disclosure to additional consumers. We analyze information disclosure
policies by firms and public authorities in the context of a behavioral industrial organization
framework. We thus demonstrate the possible use of behavioral models to address policy
questions in industrial organization. As stated above, our model has the feature that, absent
behavioral bias, information disclosure policies are meaningless. Thus the behavioral bias
is essential in our model to address these issues. In particular, we show that private and
social incentives to disclose information early on are not aligned. We also show that the more
efficient and thus larger firm discloses information if firms have conflicting interests.
Our analysis contributes to the literature on the economics of advertising (see Bagwell (2007)
for an excellent survey). It uncovers the role of advertising as consumer expectation man-
agement. Note that at the point of purchase consumers are fully informed so that there is no
role for informative advertising. However, since consumers are loss–averse, educating con-
sumers about their preferences or, alternatively, about product characteristics, makes these
consumers informed in our terminology. Advertising thus can remove the uncertainty con-
sumers face when forming their reference point. This form of advertising can be seen as a
hybrid form of informative and persuasive advertising because it changes preferences at the
point of purchase—this corresponds to the persuasive view of advertising—, albeit due to in-
formation that is received ex ante—this corresponds to the informative view of advertising. It
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also points to the importance of the timing of advertising: for expectation management it is
important to inform consumers early on.
Other marketing activities can also be understood as making consumers informed at the stage
when consumers form their reference point. For instance, test drives for cars or lending out
furniture, stereo equipment, and the like make consumers informed early on. Arguably, in re-
ality uncertainty would otherwise not be fully resolved even at the purchasing stage. However,
to focus our minds, we only consider the role of marketing activities on expectation formation
before purchase. In short, in our model firms may use marketing to manage expectations of
loss–averse consumers at an early stage.7
Our paper can be seen as complementary to the work on consumer search in product markets
(see e.g. Varian (1980), Anderson and Renault (2000), Janssen and Moraga-Gonzlez (2004),
Armstrong and Chen (2008)). Whereas that literature focuses on the effect of differential
information (and consumer search) at the purchasing stage, our paper abstracts from this issue
and focuses on the effect of differential information at the expectation formation stage which
is relevant if consumers are loss aversion.
We will discuss the connections to a number of the above cited contributions in more detail
in the main text. The plan of this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, we present the model.
Here, we have to spend some effort to determine the demand of uninformed consumers. In
Section 3.3, we establish equilibrium uniqueness and equilibrium existence. Our existence
proof requires to bound the parameters of our model, in particular, the two firms cannot be too
asymmetric for equilibrium existence to hold. In Section 3.4, we obtain comparative statics
results. First, we characterize equilibrium under cost symmetry and, secondly, analyze the im-
pact of the degree of asymmetry on equilibrium outcomes. Thirdly and most importantly, we
analyze the effect of changing the share of ex ante informed consumers on market outcomes.
In Section 3.5 we provide two extensions. Section 3.6 concludes.
7For a complementary view see Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cunat (2007).
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Setup
Consider a market with two asymmetric firms, A and B, and a continuum of loss–averse con-
sumers of mass 1. The firms’ asymmetry consists of differences in marginal costs. Here, the
more efficient firm is labeled to be firm A—i.e., cA ≤ cB. Firms are located on a circle of
length 2 with maximum distance, yA = 0, yB = 1. Firms announce prices pA and pB and prod-
uct locations to all consumers. Consumers of mass one are uniformly distributed on the circle
of length 2. A consumer’s location x, x ∈ [0, 2), represents her taste parameter. Her taste is
initially, i.e., before determining her reference point, known only to herself if she belongs to
the set of informed consumers. Note that consumers’ differential information here applies to
the date at which consumers determine their reference point and not to the date of purchase:
at the moment of purchase all consumers are perfectly informed about product characteristics,
prices, and tastes. However, a fraction (1− β) of loss–averse consumers, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, is initially
uninformed about their taste. As will be detailed below, they endogenously determine their
reference point and then, before making their purchasing decision, observe their taste param-
eter (which is private information of each consumer). All consumers have reservation value
v for an ideal variety and have unit demand. Their utility from not buying is −∞ so that the
market is fully covered.
Two remarks about our modeling choice are in order: First, we could alternatively work with
the Hotelling line. Results directly carry over to the Hotelling model in which consumers are
uniformly distributed on the [0, 1]–interval. Second, the circle model allows for an alternative
and equivalent interpretation about the type of information some consumers initially lack: at
the point in time consumers form their reference point distribution, they all know their taste
parameters but only a fraction (1 − β) does not know the location of the high– and the low–
cost firm. These uninformed consumers only know that the two firms are located at maximal
distance and that one is a high– whereas the other is a low–cost firm.
To determine the market demand faced by the two firms, let the informed consumer type
in [0, 1] who is indifferent between buying good A and good B be denoted by xˆin(pA, pB).
Correspondingly, the indifferent uninformed consumer is denoted by xˆun(pA, pB). Since market
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shares on [0, 1] and [1, 2] are symmetric, the firms’ profits are:
πA(pA, pB) = (pA − cA)[β · xˆin(pA, pB) + (1 − β) · xˆun(pA, pB)]
πB(pA, pB) = (pB − cB)[β · (1 − xˆin(pA, pB)) + (1 − β) · (1 − xˆun(pA, pB))].
The timing of events is as follows:
Stage 0.) Marginal costs (cA, cB) realize (and become common knowledge among firms)
Stage 1.) Firms simultaneously set prices (pA, pB)
Stage 2.) All consumers observe prices and
a) informed consumers observe their taste x (for them uncertainty is resolved)
b) uninformed consumers form reference point distribution over purchase price and
match value, as detailed below
Stage 3.) Inspection stage: Entering the shop also uninformed consumers observe their taste x
(uncertainty is resolved for all consumers)
Stage 4.) Purchase stage: Consumers decide which product to buy:
a) informed consumers make rational purchase decision (≡ benchmark case)
b) (ex ante) uninformed consumers compare price and match value (of each product)
with the reference point distribution and choose the most appealing product
At stage 1 we solve for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, where firms foresee that unin-
formed consumers play a personal equilibrium at stage 2b. Personal equilibrium in our context
simply means that consumers hold rational expectation about their final purchasing decision;
for the general formalization see Koszegi and Rabin (2006). Without loss of generality we
consider realizations cA ≤ cB.
3.2.2 Demand of informed consumers
Let us first consider informed consumers. They ex ante observe prices and their taste parame-
ter and therefore do not face any uncertainty when forming their reference point. Hence, their
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behavior is the same as the behavior of unboundedly rational consumers in a classical Salop
model. For prices pA and pB an informed consumer located at x obtains the following indirect
utility from buying product i
ui(x, pi) = v − t|yi − x| − pi,
where t scales the disutility from distance between ideal and actual taste on the circle. The
expression v − t|yi − x| then captures the match value of product i for consumer of type x.
Denote the indifferent (informed) consumer between buying from firm A and B on the first half
of the circle by xˆin ∈ [0, 1] and solve for her location given prices. The informed indifferent
consumer is given by
xˆin(pA, pB) = (t + pB − pA)2t . (3.1)
Symmetrically, a second indifferent (informed) consumer type is located at 2 − xˆin(pA, pB) ∈
[1, 2]. Without loss of generality we focus on demand of consumers between 0 and 1 and
multiply by 2. Cost differences influence the location of indifferent consumers via prices:
If asymmetric costs lead to asymmetric prices in equilibrium, then the indifferent informed
consumer will also be located apart from 1/2 (resp. 3/2), the middle between A and B.8
3.2.3 Demand of uninformed consumers
Uninformed consumers do not know their ideal taste x ex ante. Since they cannot judge which
product they will buy before they inspect products and learn their ideal taste x, they ex ante
face uncertainty about their match value and purchase price (although they know firms’ prices
already). With regard to this uncertainty uninformed consumers form reference point distribu-
tions over match value and purchase price. Following Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) they will
experience gains or losses in equilibrium depending on their realized taste and their purchase
decision. These gains and losses occur in two dimensions, in a taste dimension (as determined
by the fit between idiosyncratic taste and product characteristics) and in a price dimension.
In both dimensions losses are evaluated at a rate λ and gains at a rate 1 with λ > 1. This re-
flects widespread experimental evidence that losses are evaluated more negatively than gains.
8E.g. if there are only informed consumers, xˆin = 1/2 + (cB − cA)/(6t) in equilibrium . This is closer to B for
cB > cA. Thus, the low–cost firm serves a larger market share.
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Three properties of this specification are worthwhile pointing out. First, consumers have gains
or losses not about net utilities but about each product “characteristic”, where price is then
treated as a product characteristic. This is in line with much of the experimental evidence on
the endowment effect; for a discussion see e.g. Koszegi and Rabin (2006). Second, consumers
evaluate gains and losses across products.9 This appears to be a natural property for con-
sumers facing a discrete choice problem: they have to compare the merits of the two products
to each other. In other words, consumers view the purchasing decision with respect to these
two problems as a single decision problem. Third, to reduce the number of parameters, we
assume that the gain/loss parameters are the same across dimensions. This appears to be the
natural benchmark.
While our setting is related to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) (see also Heidhues and Koszegi
(2005) for a related monopoly model) our model has three distinguishing features. First, firms’
deterministic costs are known by their competitor. This property is in line with a large part of
the industrial organization literature on imperfect competition and is approximately satisfied
in markets in which firms are well–informed not only about their own costs but also about
their relative position in the market. Second, prices are already set before consumers form
their reference point.10 This property applies to markets in which consumers are from the
start well–informed about the price distribution they face in the market. This holds in markets
in which firms inform consumers about prices (but consumers are initially uncertain about
the match value and thus their eventual purchasing decision) or in which prices are publicly
posted.11 Third, there is a fraction of (1 − β) of uninformed consumers who face uncertainty
about their ideal taste x and a fraction of β informed consumers who know their ideal taste
ex ante. As motivated in the introduction, various justifications for differential information at
the ex ante stage can be given. Consumers differ by their experience concerning the relevant
product feature. Alternatively, a share of consumers know that they will be subject to a taste
shock between forming their reference point and making their purchasing decision. These
consumers then do not condition their reference point on the ex ante taste parameter, whereas
9Gains and losses also matter in the price dimension because, even though prices are deterministic, they are
different across firms. Hence, a consumer who initially does not know her taste parameter is uncertain at this
point in time about the price at which she will buy.
10This is particularly appropriate in market environments in which price information has been provided from
the outset, while uninformed (or inexperienced) consumers observe the match value only when physically or
virtually inspecting the product.
11Note that in an asymmetric market firms set different prices. Hence, although prices are deterministic, a
consumer who does not know her taste parameter is uncertain about the price she will pay for her preferred
product.
40 CHAPTER 3. PRICING AND INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
those belonging to the remaining share do.
Consider an uninformed consumer who will be located at x after her ideal taste is realized.
Suppose firms set prices pA and pB in equilibrium. Then the uninformed consumer will buy
from firm A if x ∈ [0, xˆun(pA, pB)]∪ [2− xˆun(pA, pB), 2], where xˆun(pA, pB) is the location of the
indifferent (uninformed) consumer we want to characterize. Hence, the uninformed consumer
at x will pay pA in equilibrium with Prob[x < xˆun(pA, pB) ∨ x > 2 − xˆun(pA, pB)] and pB with
Prob[xˆun(pA, pB) < x < 2 − xˆun(pA, pB)]. Since x is uniformly distributed on [0, 2] we obtain
that Prob[x < xˆun(pA, pB)∨ x > 2− xˆun(pA, pB)] = xˆun(pA, pB), i.e., from an ex ante perspective
pA is the relevant price with probability Prob[p = pA] = xˆun. Correspondingly, the purchase at
price pB occurs with probability Prob[p = pB] = 1 − xˆun.
The reference point with respect to the match value is the reservation value v minus the ex-
pected distance between ideal and actual product taste times the taste parameter t. The dis-
tribution of the expected distance is denoted by G(s) = Prob(|x − yσ| ≤ s), where s ∈ [0, 1],
the location of the firm yσ ∈ {0, 1}, and the consumer x’s purchase strategy in equilibrium for
given prices is denoted by σ ∈ {A, B}, σ ∈ arg max j∈{A,B} u j(x, p j, p− j).
Since cA ≤ cB, we restrict attention to the case xˆun ≥ 1/2, i.e., firm A has a weakly larger market
share than firm B also for uninformed consumers. Given that some uninformed consumers will
not buy from their nearest firm, G(s) will be kinked. This kink is determined by the maximum
distance |x − yB| that consumers are willing to accept buying the more expensive product B,
s = 1 − xˆun because s ≤ 1 − xˆun holds for consumers close to either A or B, while s > 1 − xˆun
only holds for the more distant consumers of A. Hence, the distribution of s is
G(s) =

2s if s ∈ [0, 1 − xˆun]
s + (1 − xˆun) if s ∈ (1 − xˆun, xˆun]
1 otherwise.
Note that if the indifferent uninformed consumer is located in the middle between A and B,
xˆun = 1/2, the expected distance between ideal and actual product taste, E[s], is minimized
and equal to 1/4.
Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), after uncertainty is resolved consumers experience a
gain–loss utility: the reference distribution is split up for each dimension at the value of re-
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alization in a loss part with weight λ > 1 and a gain part with weight 1. In the loss part the
realized value is compared to the lower tail of the reference distribution; in the gain part it is
compared to the upper tail of the reference distribution.
Consider the gain–loss utility of an uninformed consumer located at x, at the moment she
decides whether to purchase the product. Recall that at this point she knows her taste parameter
x. The initially uninformed consumer now decides which product to buy taking into account
her intrinsic utility from a product and her gain–loss utility when she compares the price–taste
combination of a product with her two–dimensional reference point distribution.
First, consider the utility of an uninformed consumer from a purchase of product A when this
consumer is located at x ∈ (1 − xˆun, 1].12
uA(x, pA, pB) =(v − tx − pA) − λ · Prob[p = pA](pA − pA) + Prob[p = pB](pB − pA)
− λ · t
∫ x
0
(x − s)dG(s) + t
∫ 1
x
(s − x)dG(s), (3.2)
where the first term is the consumer’s intrinsic utility from product A. The second term is the
loss in the price dimension from not facing a lower price than pA. This term is equal to zero
because pA is the lowest price offered in the market place. The third term is the gain from
not facing higher price than pA, which is positive. The last two terms correspond to the loss
(gain) from not facing a smaller (larger) distance in the taste dimension than x. An uninformed
consumer’s utility from a purchase of product B is derived analogously,
uB(x, pA, pB) = v − t(1 − x) − pB︸               ︷︷               ︸
Intrinsic utility
−λ · Prob[p = pA](pB − pA)︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
Loss from facing a higher p than pA
−λ · t
∫ 1−x
0
((1 − x) − s)dG(s)︸                                 ︷︷                                 ︸
Loss from facing larger distance than 0
+ t
∫ 1
1−x
(s − (1 − x))dG(s)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
Gain from facing smaller distance than 1
(3.3)
This allows us to determine the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer xˆun.
12The indifferent uninformed consumer will be located at x = xˆun, therefore (1− xˆun, 1] is the relevant interval
for determining xˆun.
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Lemma 3.1: Suppose that xˆun ∈ [1/2, 1). Then xˆun is given by
xˆun(∆p) = λ(λ − 1) −
∆p
4t
−
√
∆p2
16t2 −
(λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)∆p +
(λ + 1)2
4(λ − 1)2︸                                        ︷︷                                        ︸
≡S (∆p)
. (3.4)
where ∆p ≡ pB − pA.
The square root, S (∆p), is defined for ∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯] with
∆p¯ ≡ 2t(λ − 1)
(
2(λ + 2) −
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
, (3.5)
which is strictly positive for all λ > 1. It can be shown that for λ ≥ 3 + 2
√
5 ≈ 7.47,
xˆun(∆p) ∈ [1/2, 1] for all ∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯]. Given monotonicity xˆun(∆p¯) expresses the upper
bound on firm A’s demand from uninformed consumers for β = 0. If the degree of loss
aversion is smaller, λ < 3 + 2
√
5, xˆun(∆p¯) rises above one. Hence, we define another upper
bound on the price difference, ∆p˜, with ∆p˜ < ∆p¯ by the solution to xˆun(∆p˜) = 1. We can solve
explicitly,
∆p˜ =
(λ + 3)t
2(λ + 1) . (3.6)
The location of the indifferent uninformed consumer, xˆun, has a number of properties. Clearly,
xˆun(0) = 1/2, i.e. market splits equally under symmetric prices. Another obvious property
is that xˆun(∆p) is equal to the demand of firm A if only a measure zero set of consumers is
informed, i.e. β = 0.
It can be shown that the first derivative of xˆun(∆p) with respect to ∆p, xˆ′un(∆p), is strictly
positive for all ∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯]:
xˆ′un(∆p) = −
1
4t
− 1
2 · S (∆p) ·
(
∆p
8t2 −
(λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
At ∆p = 0 the first derivative of xˆun(∆p) is equal to
xˆ′un(0) = −
1
4t
+
(λ + 2)
2t(λ + 1) .
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xˆ′un(0) is approaching 1/(2t) from below for λ → 1 and 1/(4t) from above for λ → ∞. This
implies that, evaluated at ∆p = 0, demand of uninformed consumers reacts less sensitive
to price changes than demand of uninformed consumers—we return to this property in the
following section. Moreover, xˆun(∆p) is strictly convex for all ∆p ∈ [0,∆p¯].
xˆ′′un(∆p) =
(3 + λ)(5 + 3λ)
64t2 · (S (∆p))3 > 0
Finally, it can be shown that the level of convexity of xˆun(∆p) is strictly increasing in λ.
3.2.4 Demand comparison between informed and uninformed consumers
In this subsection we establish a number of properties when comparing market demand for
uninformed relative to informed consumers, i.e. we compare xˆun(∆p) and xˆin(∆p) with one
another.
The first property is a continuity property. For λ → 1, the indirect utility function of un-
informed consumers differs from the one of informed consumers only by a constant (this
can be called a level effect). Equation (B.3) collapses to a linear equation and we receive
xˆun(∆p) = xˆin(∆p) as a solution in this case. This means that if consumers put equal weights
on gains and losses, the effect of comparing expectations with realized values exactly cancels
out when a choice between two products is made.
The next properties refer to the sensitivity of demand with respect to price. The first derivative
of xˆin(∆p) w.r.t. ∆p is equal to 1/(2t) for all ∆p. Therefore xˆ′in(0) is strictly larger than xˆ′un(0).
This implies that the demand of uninformed consumers, evaluated at equal prices reacts less
sensitive to price changes than the demand of informed consumers.
Evaluated at large price differences, this relationship is possibly reversed: for ∆p → ∆p¯ the
square root, S (∆p), becomes zero and xˆ′un(∆p) rises to infinity. Thus, xˆ′un(∆p¯) > xˆ′in(∆p¯) =
1/(2t). Demand of uninformed consumers, evaluated at a large price difference reacts more
sensitive to an increase in the price difference than the demand of informed consumers. (This
property is satisfied if the indifferent consumer at this price difference is strictly interior; oth-
erwise some more care is needed, as is done in the following section.)
Due to monotonicity of xˆ′un(∆p) and applying the mean value theorem, there exists an inter-
mediate price difference ∆pˆ ∈ [0,∆p¯] such that xˆ′un(∆pˆ) = xˆ′in(∆pˆ) = 1/(2t). This critical price
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The Figure shows the location of the indifferent consumer (= demand of firm A) for in-
formed and uninformed consumers as a function of price difference ∆p for parameter
values of t = 1 and λ = 3: ∆p¯ = 0.8348, ∆p˜ = 3/4 and ∆pˆ = 0.2789.
Figure 3.1: Demand of informed and uninformed consumers
difference can be explicitly calculated as
∆pˆ =
t
(
2
√
2 · (2(λ + 2)) − 3 ·
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
√
2(λ − 1)
,
which is strictly positive for all λ > 1 since ∆pˆ(λ = 1) = 0 and ∆pˆ′(λ) > 0.
Hence, we find that the demand of uninformed (or loss–averse) consumers is less price sen-
sitive than the demand of informed consumers if price differences are small, ∆p < ∆pˆ. The
underlying intuition is that for small price differences loss–averse consumers are harder to
attract by price cuts because their gain from lower prices is outweighed by their loss in the
taste dimension if they change producers. Thus, demand of loss–averse consumers reacts less
sensitive to price in this range. For large price differences, however, their gain from lower
prices starts to dominate their loss in the taste dimension if consumers switch to the cheaper
producer. Therefore loss–averse consumers are more price–sensitive than informed (or clas-
sical Hotelling) consumers for ∆p > ∆pˆ. In section 4 it becomes apparent that this demand
characteristic is a driving force for our comparative static results.
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3.3 Market Equilibrium
In this section we focus on the market equilibrium of the firms’ price–setting game. We derive
market conditions under which equilibrium exists and under which it is unique. We start
by showing some properties of market demand which will be needed later to prove some of
the results. We then give an equilibrium characterization before turning to uniqueness and
existence.
3.3.1 Properties of market demand
For notational convenience we first define an upper bound for the price difference (which
depends on the parameters t and λ):
∆pmax ≡
 ∆p˜, if 1 < λ ≤ λ
c;
∆p¯, if λ > λc.
(3.7)
with λc ≡ 3 + 2
√
5 ≈ 7.47. Note that ∆p˜ ∈ [t · (√5 − 1)/2, t) ≈ [0.618t, t) for 1 < λ ≤ λc and
∆p¯ ∈ (t · 2(√3 − 2), t · (√5 − 1)/2) ≈ (0.536t, 0.618t) for λ > λc. Using results from Section
2.4, we define the upper bound of firm A’s demand of uninformed consumers as13
xˆun(∆pmax) ≡
 xˆun(∆p˜) = 1, if 1 < λ ≤ λ
c
,
xˆun(∆p¯) < 1, if λ > λc.
(3.8)
13 xˆun(∆p¯) = λλ−1 −
2(λ+2)−
√
4(λ+2)2−(λ+1)2
2(λ−1) ∈ (
√
3/2, 1) for λ > λc,
i.e. xˆun(∆p¯) is lower than one for λ > λc. This leads to a jump in demand of uninformed consumers at ∆p¯ from
xˆun(∆p¯) to one (see the definition of qA(∆p; β)), as xˆ′un(∆p¯) → ∞.
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Combining (3.1) and (3.4), we obtain the market demand of firm A as the weighted sum of the
demand by informed and uninformed consumers,
qA(∆p; β) = β · xˆin(∆p) + (1 − β) ·
 xˆun(∆p), if 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆p
max
1, if t ≥ ∆p ≥ ∆pmax
=

1
2 − 14t (1 − 3β)∆p + (1 − β) (λ+1)2(λ−1) − (1 − β)S (∆p), if 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆pmax
β · t+∆p2t + (1 − β), if t ≥ ∆p ≥ ∆pmax
≡
 φ(∆p; β), if 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆p
max
β · t+∆p2t + (1 − β), if t ≥ ∆p ≥ ∆pmax
(3.9)
where
S (∆p) =
√
∆p2
16t2 −
(λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)∆p +
(λ + 1)2
4(λ − 1)2 .
The demand of firm A is a function in the price difference ∆p, which is kinked at ∆pmax and
for ∆pmax = ∆p¯ additionally discontinuous at ∆pmax. It approaches one for ∆p = t.14 Firm
B’s demand is determined analogously by qB(∆p; β) = 1 − qA(∆p; β). In the following we are
interested in interior equilibria in which products are bought by a positive share of uninformed
consumers, i.e. ∆p is lower than ∆pmax.15 We next state properties of φ(∆p; β), the demand of
firm A in this case:16
Lemma 3.2: For 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆pmax, the demand of firm A, qA(∆p; β) = φ(∆p; β) is strictly
increasing and convex in ∆p.
We note that also the third derivative, φ′′′, is greater than zero. However, the derivative of φ
with respect to β can be positive or negative. The first derivative of the demand of A w.r.t. β is
14At ∆p = t firm A serves also all distant informed consumers which are harder to attract than distant unin-
formed consumers because the latter face a loss in the price dimension if buying from the more expensive firm
B. For ∆p > t demand of firm A shows a second kink. This region we ignore since we are interested in cases in
which both firms face a positive demand.
15This corresponds to industries in which firms are not too asymmetric.
16We will use φ as a short–hand notation for φ(∆p; β).
3.3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 47
the difference of the demand of informed and uninformed consumers:
∂φ(∆p; β)
∂β
≡ φβ = xˆin(∆p) − xˆun(∆p) = 34t∆p −
λ + 1
2(λ − 1) + S (∆p) ≷ 0
with φβ = 0 at ∆p = 0 and ∆p = t/2.
This expression is of ambiguous sign, as has been pointed out in the previous section. We also
note that cross derivative of the demand of A w.r.t. ∆p and β,
∂φ′
∂β
≡ φ′β = xˆ′in(∆p) − xˆ′un(∆p) =
3
4t
+
1
2S (∆p) ·
(
∆p
8t2
− (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
,
is of ambiguous sign. This derivative has the boundary behavior that φ′β = 0 at ∆pˆ. and φ′β →
∞ for ∆p = ∆p¯; the latter holds because S (∆p¯) = 0.
3.3.2 Equilibrium characterization
We next turn to the equilibrium characterization. At the first stage firms foresee consumers’
purchase decisions and set prices simultaneously to maximize profits. This yields the follow-
ing first–order conditions:
∂πi
∂pi
= qi + (pi − ci) ∂qi∂pi = 0 ∀i ∈ {A, B}
If the solution has the feature that demand of each group of consumers, informed and unin-
formed, is positive, then first–order conditions can be expressed by
∂πA
∂pA
= φ − (pA − cA)φ′ = 0 (FOCA)
∂πB
∂pB
= (1 − φ) − (pB − cB)φ′ = 0. (FOCB)
In this case concavity of the profit functions would assure that the solution characterizes an
equilibrium.
∂2πA
∂p2A
= −2φ′ + (pA − cA)φ′′ < 0 (S OCA)
∂2πB
∂p2B
= −2φ′ − (pB − cB)φ′′ < 0. (S OCB)
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Given the properties of φ—particularly that φ is strictly increasing and convex for β < 1—
S OCB holds globally, while S OCA is not necessarily satisfied. Using that (pA − cA) = φ/φ′ by
FOCA, S OCA can be expressed as follows
−2(φ′)2 + φφ′′ < 0. (3.10)
It can be shown that (3.10) is satisfied for small ∆p (and λ) while it is violated for ∆p → ∆p¯ as
φ′′ goes faster to infinity in ∆p than (φ′)2.17 This violation reflects that firm A has an increas-
ing interest to non–locally undercut prices to gain the entire demand of uninformed consumers
when ∆p is large. The driving force behind this is that loss aversion in the price dimension
dominates loss aversion in the taste dimension if price differences are large. Moreover, large
losses in the price dimension if buying the expensive product B makes far–distant consumers
of A more willing to opt for product A.
We will discuss the issue of non–interior solutions and non–existence in Proposition 3.2, but
focus next on interior solutions. We denote an equilibrium with prices (p∗A, p∗B) that is deter-
mined by an interior solution as an interior equilibrium.
Lemma 3.3: In an interior equilibrium with equilibrium prices (p∗A, p∗B), the price difference
∆p∗ = p∗B − p∗A satisfies
∆p∗ = ∆c + f (∆p∗; β) ∀β ∈ [0, 1],∆p feasible, (3.11)
with ∆c = cB − cA and f (∆p; β) = (1 − 2φ)/φ′.
Thus, (3.11) implicitly defines the optimal ∆p as a correspondence of ∆c, β, λ, and t.18
3.3.3 Equilibrium uniqueness
In Proposition 3.1 we state conditions under which an interior equilibrium is unique. Given
parameters λ and t, the condition states that the cost asymmetry between firms is not too large.
17This implies that πA is not globally concave. We will show later that it is neither globally quasi–concave.
Moreover, the non–concavity of πA becomes more severe as ∆p (resp. −pa) increases.
18Besides β the latter two parameters affect the functional form of f via φ.
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The Figure shows the equilibrium condition (3.11) at ∆c = ∆p¯ for parameter values
of β = 0, t = 1, and λ = 3: ∆p˜ = 0.75, ∆p¯ = 0.8348.
Figure 3.2: Two potential interior equilibria
Proposition 3.1: An interior equilibrium is unique if
∆c < ∆p¯ =
2t
(λ − 1)
(
2(λ + 2) −
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ + 1)2
)
, (3.12)
where ∆p¯ depicts the critical value of ∆p such that the S (∆p) in xˆun(∆p) is equal to zero.19
3.3.4 Equilibrium existence
The next proposition clarifies the issue of equilibrium existence. It deals with the non–
concavity of firm A’s profit function by determining critical levels for firm A’s incentive to
non–locally undercut prices. Moreover, it is shown that non–interior equilibria fail to exist.
Proposition 3.2: An interior equilibrium with prices (p∗A, p∗B) exists if and only if
19Cf. equation (3.5).
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1. ∆c satisfies
∆c ≤ ∆cnd ≡ max{∆pnd − f (∆pnd; β), 0}, (3.13)
with ∆pnd being implicitly determined by the following non–deviation condition
∆pnd =
{
∆p | ∆p = ∆pmax −
φ ·
(
φ(∆pmax; β) − φ
)
φ′ · φ(∆pmax; β) ,∆p , ∆p
max
}
, (3.14)
where φ(∆pmax; β) = β · xˆin(∆pmax) + (1 − β) ≤ 1,
2. and if ∆pnd < 0, β additionally satisfies
β ≥ βcrit(λ), (3.15)
with βcrit(λ) being an increasing function in λ which is expressed by
βcrit(λ) ≡

0, if λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2];
βcrit0 (λ) ∈ (0, 0.349], if λ ∈ (1 + 2
√
2, λc];
βcrit1 (λ) ∈ (0.349, 0.577), if λ > λc.
(3.16)
Moreover, any equilibrium is interior.
Before turning to the proof, let us comment on this proposition. The result shows that an equi-
librium exists if firm A has no incentive to non–locally undercut prices. In fact, the incentive to
undercut prices increases in more asymmetric industries or for more loss–averse consumers.
For a low degree of loss aversion (1 < λ < 1 + 2√2 ≈ 3.828) equilibrium exists if the cost
difference between firms is not too large (see (3.13)).20 In this case, an equilibrium exists
for all values of β. However, if the degree of loss aversion rises further, equilibria only exist
if there is a sufficiently large share of informed consumers. Such a large share of informed
consumers reduces the undercutting incentive of firm A. The possible non–existence due to
undercutting even holds for symmetric industries. Again, if the share of informed consumers
is sufficiently large, an equilibrium exists; e.g. if 60% (which is greater than 57.7%) of the
20Note that according to experimental work on loss aversion λ takes the value of approximately 3, which is
within this range.
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consumers are informed then an equilibrium exists in symmetric industries for any level of
loss aversion λ > 1.
In the proof we first provide the critical level of ∆c for which the equilibrium condition in
(3.11) is satisfied for potentially interior equilibria. We next identify the set of interior equi-
libria which locally satisfy the S OC’s and which are robust to non–local price deviations of
firm A. Finally, the existence of non–interior equilibria is refuted.
We conclude this section by a numerical example. For λ = 3, t = 1 and β = 0, the following
price differences arise ∆pnd = 0.27889, ∆pta = 0.69532, ∆pmax = ∆p˜ = 3/4, and ∆p¯ =
0.83485.21 Moreover, ∆cnd is equal to (∆pnd − f (∆pnd; 0)) = 0.75963, i.e. an equilibrium
exists for ∆c < 0.75963. Compare table B.1 and B.2 in the appendix with ∆c = 0.25 and 0.75
at β = 0. For non–existence at β = 0 consider Figure 3.2 and B.1 with ∆c = ∆p¯ and 1.
Table 3.1 depicts the critical level of price differences and cost differences for non–deviation
for β ≥ 0 and λ ≥ 3. It can be seen that a sufficiently large share of informed consumers
dampens firm A’s incentive to deviate even if the degree of loss aversion becomes high.22
Table 3.1: Non–deviation condition
The table shows the variation of ∆pnd and ∆cnd in β and λ.
λ = 3 λ = 6 λ = 9
β ∆pnd(β) ∆cnd(β) ∆pnd(β) ∆cnd(β) ∆pnd(β) ∆cnd(β)
1.0 - - - - - -
0.8 0.648337 1.75869 0.372669 1.07069 0.294726 0.857815
0.6 0.543254 1.45317 0.23824 0.686206 0.150303 0.440498
0.4 0.459237 1.22329 0.107415 0.314749 0.000320 0.000959
0.2 0.377489 1.00993 -0.0719496 - -0.229582 -
0.0 0.278889 0.75963 -0.521395 - -1.0704 -
Finally, the critical β for existence of symmetric equilibria (β ≥ βcrit(λ)) is depicted in Figure
3.3.
21Figure B.2 in the appendix depicts the determination of ∆pnd for these parameter values.
22Note that for ∆cnd(β) > ∆p¯ potential second equilibria can arise (=second intersection of ∆p and ∆c +
f (∆p; β), compare Figure 3.2). However, those equilibria can be ruled out by the non–deviation condition since
∆p∗∗ > ∆pnd(β). This means that by combining uniqueness and existence conditions equilibrium uniqueness can
be granted for a broader class of industries.
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The Figure shows the critical amount of informed consumers, βcrit(λ), for which sym-
metric equilibria exist as a function of the degree of loss aversion λ > 1. Parameter
values are ∆c = 0 and t = 1: ∆pnd(∆c = 0, β = βcrit(λ)) = 0. non–deviation for
β ≥ βcrit(λ).
Figure 3.3: Non–deviation for symmetric industries
3.4 Comparative Static Analysis
In this section we focus on comparative static properties of the equilibrium. As a starting
point, we analyze comparative statics properties of symmetric markets, i.e., markets in which
cA = cB. We then investigate the role of cost asymmetries and then turn to the role of the degree
of initial information disclosure (captured by the share of informed consumers) in asymmetric
markets. Finally, we investigate the effect of various demand characteristic on equilibrium
outcomes.
3.4.1 Symmetric Market
In contrast to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) our framework allows us to explicitly solve for
equilibrium markup in our model. The following result characterizes the symmetric equilib-
rium.
Proposition 3.3: For ∆c = 0, any equilibrium is unique and symmetric. Equilibrium prices
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are given by
p∗i = ci +
t
1 − (1−β)2 (λ−1)(λ+1)
, i = A, B. (3.17)
For ∆p∗(β) = 0 loss aversion about prices is irrelevant even for uninformed consumers. In this
situation uninformed consumers exclusively try to avoid losses in the taste dimension. This
reduces the attractiveness of a lower–priced firm and thus the price elasticity of demand. This
can be exploited by the firms the higher the degree of loss aversion and the higher the share
of uninformed consumers. Since firms apply a markup over marginal costs equilibrium profits
are independent of the level of marginal costs.23
Three comparative statics results are immediate.
Corollary 3.3.1: For ∆c = 0 and λ > 1, equilibrium markup is decreasing in the share of
informed consumers β.
This follows directly from differentiating (3.17) with respect to β and means that as the share
of informed consumers increases the firms’ markup decreases. In other words, informed con-
sumers exert a positive externality on uninformed consumers. This prediction is in line with
alternative models from the search literature, where a larger share of consumers who do not
know some products exert a negative externality on those who do. Nevertheless our frame-
work is substantially different since all consumers are fully informed at the moment of pur-
chase. Here, an externality also arises due to uncertainty at the moment consumers form their
reference points. With respect to recent work with behavioral biases, our result is of interest
in the light of claims that better informed consumers are cross–subsidized at the cost of less
informed consumers. This, for instance, holds in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) where only a
fraction of consumers are knowledgeable about their future demand of an “add–on service”,
while other consumers are “naively” unaware of this. This shows that the particular type of
behavioral bias is central to understand the competitive effect of changes in the composition
of the consumer population.
Our first comparative statics result in the symmetric setting implies that firms do not have
23This is a standard property of models with demand aggregated over the two products that is perfectly price
inelastic (more specifically of spatial models with full coverage).
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an incentive to inform consumers at an early stage. However, there is a potential role of
public authorities to inform consumers about their match value at an early point in time so
that all uncertainty is resolved early on. This increases competitive pressure and thus lead
to higher consumer surplus. As we already pointed out in the introduction, it is not required
that public authorities aim at eliminating the behavioral bias directly (and thus to manipulate
consumer preferences) but rather to disclose information at an early stage. This neutralizes the
behavioral bias (but does not change the consumers’ utility function). This insight provides a
novel rational for information disclosure by public authorities due to behavioral biases in the
consumer population.
Secondly, equilibrium markup is increasing in the degree of loss aversion, λ. For λ → 1 firms
receive the standard Hotelling markup of t. Thirdly, equilibrium markup is increasing in the
inverse measure of industry competitiveness, t. For t → 0 firms face full Bertrand compe-
tition and markups converge zero for all levels of loss aversion. This shows that consumer
loss aversion does not affect market outcomes in perfectly competitive environments and our
results rely on the interaction of imperfect competition and behavioral bias. The second and
third comparative statics results are rather obvious but still noteworthy.
Table 3.2: Symmetric Equilibrium: Equilibrium Markups
The table shows the variation of m∗i (∆c = 0, β, λ) ≡ p∗i (∆c = 0, β, λ)− ci
for all i ∈ {A, B} in β and λ.
β λ 1 2 3 3.8284 5 7 9 ∞
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1.03448 1.05263 1.06222 1.07143 1.08108 1.08696 1.11111
0.6 1 1.07143 1.11111 1.1327 1.15385 1.17647 1.19048 1.25
0.4 1 1.11111 1.17647 1.2132 1.25 1.29032 1.31579 -
0.2 1 1.15385 1.25 1.30602 1.36364 - - -
0 1 1.2 1.33333 1.41421 - - - -
Table 3.2 shows the variation of equilibrium markups in the share of informed consumers β
and the degree of loss aversion λ for fully symmetric markets (∆c = 0). We make the following
observations: (1) The highest markup is reached when all consumers are uninformed and the
degree of loss–aversion approaches its critical level for existence in symmetric markets λ = 1+
2
√
2 ≈ 3.82843.24 (2) If the share of informed consumers is sufficiently large (above 57.7%)
24Compare Figure 3.3.
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symmetric equilibria exist for all λ > 1. With such a large share of informed consumers the
equilibrium markup is below its maximum level since the demand of informed consumers is
more elastic and thus dampens the firms’ incentives to set higher prices.
3.4.2 The role of cost asymmetries
In this subsection we take a first look at comparative statics properties of the asymmetric
market. Here we focus on the degree of cost asymmetry, i.e. the level of ∆c = cB − cA.
Proposition 3.4: In equilibrium, the price difference ∆p∗(∆c, β) is an increasing function in
the cost asymmetry between firms ∆c. Moreover, ∆p∗(∆c, β) ≥ 1/3.
This result says that the more pronounced the cost asymmetry the larger the price difference
between high–cost and low–cost firm. This result shows that standard comparative statics
result with respect to cost difference are qualitatively robust to consumers being loss averse.
However, in our model the marginal effect of an increase in cost differences on price variation
is much stronger if some consumers are loss averse. To see this, note that d∆p∗(∆c)/d∆c is
equal to 1/3 for β = 1, i.e. if all consumers are informed. This coincides with the standard
Hotelling case. By contrast, for β < 1 our model predicts exacerbated price variation in
markets with cost asymmetries.
This is in stark contrast to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) who found that price variation is
reduced in markets with loss–averse consumers. This difference arises because in our model
prices are set early and become transparent before consumers form their reference point dis-
tributions. Consumers in our setup therefore incorporate the realized level of price variation
into their reference point distribution instead of forming expectations about the future level of
price variation: they do not form beliefs about firms’ price setting strategy but only about their
own product choice for given observed prices. This product choice is uncertain due to the
uncertainty about ideal tastes. Consumers therefore correctly identify high–price firms before
forming their reference point distributions. This affects firm behavior. They condition their
price–setting behavior on the cost difference since they are informed about own and rival’s
costs. It follows that high–cost firms have less incentives to pool with more efficient firms in
our setup than in Heidhues and Koszegi (2008).
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Let us now look at the individual prices set by the two firms. For comparative statics we use
markups m∗i ≡ p∗i − ci, i ∈ {A, B} instead of prices because markups are net of individual costs
and depend solely on cost differences.25 At the same time we could use individual prices but
focus on changes in rival’s costs only.
First, we observe that the low–cost firm’s markup is increasing or decreasing depending on
the degree of market asymmetries (=cost differences) and the share of uninformed consumers
in the market.
Proposition 3.5: For β < 1 and λ > 1 , the equilibrium markup charged by the low–cost
firm m∗A(∆c) ≡ p∗A(∆c, cA) − cA is either first monotonously increasing and then decreasing
in the cost difference if the share of informed consumers β is high, or always monotonously
decreasing if β is sufficiently low. For β = 1 or λ → 1, m∗A(∆c) is always monotonously
increasing.
In the latter case when all consumers are informed or the behavioral bias vanishes we receive
the standard Hotelling result that the low–cost firm faces a larger markup in more asymmetric
markets.
Note that, for β = 1, dm∗A/d∆c collapses to 1/3. This implies that in the standard Hotelling
world without behavioral biases (β = 1) the markup of the more efficient firm is increasing
in the cost difference. The proposition thus shows that a local increase of the cost difference
may have the reverse effect under consumer loss aversion (β < 1, λ > 1). If the degree of loss
aversion and the share of uninformed consumers are high, firms obtain much higher markups
under symmetric costs than in the standard Hotelling world (compare table 3.2). This leads to
a level effect due to high markups if cost differences increase: Firm A decreases its markup
to gain more consumers already in slightly asymmetric markets. It does so although in these
markets price sensitivity of demand is lower than in the standard Hotelling world due to the
dominating loss in the taste dimension. Here, the effect of a high markup level dominates
the effect of a low price sensitivity of demand. For intermediately and strongly asymmetric
markets firm A decreases its markup even further since in these markets the price sensitivity
of demand becomes even larger than in the standard Hotelling world due to the dominating
loss in the price dimension. Under very large cost differences firm A’s markup might even fall
25This follows directly from firms’ first–order conditions. ∆c affects pi − ci = φ(∆p)/φ′(∆p) via ∆p.
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below its level in the standard Hotelling case (compare Figure 3.4).
Second, we consider the markup of firm B.
Proposition 3.6: The equilibrium markup charged by the high–cost firm m∗B(∆c) ≡ p∗B(∆c, cB)−
cB is always decreasing in the cost difference.
Note that for β = 1, dm∗B/d∆c is equal to −1/3. Thus the qualitative finding that the equi-
librium markup of the high–cost firm is decreasing in the cost difference is preserved under
consumer loss aversion. Due to a level effect of high markups we find that firm B’s markup is
decreasing more strongly than in the standard Hotelling world without behavioral bias. How-
ever, the critical market asymmetry for which its markup drops below its Hotelling level has
to be larger than for firm A. This is presented in Figure 3.4.
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
∆c
m∗A(∆c; β) : solid, m∗B(∆c; β) : dashed; β = 0 vs. 1 : thick vs. thin
The Figure shows the equilibrium markups of firm A and B for markets in which
either all consumers are uninformed (β = 0) or informed (=benchmark case, β = 1) as
a function of cost differences ∆c for parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 3: ∆cnd(β =
0) = 0.75963.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium markup of both firms
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3.4.3 The role of information
In this subsection we focus on comparative statics results with respect to β, the share of initially
informed consumers. These results are relevant to evaluate information disclosure policies by
public authorities and firms. The latter provide new insights into the firms’ advertising and
marketing activities. Our first result concerns the equilibrium price difference.
Proposition 3.7: The equilibrium price difference ∆p∗(β) is decreasing in β.
The above proposition says that prices become more equal as the share of initially informed
consumers increases, or, in other words, that the population average becomes less loss–averse.
Put differently, more loss–averse consumers lead to larger price differences. This is in stark
contrast to one of the main findings in Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) who show in their setting
that consumers loss aversion is a rationale for focal prices compared to a setting without be-
havioral biases in which firms would set different prices (using our terminology they compare
a setting with mass 1 of uninformed consumers, i.e. β = 0, to a setting with mass 0 of un-
informed consumers, which corresponds to a world without behavioral bias). Their message
is that consumer loss aversion tends to lead to the (more) equal prices; our finding says that
consumer loss aversion leads to larger price differences of asymmetric firms.
Let us now look at the individual prices set by the two firms. We first observe that the low–cost
firm’s price is monotone or inverse U–shaped in β depending on the parameter constellation.
Proposition 3.8: The equilibrium price charged by the low–cost firm p∗A(β) may be increas-
ing or decreasing in the share of informed consumers β: p∗A(β) is monotonously increasing,
monotonously decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in β. It tends to be decreasing
for small and increasing for large cost differences.
The critical price difference (which implies the critical cost difference) at which price locally
does not respond to β (c.p. ∆p, i.e. partial effect) can be solved for analytically. The critical
∆p, which is a function of λ and t and is independent of β:
∆pcrit ∂pA/∂β(λ, t) = t
4(3 + 5λ)
(
(9 − (26 − 15λ)λ) +
√
3 · | − 1 + 5λ|
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ − 1)2
)
3.4. COMPARATIVE STATIC ANALYSIS 59
For example, for parameters λ = 3 and t = 1 the critical price difference, at which the price
of the low–cost firm reaches its maximum, satisfies ∆pcrit ∂pA/∂β(3, 1) = 0.2534. It is also
insightful to evaluate the derivative in the limes as β turns to 1. In this case we can also solve
analytically for a critical ∆p at which the total derivative of pA is zero, i.e.
dp∗A(∆p∗(β);β)
dβ = 0:
∆pcrit dpA/dβ(λ, t) = t3(λ(31λ + 42) − 41) −
√
21 · |7 − 11λ| √(λ + 3)(3λ + 5)
2(λ − 3)(9λ − 1) at β = 1
For example, ∆pcrit dpA/dβ(3, 1) = 7/26 = 0.2692 at β = 1. This means that, given parameters
λ = 3 and t = 1, if we observe ∆p∗(1) = A < 0.2692 a small increase in the share of informed
consumers leads to a lower price of the more efficient firm, dpA/dβ < 0 (this confirms our
numerical results in table B.1 and B.2), while for ∆p∗(1) > 0.2692 the opposite holds, i.e.
dpA/dβ > 0. (this confirms our numerical results in B.3).
The previous proposition implies that consumers who end up buying from the low–cost firm
may actually be worse off when additional consumers become informed ex ante. Consider
a change in policy from β to β′ with β′ > β. This parameterizes the market environment.
Some consumers buy from the low–price firm in both market environments. For a sufficiently
large cost asymmetry, the equilibrium price of the low–cost firm is locally increasing for all
environments between β and β′. Hence, all those consumers of the low–cost firm whose ex ante
information is constant across the two market environments are worse off from information
disclosure to a share of β′ − β of consumers. This tends to occur in markets in which the
initial share of informed consumers is small and in which the asymmetry (i.e. cost difference)
between firms is large.
What is the effect on the price of the high–cost firm? Here our result is qualitatively similar:
The price tends to be decreasing in β for small cost differences and increasing for large cost
differences.
Proposition 3.9: In equilibrium, the price of the high–cost firm p∗B(β) may be increasing
or decreasing in the share of informed consumers β: p∗B(β) is monotonously increasing,
monotonously decreasing or first increasing and then decreasing in β. It tends to be decreasing
for small cost differences and increasing for large cost differences.
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We can also solve for critical values at which the comparative statics effect changes sign:
∆pcrit ∂pB/∂β(λ, t) = t
2(λ + 1)(λ + 7)
(
(−23 + (λ − 10)λ) + |5 − λ|
√
(2(λ + 2))2 − (λ − 1)2
)
For instance, ∆pcrit ∂pB/∂β(3, 1) = 0.3201. At β = 1 we can also solve analytically for a critical
∆p at which the total derivative of pB is zero, i.e.
dp∗B(∆p∗(β);β)
dβ = 0:
∆pcrit dpB/dβ(λ, t) =
t
(
3(λ(17λ + 6) − 55) − √15 · |11 − 7λ| √(λ + 3)(3λ + 5)
)
4λ(3λ − 11)
For instance, ∆pcrit dpB/dβ(3, 1) = 1/2 · (5√35 − 29) = 0.2902 at β = 1. This means that for
∆p∗(1) < 0.2902 we expect dpB/dβ < 0 at β = 1 (compare table B.1 and B.2), while for
∆p∗(1) > 0.2902 we expect dpA/dβ > 0 at β = 1 (compare table B.3). Thus, for this set of
parameter values the overall effect of a marginal increase in β can indeed become positive if
price differences (resp. cost asymmetries) become large enough.
Let us distinguish consumer groups by the product they consume. We observe that∆pcrit dpB/dβ(λ, t) >
∆pcrit dpA/dβ(λ, t) ∀λ, t. Hence, for a larger range of cost parameters the price of the high–cost
firm is locally decreasing (compared to the low–cost firm). This implies that, focusing on the
consumers whose ex ante information remains unchanged, there exists an intermediate range
of values of β under which consumers of the low–cost product lose whereas consumers of
the high cost product gain from an increase in β. This means that in such cases additional
information in the population benefits those consumers who purchase the high–cost product.
Since the high–cost product only serves a niche market we may call these consumers niche
consumers. Hence, informed niche consumers are more likely to benefit from an increase in β
than the other informed consumers.26
The above observation helps us to shed some light on information acquisition by consumers.
A particular application are consumer clubs that provide early information on match value to
its members. Whether existing club members have an incentive to attract additional members
depends on the market environment. Our above observation also indicates, that consumer
clubs may be more likely to be formed by niche consumers. We also note that a forward–
looking club may be willing to cope with increasing prices for a while with the understanding
that, as the club further increases in size (reflected by an increase in β) prices will eventually
26The effect on uninformed consumers is ambiguous from an ex ante perspective since they buy the low–cost
and the high–cost product with positive probability.
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fall.
With respect to equilibrium demand our model generates the following predictions.
dqA(∆p∗(β); β)
dβ = β
dxˆin(∆p∗)
d∆p∗ ·
d∆p∗
dβ + xˆin(∆p
∗) + (1 − β)dxˆun(∆p
∗)
d∆p∗ ·
d∆p∗
dβ − xˆun(∆p
∗)
=
∂qA(∆p∗)
∂∆p∗︸     ︷︷     ︸
⊕
· d∆p
∗
dβ︸︷︷︸
⊕
+(xˆin(∆p∗) − xˆun(∆p∗)) ≷ 0,
which is positive for small cost (resp. price) differences and negative for large cost (resp.
price) differences (consider also Figure 3.5). Hence, in rather symmetric markets the demand
of the more efficient firm rises, as the share of informed consumers increases (compare Table
B.1 in the appendix). This implies that with consumer loss aversion (and a positive share of
uninformed consumers) firm A’s equilibrium demand is lower than in the standard Hotelling
case.27 Our result is reversed in strongly asymmetric markets in which the demand of the
more efficient firm decreases in the share of informed consumers (compare Table B.3 in the
appendix).
What about private incentives to disclose information? To address this question we will have
to investigate the effect on profits. Here private information disclosure can be seen as the
firms’ management of consumer expectations (i.e. reference points). Note that in our simple
setting information disclosure by one firm fully discloses the information of both firms since
consumers make the correct inferences from observing the match value for one of the two
products.28
dπA(∆p∗(β), p∗A(β); β)
dβ =
dp∗A(∆p∗; β)
dβ · qA(∆p
∗; β) +
(
p∗A(∆p∗; β) − cA
)
· dqA(∆p
∗; β)
dβ ≶ 0
dπB(∆p∗(β), p∗B(β); β)
dβ =
dp∗B(∆p∗; β)
dβ ·
(
1 − qA(∆p∗; β)
)
−
(
p∗B(∆p∗; β) − cB
)
· dqA(∆p
∗; β)
dβ ≶ 0
27This is qualitatively in line with Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) who predict equal splits of demand between
firms in asymmetric markets.
28This is due to our assumption that firms necessarily locate at distance 1 from each other. It applies to either
the setting in which uninformed consumers do not know their type before forming their reference point or they
do not know the locations of firms in the product space.
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The Figure shows the equilibrium demand of firm A for markets with either many
uninformed consumers (β = 0.2) or only informed consumers (=benchmark case,
β = 1) as a function of cost differences ∆c for parameter values of t = 1 and λ = 3:
∆cnd(β = 0.2) = 1.00993.
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium demand of firm A
It is of interest to compare the size of the price effect to the size of the quantity effect for
different degrees of market asymmetry. Numerical simulations suggest that the price effect
dominates the quantity effect for all λ > 1. Thus, profits closely follow prices. Here, we
confine attention to a single numerical example. The critical value of ∆p such that dπA(.)/dβ =
0 at β = 1 and λ = 3 and t = 1, cA = 0.25, and cB = 1 is ∆p = 0.2581. The critical values of
∆p s.t. dπB(.)/dβ = 0 at the same values as above is ∆p = 0.2870.29 For comparison, we take
a look at table B.2 in the appendix: The critical value at β = 1 is ∆p∗(1) = 0.25. Hence, the
critical values of ∆p at β < 1 are larger than ∆p∗(1). Moreover, ∆pcritB > ∆pcritA .
Our numerical example also suggests that increasing the initial share of ex ante informed con-
sumers first none, then one and then both firms gain from information disclosure. In case of
conflicting interests it is the more efficient firm which locally gains from information disclo-
sure as an expectation management tool.
Our numerical finding has direct implication for the observed advertising strategy of the firm.
29Note that we have problems to obtain an analytical solution as a function of λ and t or cB even for the special
case β = 1.
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Our model predicts that it is rather more efficient firms that advertise product features and
price and run promotions that allow consumers test–drives etc. This means that one should
observe a positive correlation between efficiency level and advertising and marketing activities
of the above mentioned form. We would like to stress that although all consumers will be
fully informed at the moment of purchase, advertising content and price matters for firms if
consumers are loss–averse. Without this behavioral bias it would be irrelevant whether or not
a firm advertises price and characteristics.
How are the different consumer groups doing after an increase of the share of informed con-
sumers? Let us first consider informed consumers. Their change in consumer surplus is sim-
ply a weighted average of price changes. To show this we next derive the aggregate consumer
surplus for informed consumers.
CS in(pA(β), pB(β)) =
∫ xˆin(∆p(β))
0
uA(x, pA(β))dx +
∫ 1
xˆin(∆p(β))
uB(x, pB(β))dx
We thus receive
dCS in
dβ =
∫ xˆin(∆p(β))
0
∂uA(x, pA(β))
∂pA(β)︸           ︷︷           ︸
=−1
·dpAdβ · dx +
∫ 1
xˆin(∆p(β))
∂uB(x, pB(β))
∂pB(β)︸           ︷︷           ︸
=−1
·dpBdβ · dx
= −xˆin(∆p)dpAdβ − (1 − xˆin(∆p))
dpB
dβ ≷ 0.
Consumer surplus of informed consumers may increase or decrease in the share of informed
consumers. The sign of the derivative is determined by the weighted marginal price changes
dpi/dβ of the two products. If the two prices respond in different directions some informed
consumers are better off whereas others are worse off in response to a increase in the share of
informed consumers.
Evaluating the ex ante effect on uninformed consumers is more involved because gains and
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losses relative to their reference point have to be taken into account.
CS un(pA(β), pB(β)) =
( ∫ 1−xˆun(∆p(β))
0
u˜A(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β)))dx
+
∫ xˆun(∆p(β))
1−xˆun(∆p(β))
uA(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β)))dx
)
+
∫ 1
xˆun(∆p(β))
uB(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β)))dx,
where uA(x, .) and uB(x, .) represent uninformed consumers’ gain/loss utility for distant con-
sumers of A and nearby consumers of B derived in (B.1) and (B.2), and
u˜A(x, pA(β), pB(β), xˆun(∆p(β))) =(v − tx − pA) + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA)
− λ · tx2 + t
2
(
(1 − xˆun)2 − 2(1 − x)x + xˆ2un
)
,
which demonstrates the gain/loss utility for nearby uninformed consumers of A. u˜A(x, .) differs
from uA(x, .) only in the taste dimension of the gain/loss utility.
In contrast to intrinsic utility the gain/loss utility also depends on reference point distributions
which require knowledge of all prices and the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer.
Taking derivatives with respect to β we obtain
dCS un
dβ =
∫ xˆun(∆p(β))
0
(
∂uA(x, .)
∂pA
· dpAdβ +
∂uA(x, .)
∂pB
· dpBdβ
)
· dx
+
( ∫ 1−xˆun(∆p(β))
0
(
∂u˜A(x, .)
∂xˆun
· dxˆun(∆p)d∆p ·
d∆p
dβ
)
· dx
+
∫ xˆun(∆p(β))
1−xˆun(∆p(β))
(
∂uA(x, .)
∂xˆun
· dxˆun(∆p)d∆p ·
d∆p
dβ
)
· dx
)
+
∫ 1
xˆun(∆p(β))
(
∂uB(x, .)
∂pA
· dpAdβ +
∂uB(x, .)
∂pB
· dpBdβ +
∂uB(x, .)
∂xˆun
· dxˆun(∆p)d∆p ·
d∆p
dβ
)
· dx.
Beside consumers’ intrinsic utility a price change also affects consumers’ gains/losses with
respect to the price dimension via the varying price difference. A change of the location of
the indifferent uninformed consumer xˆun has an impact on consumers’ gains/losses in both di-
mensions. The taste dimension is affected since an increase of xˆun shifts mass of the reference
point distribution to the upper tail.30 An impact on the price dimension occurs since the prob-
30It can be easily shown that G(s|xˆ′un) first–order stochastically dominates G(s|xˆun) for all xˆ′un > xˆun feasible.
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ability of buying at a specific price depends on the location at which consumers are indifferent
between two products. The equation of dCS un/dβ can be further simplified to
dCS un
dβ = − xˆun ·
dpA
dβ − (1 − xˆun) ·
dpB
dβ
+
(
(λ − 1)xˆun(1 − xˆun) + ∆p (xˆun + λ(1 − xˆun)) · dxˆund∆p
)
· (−d∆pdβ )
− t
(
1
2
(2xˆun − 1)
(
(λ − 1)(2xˆun − 1) + 2
))
· dxˆund∆p · (−
d∆p
dβ ) ≷ 0, (3.18)
where the first line shows marginal effect of β on intrinsic utility (compare CS in). This effect
is positive in markets with small cost differences in which prices decrease in the share of
informed consumers (dpi/dβ < 0) and negative in markets with large cost differences in which
the reverse is true.
In the second line of equation (3.18) the marginal effect of β on the price dimension of con-
sumers’ gain/loss utility is depicted. An increase of the share of informed consumers has
a positive overall impact on CS un. This holds true for two reasons. Firstly, from Proposi-
tion 3.7 we obtain that the price difference is a decreasing function in the share of informed
consumers. It turns out that a lower price difference (=seize of gains and losses in the price
dimension) always reduces the losses for B consumers more in total terms than the gains for
A consumers (consider the first term in second line). Secondly, a downward shift of the loca-
tion of the indifferent uninformed consumer (caused by an reduction of the price difference)
makes uninformed consumers of both firms better off with respect to gains/losses in the price
dimension since the reference point distribution becomes skewed towards gains. This means
that the probability of facing a loss in the price dimension decreases (for B consumers), while
the probability of facing a gain in the price dimension increases (for A consumers).
The third line shows that the marginal effect of β on the match value dimension of consumers’
gain/loss utility is always negative. A downward shift of the location of the indifferent unin-
formed consumer (caused by an increase in β) decreases the probability of large taste differ-
ences (s ∈ (1 − xˆun, xˆun]) keeping the probability of small taste differences (s ∈ [0, 1 − xˆun])
constant.31 Since remaining uninformed consumers of firm B are located on the interval with
small taste differences, they feel the same losses but lower gains. They are clearly worse off
with respect to the the match value dimension of their gain/loss utility. The same holds true
31This argument also relies on the FOSD property of G(s|xˆun).
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for nearby uninformed consumers of firm A. On top of lower gains, more distant consumers
of A experience higher losses due to the downward shifted reference point distribution for the
taste dimension. Thus, the overall effect of β on the taste dimension of consumers’ gain/loss
utility must be negative indeed.
The overall effect of β on CS un is positive in rather symmetric markets since the effect of β on
individual prices pi is negative in these markets (compare CS in and the tables in the appendix).
By the same argument, the effect is negative in more asymmetric markets. Hence, the result
from informed consumers qualitatively carries over to uninformed consumers. The reason for
this that the sign of the effect of β on both dimensions of consumers’ gain/loss utility does not
change in market asymmetries. Moreover, it can be shown that for all λ > 1 and ∆c feasible
the sum of the second and the third line of (3.18) is negative, i.e. the marginal effect of β on
the taste dimension dominates its effect on the price dimension of consumers’ gain/loss utility.
Unfortunately, this does not suffice to predict that the sign of dCS un/dβ is changing for a higher
level of β in intermediately asymmetric markets since the price changes, which determine the
sign change of consumer surplus, are weighted by different means between informed and
uninformed consumers. Table B.2 demonstrates the effect of the weight difference dominates
the negative effect of β on the both dimensions of consumers’ gain loss utility, i.e. the critical
β at which the marginal consumer surplus of uninformed consumers switches sign is lower
than the critical β for informed consumers.
To determine the overall effect of β on aggregate consumer surplus of both consumer groups,
an additional decomposition effect has to be taken into account. This effect reflects the con-
sumer surplus of the group of formerly uninformed consumers which become informed. The
overall effect of β on aggregate consumer surplus is determined by the first derivative of
CS (β) = β · CS in(pA(β), pB(β)) + (1 − β) · CS un(pA(β), pB(β)) with respect to β, which yields
the following expression
dCS
dβ = β ·
dCS in
dβ + CS in + (1 − β) ·
dCS un
dβ −CS un
= β · dCS indβ + (1 − β) ·
dCS un
dβ + (CS in −CS un).
It can be shown that the decomposition effect represented by (CS in − CS un) is always strictly
positive, which is intuitive since the group of uninformed consumers faces a lower average
utility level due to the higher weight on losses than on gains. Although some uninformed
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consumers which receive high match value at low price are better off than their informed
counterparts, the average utility of uninformed consumers is lower due to the losses in the
taste dimension of consumers located apart from the product they purchase and the losses in
the price dimension of B consumers (consider the tables in the appendix). It turns out that the
decomposition effect always dominates the group–specific effect of β on consumer surplus.
This means that the group of consumers who becomes informed is so much better off that its
surplus increase always dominates the surplus change of the remaining uninformed consumers
and the old informed consumers. This holds even in strongly asymmetric markets in which
remaining uninformed and old informed consumers are worse off if the share of informed
consumers increases.
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Relative weight on gain–loss utility
Consider next consumer preferences for which the intrinsic utility is weighted by one, while
the gain–loss utility has a weight of α > 0.32 It could now be asked whether a change of
the relative weight on the gain–loss utility has a different influence on the location of the
indifferent uninformed consumer than a change in the degree of loss aversion λ. The next
proposition shows that this is not the case.
Proposition 3.10: Suppose the utility function of uninformed consumers shows an additional
weight, α > 0, on the gain–loss utility, i.e. all terms except for the intrinsic utility term in
(B.1) (resp. (B.2)) are pre–multiplied by α.
Then, ∀λ′ > 1, α′ > 0 ∃λ > 1 such that
xˆun(∆p; λ, α = 1) = xˆun(∆p; λ′, α′), (3.19)
where xˆun(∆p; λ, α) is the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer given α–extended
preferences. Moreover, λ ≥ λ′ for α′ ≥ 1 and λ < λ′ for α′ < 1.
32For α = 0 we are obviously situated in a standard Salop world.
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The previous proposition points out that for any change of the relative weight on gain–loss
utility apart from one, there is an equivalent change of the degree of loss aversion, λ, which
shows the same sign.
3.5.2 Asymmetric product quality
Our model is easily extended to allow for differences in product quality which are known
to consumers at the beginning of the game. An informed consumer’s utility function is
ui(x, pi) = (vi− pi)− t|yi− x|. We then distinguish between a quality–adjusted price dimension,
which includes easily communicated product characteristics which are of unambiguous value
to consumers and a taste dimension which includes those product characteristics whose value
depends on the consumer type. We define quality–adjusted (or hedonic) prices p˜i = pi − vi,
i ∈ {A, B} for all consumers and consider those to be relevant for consumers’ purchase de-
cision. The main difference arises for uninformed consumers when building their reference
point distribution with respect to prices. Here, only the gain/loss in quality–adjusted prices
∆p˜ = ∆p−∆v matters, ∆v ≡ vB − vA. We label firms such that ∆c−∆v > 0 and call firm A the
more efficient firm. In the following proposition we show that any market with asymmetric
quality is equivalent to a market with symmetric quality and more asymmetric costs.
Proposition 3.11: For any market with asymmetric quality represented by a vector (∆v,∆c)
with∆c−∆v > 0 there exists a market with symmetric quality represented by a vector (∆v′,∆c′)
with ∆v′ = 0, ∆c′ > 0 such that market equilibria of both markets are the same, i.e. ∆p∗−∆v =
∆p′∗. Moreover, ∆c′ = ∆c − ∆v.
As a special case, it can be thought of all asymmetry in the first market being generated by
quality differences. This means that firm A delivers higher quality in a market with symmetric
costs, ∆v < 0 and ∆c = 0. Then, the costs asymmetry in the second market shows the same
size in absolute terms as the quality difference in the first market, ∆c′ = −∆v.
In the proof we show that the optimization problems of the two consumer groups and the firms
are the same in both markets.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the impact of consumer loss aversion on market outcomes in asym-
metric imperfectly competitive markets. Consumer loss aversion only makes a difference
compared to a market in which consumers lack this behavioral bias if they are uncertain about
product characteristics or associated match value at an initial stage where they form expecta-
tions. Early information disclosure can thus be interpreted as expectation management. Such
information disclosure can be achieved through advertising campaigns and promotional ac-
tivities which do not generate additional information at the moment of purchase (at this point
consumers would be informed in any case) but make consumers informed much in advance of
their actual purchasing decision.
We followed Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) and modeled the market as a Salop circle. Our
framework, however, has notable differences to their work: consumers and firms know the
market environment; in particular, they know the actual (asymmetric) cost realizations. Con-
sumers also observe prices from the outset. Our model is enriched by considering a heteroge-
nous population which differs according to their knowledge of their preferences at the initial
point when they form their (probabilistic) reference point. Our model delivers remarkably
different results compared to Heidhues and Koszegi (2008): while they obtained focal pricing
as a consequence of the presence of loss–aversion in the population, we show that the price
difference increases in the share of uninformed loss averse consumers. We also show that
prices and profits decrease if the cost asymmetry is large.
Our results have implications for public policy and firms’ advertising strategies. There are
instances in which consumers would gain from more information whereas both firms would
refrain from early information disclosure, namely when the market is symmetric or moderately
asymmetric. In these markets public information disclosure (which allows consumers to learn
the products’ match values) would enhance consumer surplus. Moreover, our model predicts
that advertising and other marketing instruments that allow for early information disclosure
about match value are more prevalent in markets characterized by large asymmetries between
firms. In these asymmetric markets one or both firms gain from information disclosure be-
cause this leads to higher prices. Whenever firms have conflicting interests with respect to
information disclosure, it is the more efficient firm that discloses information.
We have analyzed industries that are characterized by cost asymmetries. Alternatively, asym-
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metries with respect to observed product quality may be introduced. Since there is a one–to–
one relationship between these two models our insights are directly applicable to a model in
which firms differ in observed product quality.
Chapter 4
Ownership and Control in Differentiated
Product Markets
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Motivation
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium allocation of ownership and control rights in a simple
static economy consisting of two competing firms, A and B. Initially, an investor I1 holds a
controlling stake in A and decides whether to acquire a stake in B and/or an additional stake
in A. Moreover, he can initiate a cross investment of A in B to indirectly participate in B’s
profits.
The acquisition of shares has two effects. First, the acquisition is associated with cash flow
rights on firm B’s profits. I1 will internalize their effect by appropriately setting firm A’s price.
Second, if I1 acquires enough shares, she gains control in B as well. She then sets both prices
so as to maximize her portfolio return. The threshold of shares to gain control is assumed to
be exogenous. We think of it as being the lower, the more dispersed the remaining ownership
in the firm or, alternatively speaking, the less shareholders are able in coordinating their votes
against decisions favorable to our investor I1.
As to the initial ownership structure we consider two polar cases in each firm, i.e. four cases
in total. In the first two cases, initial ownership of the shares in B is dispersed, but the shares in
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A net of I1’s stake are either owned by a single investor, or ownership is dispersed as well. In
both cases, initial owners in B can free–ride on the increased value of B that may result from
an acquisition of shares directly by I1 or indirectly via firm A, so that I1 will profit only from
the increased value of her stake in A. This value is negatively related to the level of her direct
and indirect investment in B. In equilibrium, she therefore acquires only a minimal controlling
stake in B. If I1 is not able to acquire all of A’s shares, her payoff is maximized if that stake is
acquired via a cross investment of firm A in firm B. This constitutes an important leverage in
our model.
In the remaining two cases, firm B is initially owned by a large investor. If the remaining
ownership in A is dispersed, the remaining owners of A can again free–ride on the benefits of
control over both firms. We show that in this case, a cross ownership arrangement is never
optimal for I1 unless she initially owns all of A. She instead prefers to directly acquire all of
firm B’s cash flow rights and to set both prices as to maximize a weighted sum of profits, with
the weight on B’s profit higher than the weight on A ’s profit. This is so because when buying
out a blockholder, I1 can benefit from acquiring B at a low price and absorbing all benefits of
control herself. In the last case, both the remaining ownership in A and ownership in B are
concentrated. Again, I1 will acquire a controlling stake in B as well. She then sets both prices
as to maximize the joint profits of both firms, which results in monopoly prices.
In this paper we aim at analyzing the interplay between investment decisions, the attainment
of control over two competing firms and product market outcomes. Clear limitations of our
model are that (i) it is static, (ii) debt finance is not modeled (Jensen, 1989), and that (iii) we
abstract from agency costs (Manne, 1965; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny,
1997) and other benefits of control such as efficiency gains. These are important aspects which
we leave for future research.
Nevertheless, we are able to make predictions over and above the ones that can be obtained
in models with passive investments in, or controlling takeovers of rivals, as well as in models
with homogeneous product markets. Most importantly, we are able to relate the evolution of
ownership and control structures to initial conditions and properties of the relevant product
market.
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4.1.2 Related Literature
We are aware of only one paper, Charlty-Lepers, Fagart, and Souam (2002), that studies ac-
quisition decisions in a similar context. Their work differs from ours in at least two important
ways. First, they don’t consider the possibility that the investor might want to adjust her in-
vestment in the firm already controlled by her. Second, they consider a Cournot industry with
homogeneous goods. As suggested by Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), in such an in-
dustry, the acquisition of a controlling stake always goes along with a lower aggregate profit
of both firms. Therefore, after the acquisition took place, the investor will always shut down
the firm in which her investment is smaller.1 Similar conclusions arise in the case of Bertrand
competition in homogeneous product markets, where in the case of a take over it is optimal to
shut down one of the two firms.
Within the context of pure mergers much simpler than the one considered by us, Salant,
Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) find that in a Cournot model, the joint profits of two merg-
ing parties decrease due to the merger, yet Deneckere and Davidson (1985) show that they
increase if the two firms engage in price competition in a market with differentiated products.
Similarly, Flath (1991) shows that if stock markets are efficient in the sense that share prices
reflect post–share trading product market equilibria, acquiring shares in rivals is not rational
in Cournot industries, but can be so in Bertrand duopolies. This is related to an article by Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1984) who find that only those investments are made that yield toughness.
This is not the case in Cournot models where quantities are strategic substitutes but in models
where prices are strategic complements.
At any rate, we wish to make use of the fact that under price competition there is an incentive to
invest in rivals even if the investment incentive is only related to cash flows. Such investment
is observed in many industries (Gilo, 2000).
There is a sizeable literature on the competitive effect of passive investments in rivals in a
static context. In general, competition is reduced (Reynolds and Snapp, 1986; Bolle and Gth,
1992; Flath, 1992; Reitman, 1994; Dietzenbacher, Smid, and Volkerink, 2000). O’Brien and
Salop (2000) distinguish in addition several control scenarios and derive comparative static
results in a Cournot framework. However, they do not model the acquisition stage.
1In related work, Schwartz and Thompson (1986) and Baye, Crocker, and Ju (1996) show that firms have
an incentive to divisionalize, keeping two firms and letting each of them maximize their own profit. This can,
however, give rise to a commitment problem because both managers still belong to the same firm.
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In their empirical work, Dorofeenko, Lang, Ritzberger, and Shorish (2005) assume that there
is a controlling group of shareholders in each company. They then use German data to identify
control scenarios consistent with the observed ownership structure.
In a dynamic context, Malueg (1992) and Gilo, Moshe, and Spiegel (2006) examine the effects
of exogenously given passive investments in rivals on the incentives of firms to engage in tacit
collusion. The effect is ambiguous in Cournot industries because, relative to the case without
cross holdings, competitors act less aggressively if collusion breaks down. In contrast, when
price competition takes place, under general conditions, collusion is facilitated.
There are also important links to the literature in corporate finance. In particular, for the case
of initially dispersed ownership in firm B, our findings are related to the free–rider effect that
is studied in Grossman and Hart (1980), namely that in the case of dispersed ownership the
value of the firm after the acquisition of shares determines the acquisition price. In our model,
the firm value is a function of control and ownership arrangements. In that, our paper is related
to Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998). They argue that bidders cannot commit ex ante not to
extract private benefits ex post. Therefore, the more shares they buy, the higher the acquisition
price. Consequently, the investor acquires as few shares as necessary to gain control, either by
directly investing in firm B or by initiating a cross holding of A in B, thereby maximizing ex
post moral hazard.
For the case in which the shares of firm B are initially held by a large block holder, our
results are related to pivotal shareholder models of takeovers Bagnoli and Lipman (1988);
Bebchuk (1989); Holmstrom and Nalebuff (1992). As such block holders cannot free–ride on
the benefits of a takeover, such a takeover will always occur in our model and is then used to
fleece consumers.
Our paper is furthermore related to the literature which deals with the separation between
ownership and control. Such a separation occurs in a number of countries including Germany
(La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) which results from a high concentra-
tion of cash flow rights (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Franks and Mayer,
2000; Faccioa and Lang, 2002).
Finally, there is a literature on alternative uses of cross holdings.2 First, cross holdings can
be used as a monitoring device when banks provide debt. By investing in the lender, banks
2See Becht and Boehmer (2001, 2003) for descriptive evidence. Streek and Ho¨pner (2003) is a collection of
case studies concerned with the recent development of the “Deutschland AG”.
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become represented in the supervisory board of the firm which is the main monitoring insti-
tution within the firm (Bo¨hm, 1992). Second, cross ownership arrangements could be used
as a means against takeovers (Hellwig, 2000). For instance, a ring structure could be used
by a group of firms to prevent outsiders from buying a controlling stake in each of the inside
firms. Third, a pyramidal structure could be built. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005) argue that
firms can thereby acquire new firms without external funding. Riyanto and Toolsema (2004)
present a formal model in which controlling shareholders can shift resources from one firm
into another. Then, so–called tunneling within pyramidal ownership structures can be used to
save the receiving firm from bankruptcy.3
4.2 The Model
Consider an industry involving two firms i ∈ {A, B} selling differentiated products that are
substitutes to each other. Their reduced form payoffs πi(pA, pB), i = A, B are supposed to be
twice differentiable. In addition, the payoffs are supposed to satisfy the following assumptions:
(i) πA(x, y) = πB(y, x)∀x, y ≥ c,
(ii) ∂πi
∂p j
≥ 0,
∣∣∣∣ ∂πi∂pi ∣∣∣∣ ≥ ∂πi∂p j ,
(iii) ∂2πi
∂p2i
< 0, ∂
2πi
∂p2j
≤ 0,
(iv) ∂2πi
∂pi∂p j
> 0,
∣∣∣∣∂2πi∂p2i
∣∣∣∣ > ∂2πi∂pi∂p j , i, j = A, B, j , i.
Assumption (i) ensures complete symmetry between the two firms, which allows us to con-
centrate on the effects of ownership arrangements on allocative decisions. The first part of
Assumption (ii) is standard. The second part of Assumption (ii) limits the cross price effect
by the own price effect on profits. The first part of Assumption (iii) is also standard. The sec-
ond part of Assumption (iii) is needed to satisfy the second order conditions for optimization
in the interactive situation considered here. Finally the first part of Assumption (iv) is again
standard. Its second part states that the effect of a change in its own price pi on the marginal
profits of firm i is stronger than the effect of a price change in the competing firm.
3See also Chapelle and Szafarz (2005) who develop a model for measuring integrated ownership and
threshold–based control.
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In our acquisition subgame specified later, we consider only one active agent named investor
I1. Initially, that investor controls firm A with an initial stake αA = α0A ∈ (0, 1] of its cash flow
rights. Neither investor I1 nor firm A hold stakes in firm B.
Firm B is assumed to be either owned by a unit mass of atomless investors, or owned (and
controlled) by another large investor I2. To simplify matters, neither investor I2 nor firm B are
initially invested nor will invest in firm A.
Investor I1 can either directly acquire a stake αB in firm B, or, by virtue of controlling firm A,
induce it to acquire a stake γ in firm B. Investor I1’s indirect acquisition in B is then of size
α0Aγ. Naturally, all magnitudes involved here as well as αB + γ take values in the unit interval.
If a firm is owned by dispersed shareholders, we assume its management to maximize its profit
by controlling its price. By contrast, if controlling shares of that firm are owned by a block
holder, she decides about the direct or the indirect acquisition of stakes in both firms, and if
controlling a firm sets its product price, taking into account her interests in both firms. In
particular, I1 is supposed to control firm B if she acquires at least a fraction αˆB of firm B’s
shares. 4 She can do so by directly buying sufficiently many shares herself, or by indirectly
initiating a cross holding of firm A in firm B, or a convex combination thereof. Her financial
interest in B is denoted by α˜B ≡ αB + αAγ, where αA denotes the quantity of shares she
ultimately acquires in firm A. However, since I1 has a controlling interest already in firm A, I1
controls B if αB + γ ≥ αˆB, i.e. even if α˜B < αˆB
The cases involving firm ownership patterns considered here are collected in the following
table.
Shares of B dispersed Shares of B concentrated
Remaining shares of A dispersed 1 3
Remaining shares of A concentrated 2 4
The time structure in our model is as follows.
1. Investment: I1 decides whether or not to buy additional stakes αA − α0A in firm A, and
4A natural sufficient condition for control is that she owns more than 50 per cent of the shares. We have
conducted field studies suggesting that the percentage of shares sufficient for control tends to be much smaller.
In general, the controlling stake size depends on the distribution of a firm’s ownership. If it is dispersed, then a
much smaller percentage (sometimes as small as 5 per cent) is sufficient for control.
4.3. PRODUCT MARKET STAGE 77
non–controlling or controlling direct stakes αB, or indirect stakes γ via firm A, in firm
B, respectively.
2. Pricing: If αB + γ < αˆB so that I1 does not control B, then she sets pA so as to maximize
αAπA(pA, pB) + α˜BπB(pA, pB) for given pB . In turn, firm B’s management or controlling
owner sets price pB so as to maximize πB(pA, pB).
If I1 does control B, i.e. if αB + γ ≥ αˆB, she sets both pA and pB so as to maximize
αAπA(pA, pB) + α˜BπB(pA, pB).
3. Payoff: I1 obtains αAπA + α˜BπB, less the acquisition price of her additional stake in A
and her stake in B. The remaining owners of A and B obtain their fraction of πA and πB,
respectively.
Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfection, so that this game can be solved by backward
induction. In Section 4.3 we characterize the Nash equilibria in the product market stage, that
arise for any given initial allocation of ownership and control rights. In the ensuing Section 4.4
we incorporate product market outcomes to analyze I1’s acquisition of cash flow and control
rights, and to relate it to the initial ownership structure in our economy.
4.3 Product Market Stage
In this section, we characterize product market equilibrium prices and profits as a function of
direct and indirect investment of I1 in B, separately for the case in which I1 does not control
firm B but enjoys cash flow rights in it, vs. the case where she controls firm B.
Towards this analysis, consider the case in which I1 holds controlling shares αA ≥ 0 in firm
A, and non–controlling cash flow rights α˜B ≥ 0 in firm B. Let ω ∈ [0,∞) denote investor I1’s
share of cash flow rights in B relative to A, so that ω ≡ α˜B/αA ∈ [0, 1/αA].
4.3.1 Firm B uncontrolled by I1
If I1 owns αA controlling shares in firm A and αB non–controlling shares in firm B she solves
max
pA
πA(pA, pB) + ωπB(pA, pB).
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Firm B’s price pB is set such that it maximizes B ’s profits, hence
max
pB
πB(pA, pB).
The respective best responses are given by
BRA(pB) =
{
pA(pB) | ∂πA
∂pA
(pA, pB) + ω∂πB
∂pA
(pA, pB) = 0
}
(4.1)
and
BRB(pA) =
{
pB(pA) | ∂πB
∂pB
(pA, pB) = 0
}
. (4.2)
Assumptions (iv) guarantee that the second order conditions
∂2πA
∂p2A
+ ω
∂2πB
∂p2A
< 0 (4.3)
and
∂2πB
∂p2B
< 0 (4.4)
are satisfied for all ω ∈ [0, 1
αA
]. Assumptions (iv) and (v) guarantee that the best responses are
both positively sloped, as both
∂BRA(pB)
∂pB
= −
∂2πA
∂pA∂pB
+ ω ∂
2πB
∂pA∂pB
.
∂2πA
∂p2A
+ ω∂
2πB
∂p2A
(4.5)
and
∂BRB(pA)
∂pA
= −
∂2πB
∂pA∂pB
.
∂2πB
∂p2B
(4.6)
are strictly positive. Denote by (pOA(ω), pOB(ω)) a Nash equilibrium price vector. We assume
this to be unique. The equilibrium is stable if
∂(BRA)−1
∂pA
(pOA(ω)) >
∂BRB
∂pA
(pOA (ω)) (4.7)
which we assume henceforth.
With the following Proposition we characterize Nash equilibrium prices and profits as a func-
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tion of ω, the relative share of cash flow rights held by investor I1 in firm B over firm A.
Proposition 4.1 (Equilibrium Prices and Profits under Separate Control): Let I1 control firm
A only, so that the two firms compete with each other a` la Bertrand. Then
(i) pOA(ω) ≥ pOB(ω) for all ω > 0,
(ii) πA(pOA (ω), pOB(ω)) ≤ πB (pOA(ω), pOB(ω)) for all ω > 0,
(iii) pOA(ω) and pOB(ω) increase in ω, with
∂pOA
∂ω
>
∂pOB
∂ω
,
(iv) πA(pOA (ω), pOB(ω)) increases for small ω up to some ωO, and strictly decreases thereafter.
πB(pOA (ω), pOB(ω)) increases for all ω > 0.
The main effect of an investment of I1 in B under separate control is that I1 uses pA to soften
competition and thus to increase relative profits πB, and this the more, the larger ω. As a direct
corollary it emerges that, provided that demand is downward sloping, consumer welfare as
measured by consumers’s surplus decreases with an increase in ω, as long as no controlling
stake is associated with that increase. We cannot say much about changes in total welfare,
as this would necessitate a direct comparison of negative changes in consumer, and positive
changes in producer surplus.5
4.3.2 Firm B controlled by I1
We now consider the case in which I1 holds controlling shares αA in firm A and α˜B in firm B,
respectively. Consider first profit maxima involving both firms active. Then I1 solves
max
pA,pB
πA(pA, pB) + ωπB(pA, pB). (4.8)
The necessary conditions are given by
∂πA
∂pA
(pA, pB) + ω∂πB
∂pA
(pA, pB) = 0 (4.9)
5In a Hotelling example of our product market specification we obtained a decrease also in total welfare with
an increase in ω.
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and
∂πA
∂pB
(pA, pB) + ω∂πB
∂pB
(pA, pB) = 0. (4.10)
The second order conditions are satisfied by invoking Assumptions (iii) and (iv). Denote the
optimal choice by (pMA (ω), pMB (ω)).
Proposition 4.2 (Optimal Prices and Profits under Joint Control): Let I1 control both firms A
and B. Then
(i) pMA (ω) ≤ pMB (ω) if ω < 1, pMA (ω) = pMB (ω) if ω = 1, and pMA (ω) ≥ pMB (ω) if ω > 1
(ii) πA(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) T πB (pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) for all ω S 1
(iii) pMA (ω) strictly increases and pMB (ω) strictly decreases in ω
(iv) πA(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) decreases and πB(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) increases in ω.
Observe in particular that if the controlling stakes αA, αB and γ are such that ω = 1, the
monopoly solution obtains, no matter how small the stakes actually are.
4.4 Acquisition Decision
We now look at I1’s acquisition decisions. We relate the equilibrium allocation of ownership
and control rights to the initial ownership structure in A and B. Again, we consider I1 and
firm A to be the only active investors in our model and thus exclude competitive bidding. I1
and A are assumed to be able to buy any stake in firm B out of current profits obtained. The
opportunity costs of their investments are normalized to zero. In line with the approach taken
here, firm values are supposed to be solely determined by the profits obtained from product
market activity.
In the following we analyze acquisition decisions separately for the four cases introduced
in the model specification, that related to the structure of initial ownership of the remaining
shares in A, and that of the shares in B.
We use dispersed ownership in the sense of Grossman and Hart (1980), so that every share-
holder perceives herself as being non-pivotal. In particular, she believes that her decision of
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whether or not to accept an offer neither influences the overall stake I1 holds in A or B, nor
whether or not I1 gains control in B.
If initial ownership in firm B is dispersed, then I1 and A can acquire shares in B via a tender
offer. Towards this, an offer price PB(ω) per share is announced which then attracts a fraction
αB + γ of all shares outstanding. We normalize to unity the total mass of (infinitely divisible)
shares so that PB(ω) is the firm value. Following Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1998), we use
the concept of a rational expectations equilibrium in which all shareholders behave symmet-
rically, each shareholder tendering her shares with probability αB + γ and retaining them with
probability 1 − αB − γ.
In equilibrium, every single atomistic shareholder is indifferent between tendering or not,
and believes that both the acquisition of cash flow and/or control rights in firm B by I1 does
not depend on her decision. Therefore, the offer price for αi shares in firm i is equal to
αiπi(pkA(ω), pkB(ω)), k = O, M which—as shown in Section (4.3)—depends on I1’s stakes in A
and B, and on whether she gains control in B. Formally, letting πki (ω) ≡ πi(pkA(ω), pkB(ω)), i =
A, B; k = O, M
PkA(ω) = πkA(ω) + γ(πkB(ω) − PkB(ω)) (4.11)
PkB(ω) = πkB(ω).
This specification reflects the free–rider problem discussed by Grossman and Hart (1980)
faced by I1 when acquiring shares from dispersed owners: Because shareholders rationally
expect the consequences of that acquisition on firm profits, the acquisition price fully incor-
porates the allocative gains to firm B. Hence I1 can never gain directly from acquiring (addi-
tional) cash flow rights when (remaining) ownership is dispersed, as the acquisition price is
always equal to the profits she will earn. However, if investing in firm B, I1 may benefit from
an increased value of her initial stake in firm A, which we have modeled in Section 4.3. In all,
if the (remaining) ownership is dispersed, our acquiring investor I1 has de facto no bargaining
power.
By contrast, if the target shares of one of the firms i, i = A, B are held by one investor, then
we suppose that all bargaining power rests with the acquiring investor I1, so she can absorb
all the surplus generated from that acquisition. Accordingly, the acquisition price per share
is determined by equalizing the seller’s payoff obtained when selling some of his shares to I1
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and enjoying the profits from his remaining shares to his outside option, which is the payoff
generated when selling no shares at all.
To make our arguments transparent, we henceforth sequence investor I1’s decisions. Within
all cases, 1 through 4, we first consider the optimal specification of the relative weight ω,
and then how this ω is optimally reached; that is, the trade–off between directly acquiring αB
shares vs. indirectly acquiring γ shares via firm A, together with the option of increasing I1’s
stakes in firm A over and above α0A. In all this we analyze first the acquisition of cash flow
rights separately for the cases where no control rights and where control rights go with them,
and only thereafter whether the acquisition of control rights in B at the exogenously specified
level αˆB is profitable to I1.
4.4.1 Case 1: Remaining Shares in A Dispersed and Ownership of B
Dispersed
Investor I1’s overall payoff from acquiring cash flow rights in firms A and B is given by
Πk1(ω) = αA[πkA(ω) + γ(πkB(ω) − PkB(ω))] − (αA − α0A)PkA(ω) + αB
[
πkB(ω) − PkB(ω)
]
, k = O, M,
(4.12)
where ω = αB+αAγ
αA
, αA ∈ [α0A, 1], αB ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [0, 1], and αB + γ ≤ 1.
The first term reflects her share αA of the payoffs obtained from her interest in firm A, including
cross holding acquisitions taken by that firm; the second term denotes the acquisition costs of
an additional stake (αA − α0A); and the third term reflects payoffs after acquisition costs from a
stake αB in firm B.
Using (4.11) specifying the acquisition price when the (remaining) ownership is dispersed,
investor I1’s overall acquisition payoff (4.12) reduces to
Πk1(ω) = α0AπkA(ω), k = O, M. (4.13)
All payoff increases generated through the acquisition go to the atomless owners of A and B.
Now, result (iv) from Proposition 4.1 states that πOA(ω) increases for small ω. From Proposition
4.1 we know that ωO = arg max πOA(ω). By contrast, result (iv) from Proposition 4.2 states that
πMA (ω) is a strictly decreasing function, so given full control, investor I1’s maximal payoff is
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trivially equal to ΠM1 (0) = α0AπMA (0). This is so because any increase in her stakes in firm A
leaves I1 indifferent, whilst any direct or indirect increase in her stakes in firm B would, due
to the allocative effects, result in a decrease in profits obtained from firm A.
Since πOA(ωO) is the equilibrium payoff with positive weight on firm B and thus less than full
weight on firm A, whilst πMA (0) is the maximal monopoly payoff with complete weight on firm
A , it must hold that πOA(ωO) < πMA (0), so there must be an ωM > 0 with πOA(ωO) = πMA (ωM)
such that if the minimal controlling share αˆB ≤ αB(ωM) + γ(ωM), then I1 prefers to acquire a
controlling stake αˆB in B. The payoff maximizing stake must be minimal because πMA (ω) is a
strictly decreasing function.
Towards determining the mode of acquisition, observe that two alternative acquisition modes
have differing allocative effects and thus are not payoff neutral. In fact, the direct acquisition
of minimal shares αˆB results in some ω = αˆBα0A , whilst the indirect acquisition via firm A results
in a smaller ω = αˆB < αˆBα0A . Hence I1 acquires the minimal controlling cash flow rights through
firm A, so that γ = ωM and αB = 0. Only if she would fully own firm A, i.e. α0A = 1, would
she be indifferent between direct and indirect acquisition.
However, if αˆB > ωM, then I1 will acquire non–controlling cash flow rights in firm B such
that αB+α
0
Aγ
α0A
= ωO. In view of the fact that all acquisition rents are dissipated to the dispersed
owners of A and B, she is indifferent between the direct and the indirect form of acquisition.
We summarize in
Proposition 4.3: Suppose that initial ownership in both firms A and B is dispersed. Then there
exists ωM such that
1. if αˆB ≤ ωM, then it is optimal for I1 to acquire a minimal controlling stake αˆB in B via a
cross holding, so that γ = αˆB and αB = 0. In the product market, this results in prices
pMA (γ) < pMB (γ) and profits πMA (γ) > πMB (γ).
2. If αˆB > ωM, then investor I1 acquires non–controlling shares so that αB+αAγαA = ωO. In
this she is indifferent between the direct and the indirect mode of acquisition. In the
product market, this results in prices pOA (ωO) > pOB(ωO) and profits πOA(ωO) < πOB(ωO).
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4.4.2 Case 2: Remaining Shares in A Concentrated and Ownership of B
Dispersed
Now we study the case in which initial ownership of the remaining shares in A is concentrated,
i.e. held by one investor called I3. In line with our earlier discussion, the acquisition price for
αB − α0A shares in firm A is determined so that I3 is indifferent between selling and keeping
them. Hence the acquisition price for αA − α0A additional shares in A, PA(ω), conditional on
investor I1’s acquisition of (non–) controlling shares in B must satisfy
(αA − α0A)PkA(ω) + (1 − αA)[πkA(ω) + γ(πkB(ω) − PkB(ω))] = (1 − α0A) · πkA(ω), k = O, M (4.14)
where, as determined in Proposition 4.3, ωO = ωO and ωM = γ. Thus the left hand side of
(4.14) is the payoff to I3 in case he sells to I1 a fraction (αA − α0A) of firm A’s shares, and the
right hand side is his payoff if he does not sell. However, that payoff eventually reflects I1’s
engagement in firm B, on which I3 is able to free–ride.
If ownership of B is dispersed we have PB(ω) = πB(ωk) so that
PkA(ω) =
(1 − α0A) · πkA(ωk) − (1 − αA) · πkA(ω)
αA − α0A
= πkA(ω).
Since the purchase price of shares exactly reflects the payoffs generated from an engagement in
firm B, I1’s choice as to that remains unchanged with the structure of the remaining ownership
in firm A.
Proposition 4.4: Suppose that ownership of the remaining shares in A is concentrated and
initial ownership in firm B is dispersed. Then the results of Proposition 4.3 carry over.
The reason for this surprising result is that the choice of αA has no influence, no matter whether
I1chooses to obtain controlling cash flow rights in firm B via cross ownership rather than direct
investment, or to stick to her initial engagement.
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4.4.3 Case 3: Remaining Shares in A Dispersed and Ownership of B
Concentrated
We now consider the case in which firm B is initially held by one investor, I2 say, who is not
invested in A. In line with before, the acquisition price for αB+γ shares in firm B is determined
so that I2 is indifferent between selling and keeping them. It thus satisfies
(αB + γ)PkB(ω) + (1 − αB − γ)πkB(ω) = πOB (0), k = O, M, (4.15)
where ω = αB+αAγ
αA
. Notice that I2’s outside option on the right hand side is to obtain πOB(0), the
profit of B without any investment of I1 in B. From this we get
PkB(ω) =
1
αB + γ
· [πOB(0) − (1 − αB − γ) · πkB(ω)]. (4.16)
In contrast to the cases in which ownership in firm B is dispersed, the benefits of control over
B are shared with I2 only if αB + γ < 1, because of the dependence of the post acquisition firm
value on the ownership structure. Therefore, if no full acquisition takes place, the acquisition
price depends on both ω, and on whether I1 gains control in B.
As before, the acquisition price for shares in firm A in the case the remaining shares are under
dispersed ownership is equal to the overall value of A. Using (4.16),
PkA(ω) = πkA(ω) + γ{πkB(ω) −
1
αB + γ
· [πOB (0) − (1 − αB − γ) · πkB(ω)]}, k = O, M.
Investor I1’s overall payoff is now
Πk1(ω) = αA ·
(
πkA(ω) + γ · {πkB(ω) −
1
αB + γ
· [πOB (0) − (1 − αB − γ) · πkB(ω)]}
)
+ αB · {πkB(ω) −
1
αB + γ
· [πOB (0) − (1 − αB − γ) · πkB(ω)]} − (αA − α0A)PkA(ω), k = O, M.
Since investor I1 is indifferent between acquisition and non–acquisition from dispersed owners
of A, we can rewrite this W.L.O.G. as
Πk1(ω) = α0A · πkA(ω) +
αB + α
0
Aγ
αB + γ
· [πkB(ω) − πOB (0)], k = O, M. (4.17)
The first term specifies the value of I1’s initial stake in A. The second term refers to I1’s net
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benefit from directly or indirectly acquiring αB + γ shares in B.
In the following proposition we establish that Πk1(ω) is maximized for k = M, αB = 1 and
γ = 0, no matter the level of α0A. This reflects I1’s interest in fully internalizing the positive
acquisition gains via αB = 1, whilst otherwise these acquisition gains would have to be shared
with the owners of the remaining shares in A.
Towards establishing that proposition, we introduce Assumption
(v) πMA (ω) + πMB (ω) is maximal at ω = 1.
This assumption furthers the symmetry in the two firms’ payoffs. It rules out that investor
I1 prefers to shut down one of the two firms in order to reduce fixed costs when controlling
both of them with symmetric weights. The issue of firm shut down could arise otherwise if
products are close substitutes and fixed costs are sufficiently high.6
Proposition 4.5: Suppose that ownership of the remaining shares in A is dispersed, and initial
ownership in firm B is concentrated. Then it is optimal for I1 to always acquire a full con-
trolling direct investment in firm B, such that αB = 1 and γ = 0. However, she is indifferent
between selling and not selling shares in firm A. In the product market, this results in asym-
metric monopoly prices pMA (1/α0A) > pMB (1/α0A) and monopoly profits πMA (1/α0A) < πMB (1/α0A).
4.4.4 Case 4: Remaining Shares in A Concentrated and Ownership of B
Concentrated
We finally study the case in which the shares in B are initially held by I2 as in Subsection
(4.4.3) but at the same time the remaining shares in A are held by investor I3 as in Subsection
(4.4.2).
The acquisition price PkA(ω) for additional shares in A must satisfy
(αA − α0A) · PkA(ω) + (1 − αA) · (πkA(ω) + γ[πkB(ω) − PkB(ω)] = (1 − α0A) · πkA(1/α0A), i = O, M,
where the right hand side follows from Proposition 4.5 because the relevant payoff function
6We will analyze the impact of product substitutability and fixed costs on investors’ acquisition decision
extensively in a future version of this paper. All over the current version we focus on interior solutions in which
both firms remain active.
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for I1 is equal to the one in (4.17) if I3 does not sell his shares in A.
We know from Proposition 4.5 that irrespective of the level of α0A (controlling) shares held in
firm A, I1 will acquire all shares in B by a direct investment, i.e. αB = 1.
PB(ω) is given by (4.16) so that
(αA − α0A) · PkA(ω) = (1 − α0A) · πkA(1/α0A) − (1 − αA) · {πkA(ω) + γ[πkB(ω) − PkB(ω)]} (4.18)
= (1 − α0A) · πkA(1/α0A) − (1 − αA) ·
(
πkA(ω) + γπkB(ω)
+
γ
αB + γ
· ((1 − αB − γ) · πkB(ω) − πOB(0))
)
.
Hence, we have
Π1 = αA[πkA(ω) + γ(πkB(ω) − PkB(ω))] + αBπkB(ω) − (αA − α0A) · PkA(ω)
− αBPkB(ω)
which is, after some algebra,
Π1 = π
k
A(ω) + πkB(ω) − (1 − α0A) · πkA(1/α0A) − πOB(0), k = O, M. (4.19)
This shows that I1’s payoff is given by the sum of profits of both firms less the outside options
of I2 and I3 which are independent of I1’s choice of ω. However, the latter’s outside option is
weighted by 1 − α0A, which is minimized by acquiring all of firm A and choosing α0A.
In all, investor I1’s payoff is maximized for ω = 1. She is indifferent between achieving this
via a cross holding, a direct investment, or any convex combination of the two.
Proposition 4.6: Suppose that ownership of the remaining shares in A and of B is concen-
trated. Then it is optimal for I1 to acquire a controlling investment in firm B with symmetric
weights on A and B, i.e. to choose for any αA ≥ α0A a convex combination between a full cross
holding, αB = 0, γ = 1 and a controlling direct investment αB = αA, γ = 0 in firm B s.t.
ω = 1. In the product market, this results in symmetric monopoly with prices pMA (1) = pMB (1)
and monopoly profits πMA (1) = πMB (1).
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4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the optimal allocation of ownership and control rights in two com-
peting firms, A and B, for an investor who initially holds controlling cash flow rights in firm
A. Cash flow and control rights in firm B can be acquired by that investor either directly by
buying shares herself, or indirectly by having the controlled firm A buy shares. We distinguish
between four cases of initial ownership structures generated by combining the alternatives that
the (remaining) shares in firm A, and all shares in firm B may be held by atomless dispersed
owners, or by one block holder.
We find that if the initial ownership of the target firm B, is dispersed, I1 acquires a mini-
mal controlling investment in B if the (exogenous) critical level of controlling shares is small
enough. Otherwise she will buy a non–controlling (smaller) share in firm B. The reason for
the former is free–riding by the remaining shareholders in B. In the latter case a trade–off
arises from the fact that the acquisition of a small non–controlling stake in B allows I1 to
benefit from the strategic complementarity involved in price increases. As long as I1 does not
own all of firm A ’s cash flow rights, this acquisition is accomplished via a cross holding. I1 is
indifferent between cross holding and direct investment only if she is able to acquire all of A’s
remaining shares.
If the initial ownership in the target firm B is concentrated, the equilibrium allocation of own-
ership rights depends on the initial ownership structure of the remaining shares in A as well.
If it is concentrated, I1 will invest symmetrically in both firms and control both of them. Here,
she is indifferent between drawing on a cross ownership arrangement or investing herself in
B. By contrast, if the remaining ownership in A is dispersed, I1 will directly invest in B rather
than drawing on cross holdings. The reason is that by investing directly I1 does not have to
share the acquisition gain in B with the remaining shareholders in A.
The present model setup is limited in several respects. Firstly, our industry consists of two
firms only, so the acquisition of control rights by our investor leads immediately to monopo-
listic control. Secondly, one might argue that investors even if holding controlling cash flow
rights typically do not exercise control on prices, but on strategic variables such as product
quality enhancing, or product portfolio widening, or cost reducing investment. Thirdly, the
acquisition of cash flow or control rights may be contested by competitors.
Towards these extensions, we have analyzed the numerical version of a model involving three
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symmetric competing specialized firms, in which investors with controlling cash flow rights
exercise control over cost reducing investment (and firm acquisitions), while leaving the pric-
ing decision to an independent management. We again consider an investor holding control-
ling cash flow rights in some firm A and investing in firm B, so the third firm C including
its owners, while active in the product market, is passive in the market for shares and control
rights.
Surprisingly little changes in this extended set up. Essentially all that happens is that the
effects on product market prices and profits of the two firms A and B active in the market for
acquisitions are weakened due to both, the impact of outside competition from firm C and the
impact of less direct control, namely on cost reducing investment rather than prices, by the
controlling investor. In view of this, the above analysis of the acquisition stake should carry
through these generalizations. In view of this we should emphasize, that with the above results
we do provide very clearly testable empirical predictions.
Yet one important generalization, that includes contests between block holders involved in
more than two firms, is much more involved, and must be left for further research.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 Proofs of Section 2.2
Proof of Lemma 2.1. I first show that the agent’s individual rationality constraint (IRi) is not
binding and that the limited liability constraint (LLi) is binding instead. Suppose by contradic-
tion (IRi) is binding. Then solving (IRi) for ai(e) and substituting ai in the principal’s objective
function by ai(e) yields pi(e)y¯− c(e) which is maximized at the first–best effort level. As men-
tioned above ai(e) will be negative at eFBi which violates (LLi). Thus, (IRi) cannot be binding.
If ai is positive, however, decreasing ai to zero is beneficial for the principal by additive sepa-
rability of V in a and keeps (LLi) satisfied. Thus, (LLi) is binding at ai = 0 , while (IRi) is not
binding.
Using ai = 0 and bi(e) = c′(e)/p′i(e) from (FOCA) (=first–order approach) the principal’s
objective function can be expressed by pi(e)(y¯−b(e)). Taking the first derivative w.r.t. e yields
the required condition. 
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Suppose not, then there exists a profitable deviation for the L–type since
b∗L = arg maxbL>0 VL((a, bL), µ(L|.) = 1) for all a ≥ 0 and VL is strictly decreasing in a (=addi-
tive separability of b and a). 
Proof of Lemma 2.3. As shown in the proof of Lemma 2.1 (IRH) will never be binding under
limited liability at zero under given assumptions. If (ICPL) is not trivially satisfied at w∗H ,
i.e. VLL(w∗L) < VLH(w∗H), then (ICPL) will be binding in the least–cost separating contract
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wsH, i.e. VLL(w∗L) = VLH(wsH). Suppose not, then VLL(w∗L) > VLH(wsH). If asH > a∗H = 0,
decreasing asH raises both, VLH(wsH) and VHH(wsH) keeping the agent’s incentive constraint
(ICH) binding. This states a contradiction to least–cost separation for the interior solution
case. If asH = 0 instead (=corner solution case), then decreasing the distance between bsH and
b∗H is strictly profit–enhancing for the H–type principal and reduces the slackness of the L–
type’s incentive constraint by strict concavity of V . To see this more clearly define the L–type’s
hypothetically optimal premium if being perceived as the H–type principal with probability
one, b∗LH = arg maxbLH>0 VL((0, bLH), µ(H|.) = 1), and note that (ICPL) is violated at b∗LH since
VLL(w∗L) < VLH(w∗LH) by bH(e) < bL(e) for all e. By continuity of V there exists a ˜b with
|˜b − b∗LH | < |˜b − bsH | and |˜b − b∗H | > 0 such that (ICPL) is binding. Moreover, by monotonicity
and concavity of V choosing any premium bsH further apart from b∗H than ˜b makes the H–type
principal worse off. Thus, (0, ˜b) states a profitable deviation from any contract wsH = (0, bsH)
with VLL(w∗L) > VLH(wsH) for the corner solution case. Hence, (ICPL) is binding in the least–
cost separating contract wsH.
If (ICH) and (ICPL) are binding, then b and a in (2.7) can be replaced by bH(e) rearranging
(ICH) and by a˜(e) rearranging (ICPL). The transformed objective function equals (pH(e) −
pL(e)) · (y¯−bH(e))+VLL(w∗L) which is strictly concave by the assumptions on pi(e) that p′′H(e)−
p′′L (e) ≤ 0 and p′H(e)− p′L(e) ≥ 0 for all e. Maximizing this objective function over e yields the
required condition for case 1 which uniquely identifies the least–cost separating effort level.
If (LLH), (ICH), and (ICPL) are binding, then the interior solution of the H–type principal’s
transformed objective function would specify a negative fixed-wage payment asH which is
ruled out by (LLH). Substituting asH = 0 from (LLH) and bH(e) from (ICH) into (ICPL) gives
the constraint of the condition in case 2. The constraint yields up to two solutions of which
the one that maximizes the H–type principal’s expected utility is selected by the condition in
case 2.
Finally, if (ICPL) is trivially satisfied by w∗H, then w∗H states the unique least–cost separating
contract. 
Proof of Lemma 2.4. To provide a proof for Lemma 2.4, the 4 functions in equation (2.8)
(resp. (2.9)) have to be compared at 3 (resp. 4) points although no explicit values of neither
premia nor expected utilities can be determined. Moreover, since bH(e) < bL(e) ∀e it always
holds that b∗H > b∗HL and b∗LH > b∗L but the ordering of b∗H and b∗LH and of b∗HL and b∗L depends
on parameters and specific functional forms of p(e) and c(e). To provide a general proof in
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this setting I will make use of the fact that for a specific combination of parameters of pi(e)
the 4 points in equation (2.9) partially coincide and at the same time equation (2.8) and (2.9)
become equivalent.1
First note that if b∗H = b∗LH (or equivalently e∗H = e∗LH), it follows from Lemma 2.3 (interior
solution case) that bsH = b∗H = b∗LH. It is shown in Proposition 2.2 and Corollary 2.2.1 that
this is case if ∆s/∆r = sL/rL. Moreover, for ∆s/∆r = sL/rL it also holds that b∗HL = b∗L
since p′H(e)/pH(e) = sL p′(e)/(rL + sL p(e)) = p′L(e)/pL(e) by the first–order conditions of the
principal’s problem under project observability in Lemma 2.1. Hence, the sufficient condition
in equation (2.9) becomes also necessary here. Next, I show that the necessary and sufficient
condition for existence (2.8) is always fulfilled for ∆s/∆r = sL/rL. Define ∆V∗.,H ≡ V∗HH − V∗LH
and ∆V∗.,L ≡ V∗HL − V∗LL. Now, using that esH = e∗H = e∗LH and e∗L = e∗HL if ∆s/∆r = sL/rL
yields ∆V∗
.,H = (∆rθH +∆sθH p(e∗H))(y¯−bH(e∗H)) and ∆V∗.,L = (∆rθH +∆sθH p(e∗HL))(y¯−bL(e∗HL)).
Equation (2.8) will be satisfied if ∆V∗.,H − ∆V∗.,L ≥ 0. I next show that this holds true here. The
trick I will use takes into account that ∆V∗
.,H (resp. ∆V∗.,L) are equal to V∗HH (resp. V∗HL) up to a
constant if ∆s/∆r = sL/rL.
∆V∗.,H =
(
∆rθH + ∆sθH p(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
=
(
∆rθH +
∆rsL
rL
θH p(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
by ∆s = ∆rsL
rL
=
∆rθH
rL
(
rL + sL p(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
.
1It is shown in Proposition 2.2 that this specific combination of parameters is also the cutoff point for the
main efficient result of this paper.
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Analogously, we receive ∆V∗
.,L =
∆rθH
rL
(
rL + sLp(e∗HL)
)(
y¯ − bL(e∗HL)
)
.
V∗HH =
(
(rL + ∆rθH) + (sL + ∆sθH)p(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
=
(
(rL + ∆rθH) + (sL + ∆rsLθH
rL
)p(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
by ∆s = ∆rsL
rL
=
(
(rL + ∆rθH) + sL
rL
(rL + ∆rθH)p(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
=
(
(rL + ∆rθH)(1 + sL
rL
p(e∗H))
)
(y¯ − bH(e∗H))
=
(rL + ∆rθH)
rL
(
rL + sLp(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
.
V∗HL =
(
(rL + ∆rθH) + (sL + ∆sθH)p(e∗HL)
)(
y¯ − bL(e∗HL)
)
=
(rL + ∆rθH)
rL
(
rL + sLp(e∗HL)
)(
y¯ − bL(e∗HL)
)
analogously to V∗HH.
Hence, the maximizer of VHH(e), e∗H, is also a maximizer of ∆V.,H(e). The same argument
applies to VHL(e) and ∆V.,L(e). Moreover, ∆V.,H(e) and ∆V.,L(e) inherit strict concavity in e
from VHH(e) and VHL(e).
Thus, it finally suffices to show that ∆V.,H(e) is weakly larger than ∆V.,L(e) at e = e∗HL.
∆V.,H(e∗HL) − ∆V.,L(e∗HL) =
∆rθH
rL
(
rL + sL p(e∗HL)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗HL) − (y¯ − bL(e∗HL))
)
=
∆rθH
rL
(
rL + sL p(e∗HL)
)(
bL(e∗HL) − bH(e∗HL)
)
,
which is strictly positive since bH(e) < bL(e) ∀e. By strict concavity of ∆V.,H(e) and ∆V.,L(e) I
receive that ∆V∗
.,H = ∆V.,H(e∗H) > ∆V.,H(e∗HL) > ∆V.,L(e∗HL) = ∆V∗.,L, which completes this first
step of the proof.
If ∆r , rL∆s/sL, ∆V∗.,H and ∆V∗.,L can be expressed as follows
∆V∗.,H = VHH(e∗H) − VLH(e∗LH)
=
(
(rL + ∆rθH) + (sL + ∆sθH)p(e∗H)
)(
y¯ − bH(e∗H)
)
− V∗LH
∆V∗.,L = VHL(e∗HL) − VLL(e∗L)
=
(
∆rθH + ∆sθH p(e∗HL)
)(
y¯ − bL(e∗HL))
)
− V∗LL.
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The sufficient condition for existence (2.9) will be met if ∆V∗.,H−∆V∗.,L ≥ 0. In a last step it will
be shown that (2.9) is always satisfied if ∆r < rL∆s/sL, while (2.9) (and therefore potentially
(2.8)) might be violated if∆r is much larger than rL∆s/sL. Given that (∆V∗.,H−∆V∗.,L)|∆r=rL∆s/sL >
0 it suffices to show that
(∆V∗.,H − ∆V∗.,L)|∆r′<rL∆s/sL > (∆V∗.,H − ∆V∗.,L)|∆r=rL∆s/sL and
(∆V∗.,H − ∆V∗.,L)|∆r′′>rL∆s/sL < (∆V∗.,H − ∆V∗.,L)|∆r=rL∆s/sL ∀∆r′,∆r′′ feasible.
From the first–order conditions for Vi j(e), it can be seen that V∗LH and V∗LL are independent of
∆r. Hence, it is sufficient to show that dVHH(e∗H(∆r),∆r)/d∆r − dVHL(e∗HL(∆r),∆r)/d∆r < 0
for all ∆r feasible.
dVHH(e∗H(∆r),∆r)
d∆r =
∂VHH(e∗H(∆r),∆r)
∂∆r
+
∂VHH(e∗H(∆r),∆r)
∂e
· de
∗
H(∆r)
d∆r
=
∂VHH(e∗H(∆r),∆r)
∂∆r
+ 0 by the envelope theorem
= θH
(
y¯ − bH(e∗H(∆r))
)
> 0
dVHL(e∗HL(∆r),∆r)
d∆r =
∂VHL(e∗HL(∆r),∆r)
∂∆r
+
∂VHL(e∗HL(∆r),∆r)
∂e
· de
∗
HL(∆r)
d∆r
= θH
(
y¯ − bL(e∗HL(∆r))
)
> 0
It now holds that dVHH(e∗H(∆r),∆r)/d∆r < dVHL(e∗HL(∆r),∆r)/d∆r for all ∆r feasible since
bH(e∗H(∆r)) = b∗H(∆r) > b∗HL(∆r) = bL(e∗HL(∆r)) for all ∆r feasible.
By applying the implicit function theorem to the first–order condition of VH,.(e), it can be easily
shown that de∗H,.(∆r)/d∆r < 0. Since e∗H(∆r) > e∗HL(∆r) (or equivalently b∗H(∆r) > b∗HL(∆r)) for
all ∆r feasible there exists a ∆rc1 > rL · ∆s/sL s.t. b∗HL(∆r) ≤ 0 for ∆r ≥ ∆rc1 and b∗H(∆rc1) > 0.
For ∆r sufficiently large there exists a ∆rc2 > rL ·∆s/sL s.t. (∆V∗.,H −∆V∗.,L)|∆r ≤ 0 for ∆r ≥ ∆rc2.
Finally, I define ∆rc as min{∆rc1,∆rc2}.
This argument is given for interior solutions (case 1 of Lemma 2.3) but is also applicable
to corner solutions (case 2 of Lemma 2.3). To see this note that the sufficient condition for
existence (2.9) includes pure fixed–payment separation, which could have been chosen by the
H–type principal if choosing pure premium separation (=corner solution). Thus, by revealed
preferences the H–type principal in case 2 of Lemma 2.3 will not deviate from the least–cost
separating contract if (2.9) holds. 
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Proof of Proposition 2.1. For σ being a PBE, w∗L (resp. wsH) must maximize the L–type’s
(resp. H–type’s) expected utility given σA. For pessimistic out-of-the-equilibrium beliefs
µ(H|w , wsH) = 0, the L–type optimally chooses w∗L, but the H–type might prefer not to
separate from the L–type via wsH if this is very costly relative to being perceived as low-type
principal (=potential non-existence). The best non-separating contract for H–type is equal to
w∗HL = (0, b∗HL) which maximizes VH(w, µ(L|.) = 1). Hence, σ is an equilibrium if and only if
VHH(wsH) ≥ VHL((0, b∗HL)) which is the case for ∆r ≤ ∆rc (cf. Lemma 2.4).2
By applying the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987), the least–cost separating contract
is uniquely selected in equilibrium. This means that equilibria which allow credible deviations
for the H–type are ruled out: Hence, there is no contract w with σP(w|i) = 0 for all i such that
σˆA(.|w)·VLH(w) < VLL(w∗L) for all possible best responses σˆA(.|w) to w, while σˆA(.|w)·VHL(w) >
VHH(w∗H) for all possible best responses σˆA(.|w) to w for which the agent’s beliefs satisfy
µˆ(H|w) = 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Firstly, consider the first–order condition of the H–type principal’s
problem for interior solutions (=case1 of Lemma 2.3) which determines esH, the least–cost
separating effort level. Suppose that (p′H(e) − p′L(e))(y¯ − bH(e)) − (pH(e) − pL(e))b′H(e) ≷ 0 for
e = e∗H, the second-best effort level. Rearranging yields
(p′H(e∗H) − p′L(e∗H))
(pH(e∗H) − pL(e∗H))
≷
b′H(e∗H)
(y¯ − bH(e∗H))
.
From the first–order condition of the H–type’s problem under project observability in (2.6), I
receive analogously,
p′H(e∗H)
pH(e∗H)
=
b′H(e∗H)
(y¯ − bH(e∗H))
.
Substituting the the last equation into the inequality from above and simplifying yields
p′H(e∗H)
pH(e∗H)
≷
p′L(e∗H)
pL(e∗H)
.
By multiplying with e∗H, I get the elasticity condition in (2.10) (for case 1 of Lemma 2.3). I
2It turns out that relating the existence condition to properties of success probability function is difficult in
the general framework since the model does not satisfy a single-crossing property. Moreover, the comparison
between VHH(wsH) and VHL((0, b∗HL)) requires knowledge of the contracts (asH, bsH) and (0, b∗HL) in absolute terms
rather than implicit functional forms.
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conclude that (p′H(e) − p′L(e))(y¯ − bH(e)) − (pH(e) − pL(e))b′H(e) ≷ 0 at e = e∗H corresponds to
esH ≷ e
∗
H by strict concavity of the principal’s expected utility in the least–cost separation case
(see proof of Lemma 2.3).
In case 2 of Lemma 2.3, i.e. if also (LLH), besides (ICH) and (ICPL), is binding, the inte-
rior solution from above does not exist. However, by continuity of the principal’s expected
utility function, the selection condition in case 2 picks the effort level with the corresponding
properties, i.e. esH > e∗H if and only if ηH(e∗H) > ηL(e∗H). 
Proof of Corollary 2.2.1.
ηH(e) > ηL(e) ⇔
p′H(e)
pH(e) >
p′L(e)
pL(e) ⇔
(sL + ∆sθH) · p′(e)
(rL + ∆rθH) + (sL + ∆sθH) · p(e) >
sL · p′(e)
rL + sL · p(e) ⇔
rL + sL · p(e)
sL
>
(rL + ∆rθH) + (sL + ∆sθH) · p(e)
(sL + ∆sθH) ⇔
rL
sL
+ p(e) > (rL + ∆rθH)(sL + ∆sθH) + p(e) ⇔
rL
sL
>
(rL + ∆rθH)
(sL + ∆sθH) ⇔
rLsL + rL∆sθH > rLsL + ∆rsLθH ⇔
∆s
∆r
>
sL
rL
,
which is independent of e and θH. 
Proof of Proposition 2.3. If an equilibrium σ ∈ MH(Σ) is separating, then the unique least–
cost separating contract (wsH ,w∗L) will be selected. For σ ∈ MH(Σ) being pooling, both types
of principal must choose this contract with probability one. A candidate for such a pool-
ing contract is the optimal pooling contract for the H–type principal wPO(β) = (0, bPO(β)),
which is unique. By construction of wPO(β), VPH(wPO(β)) ∈ [V∗HL,V∗HH] with VPH(wPO(β)) =
pH(ePO(β))(y¯ − bPO(β)). By optimality of least–cost separation (∆r < ∆rc, cf. Lemma 2.4) it
holds that VPH(wPO(0)) = V∗HL < VH(wsH). Moreover, VPH(wPO(1)) = V∗HH > VH(wsH), if the in-
centive constraint of the L–type principal is not trivially satisfied by w∗H. Hence, by continuity
of VPH(wPO(β)) in β, there exists a βc ∈ (0, 1) such that VPH(wPO(β)) < VH(wsH) for β < βc and
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VPH(wPO(β)) ≥ VH(wsH) for β ≥ βc.
It is left to show that for β ≥ βc there exists a σ ∈ MH(Σ) which implements the optimal
pooling contract for the H–type principal wPO(β). This requires that it is also optimal for the
L–type principal to offer wPO(β), i.e. VPL (wPO(β)) ≥ V∗L given pessimistic out–of–equilibrium
beliefs. This condition is satisfied even with strict inequality since otherwise wPO(β) , wsH
would satisfy the incentive constraint of L–type principal and make H–type principal weakly
better off than wsH which contradicts optimality and uniqueness of least–cost separating con-
tract wsH.
Finally, M∗ = ML(MH(Σ)) selects the pooling contract for β = βc because VPL (wPO(β)) >
V∗L. 
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The proof follows directly from the derivation of bPO(β) and Propo-
sition 2.2. 
Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs of Section 3.2
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Using the properties of the reference distributions, we rewrite the utility
function further,
uA(x, pA, pB) =(v − tx − pA) + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA)
− λ · t
( ∫ 1−xˆun
0
2(x − s) ds +
∫ x
1−xˆun
(x − s) ds
)
+ t
( ∫ xˆun
x
(s − x) ds
)
=(v − tx − pA) + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA)
− λ · t
2
(
x2 + 2x(1 − xˆun) − (1 − xˆun)2
)
+
t
2
(xˆun − x)2 (B.1)
uB(x, pA, pB) =(v − t(1 − x) − pB) − λ · xˆun(pB − pA) − λ · t
∫ 1−x
0
2((1 − x) − s) ds
+ t
( ∫ 1−xˆun
1−x
2(s − (1 − x)) ds +
∫ xˆun
1−xˆun
(s − (1 − x)) ds
)
=(v − t(1 − x) − pB) − λ · xˆun(pB − pA) − λ · t(1 − x)2
+ t
(
(x − xˆun)2 + (12 − x − xˆun + 2xxˆun)
)
. (B.2)
Next, we find the location of the indifferent uninformed consumer x = xˆun by setting uA = uB,
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where
uA(xˆun, pA, pB) = v − txˆun − pA + (1 − xˆun)(pB − pA) − λ · t2
(
1 − 2(1 − xˆun)2
)
uB(xˆun, pA, pB) = v − t(1 − xˆun) − pB − λ · xˆun(pB − pA) − λ · t(1 − xˆun)2 + 2t(12 − xˆun)
2
If she buys product A the indifferent uninformed consumer will experience no gain but the
maximum loss in the taste dimension. If she buys product B she will experience a gain and a
loss because distance could have been smaller or larger than 1 − xˆun. With respect to the price
dimension the indifferent uninformed consumer (like all other consumers) faces only a loss
when paying price pB and only a gain when paying price pA.
uA(xˆun, pA, pB) = uB(xˆun, pA, pB) can be transformed to the following quadratic equation in xˆun,
0 = 2t(λ − 1) · xˆ2un −
(
(λ − 1)(pB − pA) − 4tλ
)
· xˆun +
(
2(pB − pA) + t2(3λ + 1)
)
(B.3)
Solving this quadratic equation w.r.t. xˆun leads to the expression given in the lemma. 
B.2 Proofs of Section 3.3
Proof of Lemma 3.2.
φ′ =
∂qA(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= −∂qA(∆p; β)
∂pA
= −∂qB(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= −∂qB(∆p; β)
∂pB
= β · xˆ′in(∆p) + (1 − β) · xˆ′un(∆p)
= − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) − (1 − β)
2(S (∆p))
(
∆p
8t2
− (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
︸                ︷︷                ︸
⊖
> 0
φ′ > 0 ∀∆p feasible and ∀β. At the boundaries we have
φ′(0; β) = − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) + (1 − β) (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1) > 0
φ′(∆p → ∆p¯; β < 1) → ∞ since S (p¯) = 0.
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For 0 ≤ ∆p < ∆pmax the demand of A is convex in ∆p. At the boundaries we have
φ′′(∆p; β) = (1 − β) · xˆ′′un(∆p) = (1 − β) ·
(3 + λ)(5 + 3λ)
64t2 · (S (∆p))3 ≥ 0
φ′′ > 0 ∀∆p feasible and ∀β < 1 since S (∆p) ≥ 0:
φ′′(0; β) = (1 − β) · (3 + λ)(5 + 3λ)
32t2 · (λ+1)3(λ−1)3
> 0
φ′′(∆p → ∆p¯; β < 1) → ∞.

Proof of Lemma 3.3. Combining (FOCA) and (FOCB) yields the required equilibrium condi-
tion as a function of price differences. 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. We first consider the case of λ > λc. We can derive a number of
useful properties of f (∆p; β) = (1 − 2φ)/φ′:
f (0; β) = 0/φ′(0) = 0∀β, f (∆p¯; β) → 0 since φ′(∆p¯) → ∞∀β < 1, and f (∆p¯, 1) = −2∆p¯ < 0.
f ′(∆p; β) = −2(φ
′)2 − φ′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2 = −
(
2 +
φ′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2
)
≶ 0,
f ′(0; β) = −2 < 0 ∀β and f ′(∆p¯; β) → −(2 + −∞3/2∞1 ) → ∞ ∀β < 1, and f ′(∆p, 1) =
−2 ∀∆p.
It has to be shown that f (∆p; β) is strictly convex in ∆p for β < 1. We find that
f ′′(∆p; β) = −(φ
′φ′′′ − 2(φ′′)2)(1 − 2φ) − 2(φ′)2
(φ′)3 > 0.
If β < 1 by continuity of f (∆p), f (0; β) = 0, f (∆p¯; β) → 0, f ′(0; β) < 0, f ′(∆p¯; β) → ∞ > 1,
and strict convexity of f (∆p) for β < 1, we know that for ∆c = ∆p¯ there are two potential
interior equilibria. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2. The second equilibrium arises because ∆p¯
depicts a second solution to ∆p = f (∆p; β < 1) + ∆p¯ since f (∆p¯; β < 1) = 0. Moreover,
by continuity of f (∆p) two potential equilibria occur for ∆c > ∆p¯ (if any) because ∆p¯ <
f (∆p¯; β < 1) + ∆c. For values of ∆c lower than ∆p¯, f (∆p¯; β < 1) + ∆c is always smaller than
∆p¯ and no second equilibrium can arise.
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If β = 1, f (∆p; β) is strictly decreasing for all ∆p and at most one intersection between
f (∆p; 1) + ∆c and ∆p exists (standard Hotelling case).1
Secondly, in the case of 1 ≤ λ < λc there are corner solutions if ∆p > ∆p˜ because firm A’s
demand of uninformed consumers is bounded at one. This reduces firm A’s incentives to set
a very low pA in equilibrium (that leads to ∆p > ∆p˜) because that would decrease the profit
margin for all its consumers while only increasing firm A’s demand of informed consumers.
It can be shown that a ∆p above ∆p˜ is not optimal if the optimal price difference for informed
consumers ∆p∗ = ∆c/3 lies below ∆p˜.2 Thus, there exists no second equilibrium in this case.
For ∆p∗ = ∆c/3 > ∆p˜ a higher price difference than ∆p˜ can arise in equilibrium because
attracting further informed consumers is profitable in this situation. But then ∆p∗ = ∆c/3
describes the only potential equilibrium which is driven by the demand of informed consumers
(standard Hotelling case). Hence, the uniqueness condition (3.12) also suffices to rule out
second equilibria for λ ∈ (1, λc]. 
Proof of Proposition 3.2. 1. To find an upper bound on ∆c for which the equilibrium con-
dition (3.11) is satisfied we determine the point at which f (∆p; β) is a tangent on the
∆p-line.
Tangent condition:
f ′(∆p; β) = 1 ⇔ 3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) = 0 (B.4)
An analytical solution to 3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) = 0 can be found for β = 0.3 Denote this
critical price difference as ∆pta(λ, t).4
Then, the equilibrium condition in (3.11) can be fulfilled if and only if ∆c satisfies the
following condition
∆c ≤ ∆cta ≡ ∆pta(λ, t) − f (∆pta(λ, t); β = 0). (B.5)
2. We next rule out some potentially interior equilibria . First suppose ∆p′ does not satisfy
S OCA, then ∆p′ depicts a profit minimum for firm A. ∆p′ cannot be an equilibrium.
1An analytical solution for (3.11) can be determined in this case: ∆p∗ = ∆c/3.
2Under (3.12) ∆c is weakly lower than ∆p¯ which can rise above 3∆p˜ for λ → 1.
3This is sufficient since β = 0 is the most critical case w.r.t. existence and uniqueness. The reason for this is
that for β > 0 there is a positive weight on the demand of informed consumers which is purely linear.
4∆pta(λ, t) is decreasing in λ.
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Moreover, comparing (3.10) and (B.4) shows that the critical price difference for locally
satisfying S OCA is always lower than ∆pta. Hence, a non–empty set of potentially
interior equilibria is ruled out by local non-concavity.
Secondly, if a potentially interior equilibrium locally satisfies S OCA but S OCA is lo-
cally violated for some larger ∆p, the profit function of firm A is strictly convex for a
sufficiently large non-local price decrease pA. If the convexity is sufficiently large the
profit of firm A is increasing for large non-local price decreases. Thus, a non-local devi-
ation becomes profitable for firm A.5 Given the non-decreasing convexity of πA in −pA
the optimal deviation of firm A is such that firm A serves the entire demand of unin-
formed consumers, i.e. pdA s.t. ∆pd = ∆pmax. Decreasing pdA further is not profitable
since firm A only attracts informed consumers while its profit margin goes down for
informed and uninformed consumers.6 In the following we can restrict our attention to
price deviations by firm A that steal the entire demand of uninformed consumers.
0.5 1.0 1.5
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
pA
πA(pA, p∗B)
The Figure shows the profit of firm A, πA(pA, p∗B), as a function of its own price given
pB = p∗B for ∆c = 1 (cA = 0, cB = 1) and parameter values of β = 0, t = 1, and λ = 3:
p∗A = 1.17309, p∗B = 1.55863, pdA = 0.80863, ∆p∗ = 0.385537, and ∆pmax = ∆p˜ =
3/4.
Figure B.1: Non-existence
5Figure B.1 shows an example of an potentially interior equilibrium in which deviating by firm A is profitable.
6For situations with λ → 1, in which ∆p∗ > ∆pmax can arise, it can be shown that non-concavity of πA is not
a problem.
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In such a situation firm A sets pdA = p∗B − ∆pmax. For β = 0 the firm A’s deviation profit,
πdA, is equal to (pdA − cA) · 1 while for β ∈ (0, 1] it is equal to (pdA − cA) · φ(∆pmax; β) with
φ(∆pmax; β) ≡ β · xˆin(∆pmax) + (1 − β) · 1. Using that pdA = p∗B − ∆pmax we receive
πdA =
(
p∗B − ∆pmax − cA
)
· φ(∆pmax; β)
=
(1 − φ
φ′
+ ∆c − ∆pmax
)
· φ(∆pmax; β) by FOCB
=
(
∆pnd +
φ
φ′
− ∆pmax
)
· φ(∆pmax; β) by (3.11) (B.6)
For non–deviation, firm A’s profit is equal to πA(∆p∗) = (p∗A − cA)φ, which is equivalent
to φ2/φ′ by FOCA.
Thus, deviation of firm A is not profitable if and only if πA(∆p∗) ≥ πdA.7 Rearranging
yields the required non–deviation condition
∆p ≤ ∆pnd ≡ ∆pmax − φ · (φ(∆p
max; β) − φ)
φ′ · φ(∆pmax; β) .
In Lemma B.1 in the appendix we show that ∆pnd is uniquely determined by this non–
deviation condition if ∆pnd , ∆pmax and that the set of non–negative∆pnd is non–empty.
Combining this with the equilibrium condition (3.11) we get that existence of interior
equilibria is ensured for non–negative ∆pnd if and only if ∆c ≤ ∆cnd ≡ ∆pnd − f (∆pnd).
However, ∆pnd can become negative if the degree of loss aversion becomes too high.
Here deviation is profitable even for symmetric settings (∆c = 0). But an upper limit on
the amount of uninformed consumers can reinforce existence of symmetric equilibria in
this case. In the second part of Lemma B.1 the critical level of loss aversion for which
∆pnd becomes negative is determined and the critical level of β as a function of λ for
∆c = 0, βcrit(λ), is defined.
3. Any equilibrium is interior because discontinuity of firm A’s best response function rules
out non–interior equilibria.

7We assume that firm A does not deviate from an interior strategy if it is indifferent between deviating and
playing the interior best-response.
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Existence result completed
Lemma B.1: 1. For λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2], ∆pnd ≥ 0 is uniquely determined by the non–
deviation condition in (3.14),
∆pnd(∆c ≥ 0, β = 0) =
{
∆p | ∆p = ∆pmax −
φ ·
(
φ(∆pmax; β) − φ
)
φ′ · φ(∆pmax; β) ,∆p , ∆p
max
}
,
2. For λ > 1 + 2
√
2, ∃ βcrit(λ) ≥ 0 s.t. ∆pnd(∆c = 0, β = βcrit(λ)) = 0.
Proof of Lemma B.1. First note that the non–deviation condition is trivially satisfied at ∆p =
∆pmax (see Figure B.2 below for a graphical illustration of the non–deviation condition). It can
be shown that ∆p + φ·(φ(∆p
max;β)−φ)
φ′·φ(∆pmax;β) approaches ∆p
max from above for ∆p < ∆pmax. At ∆p = 0,
∆p + φ·(φ(∆p
max;β)−φ)
φ′·φ(∆pmax;β) is strictly increasing and strictly concave. Moreover, ∆p +
φ·(φ(∆pmax;β)−φ)
φ′·φ(∆pmax;β) is
continues and exhibits at most one saddle point for ∆p ≤ ∆pmax. Taken together, there exists
a unique ∆p < ∆pmax at which the non–deviation condition is satisfied. Denoting this ∆p by
∆pnd, ∆pnd ≤ 0 if and only if at ∆p = 0, ∆p + φ·(φ(∆pmax;β)−φ)
φ′·φ(∆pmax;β) ≤ ∆pmax. It can be shown that
∀t > 0 and β = 0 this holds if and only if λ ∈ (1, 1 + 2√2].
It can be shown that the non–deviation condition is continuous and monotonous in β.
For λ > 1 + 2
√
2 the non–deviation condition can be reinforced if β > 0. Solving for βcrit(λ)
in ∆pnd(∆c = 0, β = βcrit(λ) > 0) = 0 yields
βcrit0 (λ) ≡ 1 −
−λ(5λ + 14) + √(3λ + 5)(λ(11λ(λ + 5) + 113) + 77) − 13
2(λ − 1)(λ + 3) , (B.7)
for λ ∈ (1 + 2√2, λc] (i.e. ∆pmax = ∆p˜) and
βcrit1 (λ) ≡ 1 −
37λ3 − 21Λλ2 + 177λ2 − 54Λλ + 247λ − 21Λ − Ω + 83
2
(
12λ3 − 7Λλ2 + 46λ2 − 10Λλ + 8λ + 17Λ − 66) (B.8)
with Ω ≡ (4λ6 − 2Λλ5 + 1596λ5 − 918Λλ4 + 19848λ4 − 9316Λλ3 + 91384λ3 − 31228Λλ2 +
197268λ2 − 42618Λλ + 201868λ − 20366Λ + 78880)1/2
and Λ ≡
√
3λ2 + 14λ + 15 for λ > λc (i.e. ∆pmax = ∆p¯). For λ → ∞ it holds that βcrit1 (λ) →
1 − −37+21
√
3+
√
4−2
√
3
−24+14
√
3
≈ 0.577. Compare Figure 3.3. 
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∆p
∆p + φ·(φ(∆p
max;β)−φ)
φ′·φ(∆pmax;β) : solid, ∆p
max : dashed
The Figure shows the non–deviation condition of firm A, as a function of the price
difference ∆p for ∆c = 0.25 (cA = 0.25, cB = 0.5) and parameter values of β = 0,
t = 1, and λ = 3: ∆pnd = 0.27889, ∆cnd = (∆pnd − f (∆pnd; 0)) = 0.75963, ∆pmax =
∆p˜ = 3/4, and ∆p¯ = 0.83485. non–deviation for ∆p ≤ ∆pnd = 0.27889.
Figure B.2: non–deviation for asymmetric industries
B.3 Proofs of Section 3.4
Proof of Proposition 3.3. For ∆c = 0 we get by (3.11), (3.12), and f (0; β) = 0 that ∆p∗(β) = 0
is the unique equilibrium ∀β ∈ [0, 1] (provided it exists). Rearranging (FOCi) and applying
that φ(0, β) = 1/2 for all β yields
p∗i − ci =
1
2
φ′(0; β) ∀i ∈ {A, B},
B.3. PROOFS OF SECTION 3.4 107
where
φ′(0; β) = − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) − (1 − β)
2(S (0))
(
0 − (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
= − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) + (1 − β)
2 λ+12(λ−1)
( (λ + 2)
2t(λ − 1)
)
= − 1
4t
(1 − 3β) + (1 − β)(λ + 2)
2t(λ + 1)
=
1
4t(λ + 1)
(
2(λ + 1) − (1 − β)(λ − 1)
)
.
This gives rise to (3.17). 
Proof of Proposition 3.4.
d∆p∗(∆c)
d∆c = −
(φ′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) · (−1) (B.9)
=
(φ′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ)
Since φ′ is strictly positive and denominator of d∆p∗(∆c)/d∆c is equivalent to the tangent
condition (B.4). We obtain that
d∆p∗(∆c)
d∆c > 0 (B.10)
if ∆p < ∆pta(λ, t). Moreover, since φ′′(1−2φ) = 0 for ∆c = 0 (i.e. ∆p = 0, compare symmetric
equilibrium ) and φ′′(1 − 2φ) ≤ 0 for ∆c > 0 it holds true that d∆p∗(∆c)/d∆c ≥ 1/3. 
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
dm∗A(∆p∗(∆c))
d∆c =
∂m∗A
∂∆p∗
· ∂∆p
∗
∂∆c
,
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where by (FOCA)
∂m∗A
∂∆p∗
=
∂p∗A
∂∆p∗
=
(φ′)2 − φ′′ · φ
(φ′)2 ≷ 0, (B.11)
which may be positive or negative for β < 1. Firm A’s markup is increasing in the price
difference if the price difference is rather low and the share of uninformed consumers is not too
high. It is decreasing for large price differences and/or if the share of uninformed consumers
is high. Using (B.9) we receive that
dm∗A(∆p∗(∆c))
d∆c =
(φ′)2 − φ′′ · φ
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) ≷ 0. (B.12)
Hence m∗A is not strictly increasing in ∆p∗. Firm A’s markup decreases in the price difference if
the price difference, i.e. if the cost asymmetries in the industry, and/or the share of uninformed
consumers become too large. (Compare markup of B.) 
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
dm∗B(∆p∗(∆c))
d∆c =
∂m∗B
∂∆p∗
· ∂∆p
∗
∂∆c
,
where by (FOCB)
∂m∗B
∂∆p∗
=
∂p∗B
∂∆p∗
=
−(φ′)2 − φ′′ · (1 − φ)
(φ′)2 < 0, (B.13)
which is always negative for all β. Using (B.9) we obtain that
dm∗B(∆p∗(∆c))
d∆c = −
(φ′)2 + φ′′ · (1 − φ)
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) < 0. (B.14)

Proof of Proposition 3.7. Recall that the equilibrium is implicitly characterized by
∆p − ∆c − 1 − 2φ(∆p; β)
φ′(∆p; β) = 0
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The equilibrium price difference then satisfies
d∆p∗(β)
dβ = −
(
1 − −2(φ
′)2 − φ′′(1 − 2φ)
(φ′)2
)−1(
−
−2φ′ ∂φ
∂β
− ∂φ′
∂β
(1 − 2φ)
φ′2
)
= − (φ
′)2
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ) ·
(2φ′φβ + φ′β − 2φ′βφ
(φ′)2
)
= −
2φ′φβ + φ′β(1 − 2φ)
3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ)
We show that the numerator of d∆p
∗(β)
dβ , denoted by N(∆p∗; β) = −(2φ′φβ + φ′β(1 − 2φ)) is
negative: For all ∆p with 0 ≤ ∆p ≤ ∆pmax and for all β ∈ [0, 1], we can rewrite
N(∆p; β) = −2φ′φβ − φ′β(1 − 2φ) = 2((1 − β)xˆ′un + β
1
2t
) · (xˆun − xˆin)
+(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − 2(1 − β)xˆun − 2βxˆin)
=
1
t
(xˆun − xˆin) + (xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − 2xˆin)
=
1
t
xˆun + (xˆ′un)(1 − 2xˆin) −
1
2t
=
1
t
(xˆun + 12) − xˆ
′
un(2xˆin − 1)
= −2txˆ′un · (xˆin −
1
2
) + 1(xˆun − 12)
= −2txˆ′un(∆p)(xˆin(∆p) −
1
2
) + (xˆun(∆p) − 12)
Since N(0; β) = 0 and
∂N(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= −1
t
(
2txˆ′′un(∆p)(xˆin(∆p) −
1
2
) + 2t(xˆ′un(∆p))(xˆ′in(∆p)) − xˆ′un(∆p)
)
= −1
t
(
2txˆun(∆p)(xˆin(∆p) − 12) + 0 − 0
)
< 0
it holds that N(∆p∗; β) < 0 for all admissible ∆p, β.
Consider now the denominator of d∆p
∗(β)
dβ , denoted by D(∆p∗; β) = 3(φ′)2 + φ′′(1 − 2φ). We
show that on the relevant domain of price differences D(∆p∗; β) is strictly positive. We have
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that
D(0; β) = 3(φ′(0; β))2 + φ′′(0; β) · 0
= 3(φ′(0; β))2 > 0
The sign of the derivative is of ambiguous sign:
∂D(∆p; β)
∂∆p
= 6φ′φ′′ + φ′′′(1 − 2φ) − 2φ′′φ′
= 4φ′φ′′ + φ′′′(1 − 2φ)
Thus D(∆p∗; β) is not necessarily non–negative. However, since D(∆p∗; β) is equivalent to the
tangent condition (B.4) which approaches zero at ∆p = ∆pta(λ, t) we conclude that
d∆p∗(β)
dβ < 0 (B.15)
for ∆p < ∆pta(λ, t), which is the relevant domain for equilibrium existence. 
Proof of Proposition 3.8.
dp∗A(∆p∗(β); β)
dβ =
∂p∗A
∂∆p∗
· ∂∆p
∗
∂β
+
∂p∗A
∂β
,
where
∂p∗A
∂∆p∗
=
(φ′)2 − φ′′ · φ
(φ′)2 ≷ 0,
which may be positive or negative. Hence p∗A is not strictly increasing in ∆p∗. Firm A’s
prices goes down in the price difference if the price difference becomes too large, i.e. if the
cost asymmetries in the industry or the share of uninformed consumers becomes too large.
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(Compare price of B.)
∂p∗A
∂β
=
φ′φβ − φ′βφ
(φ′)2
= −
[
((1 − β)xˆ′un + βxˆ′in)(xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆ′un − xˆ′in) · ((1 − β)xˆun + βxˆin)
]
· 1
φ′2
= −
[
(1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) − (1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) 12t (xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆun −
1
2t
)xˆin
]
· 1
φ′2
= −
[ 1
2t
xˆun − xˆ′un xˆin
]
· 1
φ′2
The numerator of ∂p
∗
A
∂β
is independent of β.
∂p∗A
∂β
(∆p = 0) = −1
2
( 1
2t
− xˆ′un(0)
)
· 1
φ′(0)2 < 0
∂p∗A
∂β
(∆p = ∆p¯ − ǫ) = −
(
1
2t xˆun − xˆ′un xˆin
)
φ′2
> 0
for ǫ small because the numerator is positive for ∆p slightly less than ∆p¯. This implies that
∂p∗A
∂β
= 0 for some ∆p ∈ (0,∆pmax),∀β. 
Proof of Proposition 3.9.
dp∗B(∆p∗(β); β)
dβ =
∂p∗B
∂∆p∗
· ∂∆p
∗
∂β
+
∂p∗B
∂β
,
where
∂p∗B
∂∆p∗
=
−(φ′)2 − φ′′(1 − φ)
(φ′)2 = −
(
1 + φ
′′(1 − φ)
(φ′)2
)
< 0
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In contrast to A, the price of B is always decreasing in ∆p∗(β).
∂p∗B
∂β
=
−φ′φβ − φ′β(1 − φ)
(φ′)2
= −
[
− ((1 − β)xˆ′un + β
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − (1 − β)xˆun − βxˆin)
]
· 1(φ′)2
= −
[
− (1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin) + (1 − β)(xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(xˆun − xˆin)
− 1
2t
(xˆun − xˆin) − (xˆ′un −
1
2t
)(1 − xˆin)
]
· 1(φ′)2
= −
[
− 1
2t
(xˆun) − (xˆ′un −
1
2t
) + xˆ′un xˆin
]
· 1(φ′)2 ≶ 0

B.4 Proofs of Section 3.5
Proof of Proposition 3.10. The derivation of the indifferent uninformed consumer with α–
extended preferences is analogous to the derivation of the indifferent uninformed consumer
for α = 1 provided in the proof of Lemma 3.1. With α–extended preferences the location
equals
xˆun(∆p; λ, α) = 1 + α(2λ − 1)2α(λ − 1) −
∆p
4t
−
√
∆p2
16t2 −
(α(2λ + 1) + 3)
4αt(λ − 1) ∆p +
(αλ + 1)2
4α2(λ − 1)2 . (B.16)
By solving for λ in equation (3.19) we receive
λ(λ′, α′) = 1 + α
′(2λ′ − 1)
1 + α′
. (B.17)
Since λ(λ′, α′ = 1) = λ′ and ∂λ/∂α′ = 2(λ′−1)/(1+α′)2 > 0, λ shows the required properties.

Proof of Proposition 3.11. First consider informed consumers’ utility: We find ui(x, pi) = (vi−
pi)− t|yi− x| = −p˜i− t|yi− x| for all i ∈ {A, B} in the first market and ui(x, p′i) = (v′i− p′i)− t|yi− x|
for all i ∈ {A, B} in the second market. Since in the second market quality levels are identical
(∆v′ = 0), it holds true that xˆin(∆p˜) = xˆin(∆p′) for ∆p′ = ∆p−∆v. If uninformed consumers use
quality-adjusted prices for determining their reference point distribution in the price dimension
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we also receive xˆun(∆p˜) = xˆun(∆p′) for ∆p′ = ∆p−∆v by the same argument. Finally, compare
firms’ maximization problem for both markets. Firm A solves
max
p˜A
πA(p˜A, p˜B) = (p˜A + vA − cA)[β · xˆin(p˜B − p˜A) + (1 − β) · xˆun(p˜B − p˜A)] and
max
p′A
πA(p′A, p′B) = (p′A − c′A)[β · xˆin(p′B − p′A) + (1 − β) · xˆun(p′B − p′A)].
Firm A’s equilibrium prices are identical iff markups in both markets are identical, i.e. p˜A +
vA − cA = p′A − c′A, and both demand functions are identical, i.e. ∆p′ = ∆p −∆v. Analogously,
for firm B this holds true iff p˜B + vB − cB = p′B − c′B and ∆p′ = ∆p−∆v. Finally, taking markup
differences between firms we get ∆p˜ +∆v−∆c = ∆p−∆c in first market and ∆p′ −∆c′ in the
second market. For ∆p′ = ∆p−∆v both markup differences are the same iff ∆c′ = ∆c−∆v. 
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Table B.1: Small Cost Differences:
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, cA = 0.25, cB = 0.5:
β p∗A(β) p∗B(β) ∆p∗(β) qA(∆p∗) xˆin(∆p∗) xˆun(∆p∗) π∗A π∗B CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.33333 1.41667 0.0833333 0.541667 0.541667 0.532453 0.586806 0.420139 1.37674 1.37674 1.16648
0.8 1.37274 1.45643 0.0836887 0.539995 0.541844 0.532597 0.606272 0.439961 1.29508 1.33717 1.12672
0.6 1.41524 1.49932 0.0840806 0.538326 0.54204 0.532755 0.627281 0.461361 1.21022 1.29448 1.08382
0.4 1.46121 1.54572 0.0845149 0.536662 0.542257 0.532931 0.650008 0.484522 1.12178 1.24832 1.03742
0.2 1.51103 1.59603 0.0849986 0.535002 0.542499 0.533127 0.674653 0.509652 1.02934 1.19828 0.987112
0.0 1.56518 1.65072 0.0855405 0.533347 0.54277 0.533347 0.701446 0.536986 0.932421 1.14388 0.932421
Table B.2: Intermediate Cost Differences
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, cA = 0.25, cB = 1:
Prices of both firms are first increasing and then decreasing in β.
β p∗A(β) p∗B(β) ∆p∗(β) qA(∆p∗) xˆin(∆p∗) xˆun(∆p∗) π∗A π∗B CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.5 1.75 0.25 0.625 0.625 0.605992 0.78125 0.28125 1.14063 1.14063 0.834921
0.8 1.5039 1.758 0.254109 0.62324 0.627054 0.60798 0.781477 0.285586 1.07357 1.13519 0.827071
0.6 1.50553 1.76414 0.25861 0.621651 0.629305 0.61017 0.780502 0.289112 1.00758 1.13188 0.821115
0.4 1.50448 1.76803 0.263546 0.62026 0.631773 0.612585 0.778104 0.29165 0.942908 1.13111 0.81744
0.2 1.50029 1.76925 0.26896 0.619097 0.63448 0.615251 0.774048 0.293008 0.879835 1.13332 0.816464
0.0 1.49248 1.76737 0.274896 0.618194 0.637448 0.618194 0.768092 0.292988 0.818625 1.13897 0.818625
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Table B.3: Large Cost Differences:
The table shows the analytical solution of the market equilibria for parameter values of t = 1, λ = 3, cA = 0.25, cB = 1.25:
Non–existence for β = 0 (see Figure B.1). qA(∆p∗) is decreasing in β, i.e. uninformed consumers are easier to attract than informed
consumers. Reason: Due to large price differences loss aversion in price dimension dominates loss aversion in taste dimension.
Uninformed consumers are more willing to buy the less expensive product.
β p∗A(β) p∗B(β) ∆p∗(β) qA(∆p∗) xˆin(∆p∗) xˆun(∆p∗) π∗A π∗B CS ∗ CS ∗in CS ∗un
1.0 1.58333 1.91667 0.333333 0.666667 0.666667 0.648371 0.888889 0.222222 1.02778 1.02778 0.673468
0.8 1.5623 1.90417 0.341863 0.66734 0.670931 0.652973 0.875753 0.217615 0.974147 1.04598 0.686806
0.6 1.5361 1.88738 0.351282 0.668631 0.675641 0.658117 0.859926 0.211208 0.923306 1.06911 0.7046
0.4 1.5043 1.86596 0.361666 0.670654 0.680833 0.663868 0.841199 0.202865 0.87537 1.09757 0.727236
0.2 1.46663 1.83971 0.373075 0.673535 0.686538 0.670284 0.819444 0.192519 0.830299 1.13163 0.754968
0.0 - - - - - - - - - - -
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
C.1 Proofs of Section 4.3
Proof of Proposition 4.1. (i) Comparing the respective necessary conditions for profit max-
imization and invoking the assumption of symmetry between the two profit functions, we
obtain
∂πA
∂pA
(pA, pB) = −ω ∂πB∂pA (pA, pB) ≤
∂πB
∂pB
(pA, pB) = 0.
Since the slope of πA is smaller than that of πB for any chosen (pA(ω), pB(ω)) given
ω > 0, it follows from the strict concavity of πA in pA that pOA(ω) ≥ pOB(ω).
(ii) It follows directly from the above argument and Assumption (i) invoking symmetric
profit functions that πA(pOA(ω), pOB (ω)) ≤ πB(pOA (ω), pOB(ω)) for all ω > 0.
(iii) Differentiating twice the two necessary conditions and inverting the matrix of derivatives,
we obtain 
∂pOA
∂ω
∂pOB
∂ω
 = −1a4a1 − a3a2
 a4 −a3−a2 a1

 ∂πB∂pA0
 , (C.1)
so that we have to evaluate
∂pOA
∂ω
=
−a4
a4a1 − a3a2
∂πB
∂pA
(C.2)
and
∂pOB
∂ω
=
a2
a4a1 − a3a2
∂πB
∂pA
, (C.3)
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where
a1 ≡
∂2πA
∂p2A
+ ω
∂2πB
∂p2A
, (C.4)
a2 ≡
∂2πB
∂pA∂pB
, (C.5)
a3 ≡
∂2πA
∂pA∂pB
+ ω
∂2πB
∂pA∂pB
, (C.6)
and
a4 ≡
∂2πB
∂p2B
. (C.7)
The denominator of the right hand fraction, a4a1 − a3a2 , is positive under assumptions
(iii) and (iv). Both numerators −a4 and a2 are positive by the same assumptions. Hence
both (C.2) and (C.3) are positive, by Assumption (ii).
Towards seeing that ∂p
O
A
∂ω
>
∂pOB
∂ω
, observe that ∂p
O
A
∂ω
≷
∂pOB
∂ω
iff −a4 ≷ a2 . But −a4 > a2 by the
second part of Assumption (iv).
(iv) Differentiating πA(pOA (ω), pOB(ω)) and πB(pOA(ω), pOB(ω)), we obtain
∂πA
∂ω
(pOA (ω), pOB(ω)) =
∂πA
∂pA
∂pA
∂ω
+
∂πA
∂pB
∂pB
∂ω
(C.8)
and
∂πB
∂ω
(pOA(ω), pOB(ω)) =
∂πB
∂pA
∂pA
∂ω
+
∂πB
∂pB
∂pB
∂ω
. (C.9)
In (C.8) ∂πA
∂pA
tends to zero at (pOA(ω), pOB(ω)) when ω → 0, so that the first term is close
to zero in that neighborhood. The second term is positive throughout, so that πOA(ω)
increases up to some ωO. By the second part of Assumption (ii) and the second part of
(iii) above, the negative first term must eventually dominate the positive second one as
ω increases, so that ∂πB
∂ω
< 0.
In (C.9) the two components of the first term are positive by Assumption (ii) and Propo-
sition 4.1 (ii), respectively, whilst the first component of the second term is zero by the
necessary condition, so that ∂πB
∂ω
≥ 0 for all positive ω.

Proof of Proposition 4.2. (i) Below, under (iii) we show that pMA (ω) increases and pMB (ω)
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decreases in ω. By Assumption (i) we know that pMA (ω) = pMB (ω) at ω = 1. To satisfy
this equality, it must hold that pMA (ω) ≤ pMB (ω) for ω < 1 and pMA (ω) ≥ pMB (ω) for ω > 1.
(ii) Below, under (iv) we show that πA(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) decreases and πB(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) in-
creases in ω. By Assumption (i) we know that πA(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) = πB(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) at
ω = 1. To satisfy this equality, it must hold that πA(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) > πB(pMA (ω), pMB (ω))
for ω < 1 and πA(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) < πB(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) for ω > 1.
(iii) Differentiating twice the two necessary conditions and inverting the matrix of derivatives,
we obtain 
∂pMA
∂ω
∂pMB
∂ω
 = −1b4b1 − b3b2
 b4 −b3−b2 b1
 ∂πB∂pA∂πB
∂pB
(C.10)
where
b1 ≡
∂2πA
∂p2A
+ ω
∂2πB
∂p2A
, (C.11)
b2 = b3 ≡
∂2πA
∂pA∂pB
+ ω
∂2πB
∂pA∂pB
. (C.12)
and
b4 ≡
∂2πA
∂p2B
+ ω
∂2πB
∂p2B
. (C.13)
As before, b4b1 − b3b2 is positive under assumptions (iii) and (iv). Both numerators −b4
and b2 are positive by the same assumptions. Hence by (C.10) ∂p
M
A
∂ω
> 0 and ∂p
M
B
∂ω
< 0 if
b4
∂πB
∂pA
− b3
∂πB
∂pB
< 0 (C.14)
and
−b3
∂πB
∂pA
+ b1
∂πB
∂pB
> 0. (C.15)
Assumption (ii) ensures that
∂πB
∂pB
∂πB
∂pA
≤ −1. To ensure the inequalities (C.14) and (C.15),
respectively, we need that both |b4| > b3 and |b1| > b3. For given ω both inequalities are
ensured by Assumption (iv).
(iv) Differentiating πA(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) and πB(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)),
∂πA
∂ω
(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) =
∂πA
∂pA
∂pA
∂ω
+
∂πA
∂pB
∂pB
∂ω
(C.16)
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and
∂πB
∂ω
(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)) =
∂πB
∂pA
∂pA
∂ω
+
∂πB
∂pB
∂pB
∂ω
, (C.17)
we see that ∂πA
∂ω
≤ 0 follows directly from the fact that ∂πA
∂pA
≤ 0 at (pMA (ω), pMB (ω)),
Assumption (i) and Proposition 4.2 (iii). ∂πB
∂ω
≥ 0 follows from the symmetric argument.

C.2 Proofs of Section 4.4
Proof of Proposition 4.5. First we show that for any given ω > 0 it is optimal to choose a
direct mode of acquisition because this maximizes I1’s participation in acquisition gains from
an investment in B. Then we establish that given a direct mode of acquisition ω = 1/α0A
maximizes I1’s payoff.
1. Consider the second term of (4.17). For given ω and α0A, if [πkB(ω) − πOB(0)] is positive
(resp. negative), investor I1 wants the weight, g(αB, γ;α0A) ≡ (αB + α0Aγ)/(αB + γ), to
be as large (resp. small) as possible. However, g(αB, γ;α0A) is maximized for αB > 0,
γ = 0, i.e. g(αB, 0;α0A) = 1, and minimized for αB = 0, γ > 0, i.e. g(0, γ;α0A) = α0A.
Next, we have to distinguish the cases of control vs. no control:
• k = O :
[πOB (ω)−πOB (0)] > 0 for ω > 0 since πOB (ω) is strictly increasing in ω by Proposition
4.1. Hence, αB > 0, γ = 0 is optimal and we receive
ΠO1 (ω) = α0A · πOA(ω) + [πOB(ω) − πOB(0)]. (C.18)
• k = M :
Since for ω = 0 investor I1 only cares about the profit in firm A, we cannot rule out
that [πMB (0) − πOB (0)] < 0.
By symmetry and no firm shut (Assumption (v)) πMA (ω) + πMB (ω) is maximized
at ω = 1. By the principle of optimization we also know that πMB (1) > πOB(0)
because πMB (1) is the profit resulting from maximizing the equally weighted sum
of profits at coordinated prices, whilst πOB (0) is the symmetric NE profit. Thus,
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[πMB (1) − πOB(0)] > 0.
Since by Proposition 4.2 (iv) πMB (ω) strictly increases forω, ∃ unique ω¯ ≡ {ω| [πMB (ω)−
πOB(0)] = 0} with ω¯ ∈ [0, 1).
Hence, given maximization / minimization of g(αB, γ;α0A) for given ω
ΠM1 (ω) =
 α
0
A · πMA (ω) + α0A · [πMB (ω) − πOB(0)], if ω < ω¯;
α0A · πMA (ω) + [πMB (ω) − πOB (0)], if ω ≥ ω¯ .
(C.19)
Now, since πMA (ω)+πMB (ω) is maximized at ω = 1, α0A ·πMA (ω)+α0A · [πMB (ω)−πOB (0)]
is also maximized at ω = 1. This implies ω > ω¯ and therefore we leave the first
case of (C.19).
Moreover, we can show that ω ≥ 1 in the optimum for the second case of (C.19),
thus we stay in the second case. Suppose not, then ∃ω′ < 1 which maximizes
α0A · πMA (ω)+ [πMB (ω)− πOB(0)]. Now, we use that the first derivative of α0A · πMA (ω)+
[πMB (ω) − πOB (0)] w.r.t. ω can be expressed as
α0A · [
∂πMA (ω)
∂ω
+
∂πMB (ω)
∂ω
] + (1 − α0A) ·
∂πMB (ω)
∂ω
.
Since the sum of profits is maximized at ω = 1 we must have that [∂πMA (ω)/∂ω +
∂πMB (ω)/∂ω] is positive for all ω < 1. At the same time ∂πMB (ω)/∂ω is positive for
all ω by Proposition 4.2. Thus, for α0A < 1, ΠM1 (ω) is strictly increasing in ω for all
ω < 1. This contradicts ω′ < 1 being optimal. This implies ω ≥ 1 > ω¯.
Hence, αB > 0, γ = 0 is optimal in the monopoly and the relevant payoff function
is the payoff function of second case of (C.19)
ΠM1 (ω) = α0A · πMA (ω) + [πMB (ω) − πOB (0)]. (C.20)
Combining the oligopoly case and monopoly case yields the following payoff function
Πk1(ω) = α0A · πkA(ω) + [πkB(ω) − πOB(0)], k = O, M. (C.21)
2. We now derive the optimal ω.1 We therefore show that if I1 maximizes the payoff func-
tion in (C.21) over ω ∈ [0, 1/α0A], then ω = 1/α0A is a unique global maximizer and
1Due to free-riding of the remaining shareholders in A we can restrict to αA = α0A wlog.
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k = M.
To provide this result we use a revelation principle argument for I1’s payoff function in
the monopoly case and then receive global optimality by the principal of optimization.
First reconsider (4.8) in Section 4.3.2—the maximization problem of I1 in product mar-
ket stage for k = M and for given ω. The arg max of this problem is denoted by
(pMA (ω), pMB (ω)). (Cf. Proposition 4.2)
Next, turn back to case 3 in the acquisition stage:
Maximizing Πk1(ω) in (C.21) over ω in the monopoly case (k = M) is equivalent to
max
ω∈[0,1/α0A]
Π1(ω) = πMA (ω) +
1
α0A
πMB (ω).2 (C.22)
Moreover, (C.22) is equivalent to
max
pA,pB
πA(pA, pB) + 1
α0A
πB(pA, pB) s.t. (pA, pB) ∈ {(pMA (ω), pMB (ω))|ω ∈ [0, 1/α0A]}.
(C.23)
The objective function of (C.23) is identical to the objective function of (4.8) for ω =
1/α0A. Since we know that (pMA (1/α0A), pMB (1/α0A)) is a maximizer of (4.8) for ω = 1/α0A,
it is a maximizer of the unconstrained problem of (C.23) as well. (pMA (1/α0A), pMB (1/α0A))
is also a maximizer of the constrained problem of (C.23) because it lies in the constraint
set {(pMA (ω), pMB (ω))|ω ∈ [0, 1/α0A]}. Therefore we get that ω = 1/α0A is a maximizer of
(C.22). It is the unique maximizer of (C.22) by Proposition 4.2 (iii).
Finally, since the unique maximizer in the monopoly case, ω = 1/α0A, can always be
achieved by the investor with an entire direct investment, αB = 1, γ = 0 , we know by
the principle of optimization that ω = 1/α0A is the unique maximizer of (C.21). This
implies that the investor will choose control in the optimum (k = M).

Proof of Proposition 4.6. The result follows directly from the assumption that the unweighed
sum of profits is maximized at ω = 1 (Assumption (v)). 
2The constant can be ignored.
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